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Abstract
Flow-sensitive labels used by dynamic enforcement mechanisms
might themselves encode sensitive information, which can leak. Meta-
labels, employed to represent the sensitivity of labels, exhibit the same
problem. This paper derives a new family of enforcers—k-Enf , for
2 ≤ k ≤ ∞—that uses label chains, where each label defines the sensi-
tivity of its predecessor. These enforcers satisfy Block-safe Noninter-
ference (BNI), which proscribes leaks from observing variables, label
chains, and blocked executions. Theorems in this paper characterize
where longer label chains can improve the permissiveness of dynamic
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enforcement mechanisms that satisfy BNI. These theorems depend on
semantic attributes—k-precise, k-varying, and k-dependent—of such
mechanisms, as well as on initialization, threat model, and lattice size.
1 Introduction
Dynamic enforcement mechanisms (which might involve static analysis) for
information flow control employ tags containing labels to represent the sen-
sitivity1 of what variables store. These labels can be flow-sensitive, meaning
that they change when a value with different sensitivity is assigned to the
tagged variable during program execution. Sensitive information might influ-
ence which assignments execute and, consequently, determine how and when
the flow-sensitive label tagging a variable changes. So flow-sensitive labels
can depend on sensitive information.
Inspecting or directly observing flow-sensitive labels might itself leak sen-
sitive information [20]. Consider a program
if m > 0 then w := h else w := l end (1)
Suppose w is tagged with a flow-sensitive label, but the other variables, are
tagged with fixed labels2, which do not change during execution: l is tagged
with fixed label L (i.e., low), m with M (i.e., medium), and h with H (i.e.,
high), where L @ M @ H holds.
(i) If m > 0 holds, then information flows explicitly from h to w and
implicitly from m (in m > 0) to w. When (1) terminates, w should be
tagged with flow-sensitive label H, because H is at least as restrictive
as the label H that tags h and the label M that tags m.
(ii) If m 6> 0 holds, then w should be tagged with flow-sensitive label M
when (1) terminates, because M is at least as restrictive as the labels
that tag l and m.
So, the flow-sensitive label tagging w depends on whether m > 0 holds.
Information about m, which is sensitive, leaks to observers that can learn
that label.
1In this paper, sensitivity refers to confidentiality level.
2Note that variables with fixed labels can model sources or sinks of information.
2
Blocking an execution based on flow-sensitive labels might leak sensitive
information, too. Consider (1), extended with two assignments:
if m > 0 then w := h else w := l end;
m := w; l := 1
(2)
(i) If m > 0 holds, then m := w should be blocked to prevent information
tagged H and stored in w from flowing to m; assignment l := 1 is not
reached.
(ii) If m 6> 0 holds, then m := w does not need to be blocked (because w
stores information tagged M). Assignment l := 1 will execute.
Depending on whether m := w is blocked, principals monitoring variable l
(which is tagged L) either do or do not observe value 1 being assigned to l.
The decision to block m := w depends on the flow-sensitive label of w, which
depends on sensitive information m > 0. So m > 0 is leaked if observers can
detect that m := w is blocked.3
To prevent such leaks, metalabels (e.g., [6]) might be introduced to rep-
resent the sensitivity of information encoded in flow-sensitive labels. For
example, the metalabel for w in (2) would be M, corresponding to the sen-
sitivity of information encoded in the flow-sensitive label tagging w. Only
principals authorized to read information allowed by the metalabel (i.e., M)
would be allowed to observe the label of w. The metalabel that tags w would
also capture the sensitivity of the decision to executem := w and reach l := 1.
To prevent the implicit flow of that information (which is tagged with M) to
variable l (tagged L), assignment l := 1 must not be executed.
Since metalabels are flow-sensitive, they too could encode sensitive infor-
mation that might leak to observers. It is tempting to employ meta-meta
labels to prevent those leaks. However, flow-sensitive meta-meta labels might
then leak. We seem to need a label chain associated with each variable: a
label `1, metalabel `2, meta-meta label `3, etc.
This paper introduces and analyzes dynamic enforcement mechanisms
that employ label chains of arbitrary length. These mechanisms protect
against a threat model where principals observe updates to variables and to
elements of label chains—attackers thus co-resident with the program being
executed.
3In fact, an arbitrary number of bits can be leaked through blocking executions [2].
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We start by formalizing label chains (§2) and defining enforcers (§3).
We next (§4) extend block-safe noninterference (BNI) [22] to stipulate that
sensitive information does not leak to observers of variables and label chains.
BNI extends termination insensitive noninterference (TINI) [37] in order to
proscribe leaks to principals that can observe variables and label chains along
normally terminated and blocked traces. Enforcer ∞-Enf is derived (§5); it
uses label chains of infinite length to enforce BNI. A family k-Enf of enforcers
use finite label chains to approximate the infinite label chains of∞-Enf . Our
k-Enf enforcers also are shown (§6) to satisfy BNI.
A loss of permissiveness could result when shorter label chains approx-
imate longer ones. In particular, with a shorter label chain, execution of
some program might be blocked sooner or fewer principals might be allowed
to observe elements in a label chain—either brings a loss of permissiveness.
This paper formally characterizes the relationship between permissiveness
and storage overhead of label chains having different lengths. We present
theorems that relate label chain length and permissiveness for k-Enf en-
forcers (§7) as well as for other enforcers (§8) that satisfy BNI. The relation-
ships between permissiveness and storage overhead depend on initialization,
threat model, size of the lattice, as well as, on certain semantic attributes of
enforcement mechanisms: k-precise, k-varying, and k-dependent.
Our theorems show that approximating longer label chains with shorter
ones can harm permissiveness. Specifically, we show:
– For k-Enf enforcers, if flexible variables initially store information as-
sociated with given label chains, then approximating these label chains
with shorter ones causes fewer principals to read chain elements, lead-
ing to a permissiveness loss.
– For other enforcers, if flexible variables initially store no information,
then the generated label chains cannot be shortened without a permis-
siveness loss; an example in §8 illustrates.
– An enforcer that uses only one label for each variable blocks some exe-
cutions sooner than an enforcer that uses two labels for each variable.
This blocking harms permissiveness: principals will make fewer obser-
vations in the blocked execution. But, when labels are drawn from a
2-level lattice, associating variables with only one label does not harm
permissiveness.
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In summary, we are identifying conditions under which longer label chains
are useful. Moreover, our conditions apply even if labels are not first-class
entities in the provided programming language but instead are internal to an
enforcement mechanism.
2 Label Chains
Each variable x in a program will be associated with a possibly infinite label
chain 〈`1, `2, . . . , `i, `i+1, . . .〉, where label `1 specifies sensitivity for the value
stored in x and label `i+1 specifies sensitivity for `i. Of course, actual im-
plementation of label chains may only use finite space. Labels come from a
possibly infinite underlying lattice L = 〈L, v, unionsq〉 with bottom element ⊥.
For4 `, `′ ∈ L, if ` v `′ holds, then `′ is at least as restrictive as `, signifying
that information is allowed to flow from data tagged with ` to data tagged
with `′.
Every principal p is assigned a fixed label ` that signifies p can read
variables and labels whose sensitivity is at most `. Thus, if variable x is
tagged with `′ and p is assigned label `, then p is allowed to read x iff `′ v `
holds.
Unless a label chain 〈. . . , `i, `i+1, . . .〉 is monotonically decreasing—`i+1 v
`i for i ≥ 1— then sensitive information can be leaked. Here is why. Con-
sider a variable x having non-monotonically decreasing label chain 〈L,H, . . .〉,
where L @ H. Principals assigned label L are authorized to read the value in
x. When read access to x succeeds, these principals conclude that the label
of x is L. Thus, success in reading x leaks to a principal assigned L infor-
mation about the label of x—even though label chain 〈L,H, . . .〉 defines the
sensitivity of that label to be H. Such leaks cannot occur in monotonically
decreasing label chains.
Label chains are implemented by sequencing individual labels stored in a
memory M . Domain dom(M) of a memory M includes:
– Variables that store (say) integers (ν ∈ Z). Lower case letters (e.g.,
a, w, x, h,m, l) denote variables. M(x) is the integer stored in variable
x by M . Let Var be the set of variables. Constants (e.g., 1, 2, 3) are
a subset of Var whose values are fixed.
4When L = 〈L, v, unionsq〉, we write ` ∈ L to assert that ` ∈ L holds.
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– Tags that store labels (` ∈ L) representing sensitivity. The label for
x is stored at tag T (x) in M ; its value is M(T (x)). Some tags store
labels representing the sensitivity of other tags. The label for T i(x) is
stored in tag T (T i(x)), for i ≥ 1. We say value v when referring to
either a label or an integer.
– Auxiliaries that store additional information needed by an enforcement
mechanism (e.g., a stack to track implicit flows in nested if commands).
The names of auxiliaries are µ1, µ2, etc.
Tags and auxiliaries are called metadata. A possibly infinite label chain
〈T (q), T 2(q), . . . , T i(q), . . .〉 will be associated with each identifier q that is
either a variable or a tag (but not an auxiliary). For convenience, we define
T 0(q) , q and T i+1(q) , T (T i(q)). We also may write T i(q) instead of
M(T i(q)) for that value in memory M if there will be no ambiguity (e.g.,
T i(q) v `, T i(q) unionsq T j(q′)). We require:
∀i ≥ 1: T i(q)∈dom(M) ⇒ T i−1(q)∈dom(M).
The mappings defined by M and T i extend from identifiers to expressions
(of variables or tags) e⊕ e′ in the usual way:
M(e⊕ e′) ,M(e)⊕M(e′) (3)
T i(e⊕ e′) , T i(e) unionsq T i(e′), for i ≥ 1. (4)
Variables are categorized according to whether their label chains may
change during execution. For a flexible variable w, the entire associated
label chain might be updated when a value is assigned to w. So, the label
chain of flexible variable w is flow-sensitive. For an anchor variable a, the
label stored in T (a) remains fixed throughout execution, and the remaining
elements of the label chain satisfy:
M(T i(a)) = ⊥ for any T i(a) ∈ dom(M) with i > 1. (5)
This form of chain is sensible for an anchor variable because T (a) is declared
in the program text and thus that label can be considered public (i.e., T 2(a)
is ⊥) when execution starts. No other information can be encoded in T (a)
during execution because T (a) remains fixed. So, T (a) ought to be con-
sidered public during execution, too. The requirement that label chains be
monotonically decreasing then leads to (5). A constant ν is a special case of
an anchor variable:
M(T i(ν)) = ⊥, for any T i(ν) ∈ dom(M) with i ≥ 1. (6)
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3 Enforcers
Execution of a command C on a memory M can be represented by a trace
τ , which is a potentially infinite sequence
〈C1,M1〉 → 〈C2,M2〉 → . . .→ 〈Cn,Mn〉 → . . .
with C1 = C. A state 〈Ci,Mi〉 gives the command Ci that will next be
executed and gives a memory Mi to be used in that execution. A sequence
τ ′ of states is considered a subtrace of τ iff τ = . . .→ τ ′ → . . .. We write |τ |
to denote the length of τ and τ [i] to denote the ith state in τ for 1 ≤ i ≤ |τ |.
We also write 〈C,M〉 =0 〈C ′,M ′〉 to denote that two states agree on the
command and the values in variables:
– C = C ′,
– dom(M)∩Var = dom(M ′)∩Var , and
– ∀x∈dom(M)∩Var : M(x) = M ′(x).
A set of operational semantics rules is employed to formally define traces.
This paper uses a while-language (Figure 1) with operational semantics rules
R (Figure 2). Notice, R does not reference metadata. Notation M [x 7→ ν]
in AsgnA and AsgnF defines a memory that equals M except x is mapped to
ν. Conditional delimiter exit in rules for If1, If2, Wl1, and Wl2 marks the
end of conditional commands (similar to [30, 32]). When execution of the
corresponding taken branch completes, rule Exit is triggered.5 Notice that Ci
in a state 〈Ci,Mi〉 can be a command C as defined in Figure 1, a termination
delimiter such as stop, or a command involving a conditional delimiter exit.
The rules comprising R define a function traceR(C,M) that maps a com-
mand C and a memory M to the trace that represents the entire execution
of C started with initial memory M . For traceR(C,M) to be well-defined,
M should be healthy for C denoted M |= H(C) and formalized as follows.
Definition 1 (Healthy memory for C). Define
M |= H(C) , ∀x∈Var : (x ∈ C ⇒ x ∈ dom(M))
∧ (x ∈ dom(M)⇒M(x) ∈ Z)
where x∈C indicates that x∈Var appears in C.
5For a while command, the number of times Exit is triggered equals the number of
times rules Wl1 and Wl2 are invoked for this command.
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(Constants) ν ∈ Z
(Anchor variables) a, x ∈ VarA
(Flexible variables) w, x ∈ VarF
(Expressions) e ::= ν | x | e1 ⊕ e2
(Commands) C ::= skip | x := e | C1;C2 |
if e then C1 else C2 end |
while e do C end
Figure 1: Syntax
(Skip) 〈skip,M〉 → 〈stop,M〉 (AsgnA)
ν = M(e)
〈a := e,M〉 → 〈stop,M [a 7→ ν]〉
(AsgnF)
ν = M(e)
〈w := e,M〉 → 〈stop,M [w 7→ ν]〉
(If1)
M(e) 6= 0
〈if e then C1 else C2 end,M〉 → 〈C1; exit,M〉
(If2)
M(e) = 0
〈if e then C1 else C2 end,M〉 → 〈C2; exit,M〉
(Wl1)
M(e) 6= 0
〈while e do C end,M〉 → 〈C;while e do C end; exit,M〉
(Wl2)
M(e) = 0
〈while e do C end,M〉 → 〈exit,M〉
(Exit) 〈exit,M〉 → 〈stop,M〉 (Seq1)
〈C1,M〉 → 〈stop,M ′〉
〈C1;C2,M〉 → 〈C2,M ′〉
(Seq2)
〈C1,M〉 → 〈C ′1,M ′〉 C ′1 6= stop
〈C1;C2,M〉 → 〈C ′1;C2,M ′〉
Figure 2: Structural Operational Semantics R
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By definition, if traceR(C,M) is finite, then it ends with normal termination
state 〈stop,M ′〉.
Executing command C on memory M under the auspices of an enforcer
E leads to a trace τ = traceE(C,M). Memories in states of traceE(C,M)
are expected to store, among other identifiers, metadata employed by E. In
particular, these memories should store label chains of size nE ≥ 1 and a set
AuxE of auxiliaries, as characterized by:
Definition 2 (Healthy memory for E, L, and C). A memory M is healthy
for enforcer E, lattice L, and command C denoted by M |= H(E,L, C), iff
– M |= H(C),
– for each variable x, dom(M) includes exactly nE tags comprising a label
chain, where all tags are mapped to lattice L:
∀x ∈dom(M)∩Var :
(∀1 ≤ i ≤ nE: T i(x) ∈ dom(M) ∧M(T i(x)) ∈ L)
∧ (∀i > nE: T i(x) 6∈ dom(M))
– dom(M) contains requisite auxiliaries AuxE:
∀µ ∈ AuxE: µ ∈ dom(M)
– flexible variables in M have monotonically decreasing label chains,
– anchor variables in M have label chains satisfying (5), and
– constants in M have label chains satisfying (6).
Notice, if M |= H(E,L, C) and x ∈ dom(M), then sensitivity T nE+1(x) of
last element T nE(x) does not belong to dom(M), and thus, T nE+1(x) is not
defined.
An enforcer is also accompanied by mapping InitE from auxiliaries in
AuxE to initial values. Initial memories should satisfy this mapping.
Definition 3 (Initially healthy memory for E, L, and C). A memory M
is defined to be initially healthy for enforcer E, lattice L, and command C
denoted M |= H0(E,L, C) iff:
– M |= H(E,L, C), and
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– auxiliaries AuxE are initialized according to InitE:
∀µ ∈ AuxE: M(µ) = InitE(µ).
We expect that traces traceE(C,M) will satisfy some policy P of interest,
where E blocks traces if needed to satisfy P . So, a trace τ = traceE(C,M)
may end with blocked state 〈block,M ′〉; omitting the blocked state from τ
and projecting only commands and variables should yield a trace prefix of
traceR(C,M).
Definition 4 (Trace prefix).
τ  τ ′ , |τ |≤|τ ′| ∧ l= |τ | ∧ (∀1≤ i<l: τ [i] =0 τ ′[i])
∧ (¬blk(τ) ∧ |τ | <∞ ⇒ τ [l] =0 τ ′[l]))
where blk(τ) holds iff τ ends with a blocked state.
We now can give the formal definition for the enforcers E being considered
in this paper.
Definition 5 (Enforcer). E , 〈traceE, nE,AuxE, InitE〉 is an enforcer on R
if traceE satisfies the following reasonable conditions:
(E0) (∀C,M : traceE(C,M)  traceR(C,M))
(E1) Trace traceE(C,M) is defined when M |= H0(E,L, C) holds.
(E2) For a memory Mi in any state of traceE(C,M), condition Mi |=
H(E,L, C) holds.
(E3) E updates the label chain of a flexible variable w only in performing an
assignment to w, or at exit for a conditional command whose branches
(taken or untaken) contain an assignment to w.6
We say that E is an enforcer on R for P , if the image of function traceE,
which is a set of traces, satisfies P .
6More formally, if 〈C1;C2,M1〉 ∗→ 〈C ′1;C2,M2〉 is a subtrace of traceE(C,M), where
C1 is a subcommand of C, and if “w := e”6∈ C1 holds for a flexible variable w, then the
following should hold:
(∀i ≥ 1: T i(w)∈dom(M1)⇒M1(T i(w)) = M2(T i(w)))
Note, a conditional delimiter (e.g., exit) is not considered a subcommand of C.
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4 Threat Models and BNI
Observations Our threat model has principals observing updates to iden-
tifiers. When an assignment to a flexible variable w is executed, each element
in set O(w) , {w, T (w), . . . , T i(w), . . .} is updated. When an assignment to
an anchor variable a is executed, only O(a) , {a} is updated. A principal
p assigned label ` observes updates to variables and tags q, where T (q) is in
the domain of a memory M and M(T (q)) v ` holds. A similar threat model
is used in [5].
Principals do not observe updates to an identifier q when T (q) 6∈ dom(M)
holds, because q then is not covered by the security policy to be enforced.
That implies principals do not observe updates to the last element of a label
chain. Also, a principal p assigned ` might be allowed to observe updates to
an identifier T j(q) (i.e., T j+1(q) v `) but p might not be allowed to observe
updates to a preceding identifier T i(q) (i.e., T i+1(q) 6v `) for 0 ≤ i < j, due
to monotonically decreasing label chains.
We now formalize the observation available to a principal p assigned label
` when an assignment executes. Define the projection M |S` of a memory M
with respect to label ` and a set S of identifiers:
M |S` , {〈q,M(q)〉 | q∈S ∧ T (q)∈dom(M) ∧ M(T (q))v`}
If an assignment to a variable x is performed and memory M results, then
observation M |O(x)` is generated to p. Notice, M |O(x)` can be empty.
A sequence of observations is generated along with a trace when assign-
ments are performed.
Definition 6 (Sequence of observations). Given a trace τ , define τ |S` to be
sequence θ = Θ1 ⇀ . . . ⇀ Θn of observations involving identifiers in set S
and having sensitivity at most `:
|S` ,  〈C,M〉|S` , 
(〈C,M〉 → 〈C ′,M ′〉 → τ)|S` ,{
M ′|O(x)∩S` ⇀ (〈C ′,M ′〉 → τ)|S` , if C is “x := e;C ′”
(〈C ′,M ′〉 → τ)|S` , otherwise
When S = {T i(x) | 0 ≤ i ≤ k ∧ x ∈ Var}, we abbreviate τ |S` by τ |k` . We
write θ =obs θ
′ to specify equality of sequences of observations with empty
observations omitted, since θ and θ′ are then equivalent for principals.
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This strong threat model produces observations for both variables and
tags. But observations are not generated when identifiers are updated at
execution points other than assignments to variables (e.g., no observation is
generated when a conditional delimiter exit is executed). This is because
enforcers may differ about whether these other updates are performed. And
those differences would make comparison of observations (employed in §7)
problematic.
Block-safe Noninterference Block-safe Noninterference (BNI) is a form
of noninterference [16] that incorporates observations on tags and consid-
ers all finite traces—normally terminated and blocked by the enforcement
mechanism. Formally, BNI stipulates that if two finite traces of the same
command agree on initial values whose sensitivity is at most `, then obser-
vations (involving variables and tags) visible to a principal assigned label `
should be the same. We define k-BNI for k ≥ 0 for settings where observa-
tions are limited to variables and tags T 0, T 1, . . . , T k. Note M |` abbreviates
M |dom(M)` .
Definition 7 (k-BNI).
k-BNI(E,L, C) , (∀` ∈ L: ∀M,M ′:
M |= H0(E,L, C)
∧M ′ |= H0(E,L, C)
∧M |` = M ′|`
∧ τ = traceE(C,M) is finite
∧ τ ′ = traceE(C,M ′) is finite
⇒ τ |k` =obs τ ′|k` )
If k-BNI(E,L, C) holds for every C, then E enforces k-BNI(L).7 If for all
k ≥ 0 and L, enforcer E satisfies k-BNI(L), then we say that E enforces
BNI. Notice that, by definition, k-BNI ignores observations generated by
infinite traces. k-BNI could be strengthened to handle such observations
by in addition requiring that τ |k` in Definition 7 be a prefix of τ ′|k` when τ ′
is infinite. Such a strengthening of Definition 7 does not affect the theory
presented in this paper.
7Notice that if E satisfies (k + 1)-BNI(L), then E satisfies k-BNI(L).
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0-BNI is stronger than TINI enforced by [3,10,12,14,25]. TINI concerns
normally terminated executions but does not consider finite traces that corre-
spond to blocked executions. So TINI ignores traces that become blocked by
the enforcement mechanism and thereby leak sensitive information. 0-BNI
considers all finite traces. So, an enforcement mechanism that satisfies 0-BNI
will satisfy TINI, too. But, an enforcement mechanism that satisfies TINI
might not satisfy 0-BNI. An example is the enforcement mechanism that
executes program (2) as outlined by (i) and (ii) given below that example
in §1. This mechanism satisfies TINI, but it does not satisfy 0-BNI because
the value of m is leaked. Notice that 0-BNI is equivalent to TINI (extended
with observations along traces), when no enforcer is being employed during
program execution (i.e., E is the trivial enforcer that accepts all commands).
0-BNI is weaker than the natural extension of termination sensitive non-
interference (TSNI) [36] for generating observations throughout traces. TSNI
considers infinite and finite traces (terminated normally as well as blocked),
but because 0-BNI ignores infinite traces, 0-BNI allows leaks through ter-
mination channels that already exist in a program (due to non-terminating
while-loops) [15].
We chose to study 0-BNI, so we could focus on leaks introduced by the
enforcer itself. The enforcement techniques of the next section prevent those
leaks. Moreover, they can be extended to enforce TSNI (e.g., would leak
through non-terminating while-loops) using techniques similar to those given
in [6].
5 Enforcer ∞-Enf
We use familiar insights about information flow to formulate an enforcer
∞-Enf that uses infinite label chains (i.e., n∞-Enf = ∞) to enforce BNI for
programs written in the programming language of Figure 1. We later derive
from ∞-Enf the k-Enf family of enforcers that use finite label chains.
5.1 Updating Label Chains of Flexible Variables
When assignment w := e executes in isolation, the value of e flows explicitly
to flexible variable w. So, w should be at least as sensitive as e. Therefore,
just prior to the assignment, ∞-Enf updates tag T (w) with T (e). But with
that update, the value of T (e) flows explicitly to T (w), so ∞-Enf also must
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update tag T 2(w) with T 2(e). Repeating the argument, we conclude that
when executing w := e, enforcer∞-Enf should update tag T i(w) with T i(e),
for i ≥ 0.
Information can also flow implicitly from the context of an assignment to
the target variable of that assignment. Context ctx of a command C is a set
of boolean expressions that includes all guards involved in determining that
C should be reached. If C appears in the body of a conditional command
having guard e, then e belongs to the context of C. For example, consider:
if x > 0 then w := w′ else w := w′′ end (7)
Here, context ctx of w := w′ and w := w′′ is {x > 0}. Notice, if T i(w′) 6=
T i(w′′) holds prior to (7) for some i ≥ 0, then the value in T i(w) after
the if command depends on ctx . Context ctx is prevented from leaking
through T i(w) if we require that T (ctx ) v T i+1(w) holds, where T (ctx ) is
the sensitivity of ctx .
In general, for q a flexible variable or a tag, if q is assigned the value of e
(for e an expression of variables or tags), then information can flow explicitly
from e to q and implicitly from ctx to q. Thus, sensitivity T (q) of q should
be updated to T (e) unionsq T (ctx ). But, this update might also require updating
T i(q) for i ≥ 1. UT (q, e, ctx ) below describes tag updates triggered by q
being updated with e in context ctx :
UT (q, e, ctx ) , T (q) := T (e) unionsq T (ctx );
UT (T (q), T (e) unionsq T (ctx ), ctx )
For w := e in context ctx , UT (w, e, ctx) expands to8
∀i ≥ 1: T i(w) := T i(e) unionsq T (ctx ). (8)
Here, universal quantifier ∀ denotes simultaneous update of infinitely many
identifiers. So, enforcer ∞-Enf will produce a new label chain for w; each
label in that chain is computed according to (8).
5.2 Preventing Leaks through Anchor Variables
Prior to executing a := e for an anchor variable a, an enforcer checks a block
condition Ga:=e. If Ga:=e holds, then the explicit and implicit flows to a in
a := e do not constitute leaks; if Ga:=e does not hold, then execution blocks.
8This expansion uses the fact that the label chain associated with ctx is monotonically
decreasing: T i+1(ctx ) v T i(ctx ).
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But blocking execution might cause implicit flow of sensitive information,
as seen with (2). We avoid this flow by generalizing the definition of ctx to
include block conditions that could have already been checked. This gener-
alization is consistent with the role of ctx : execution of a := e and of any
command that might follow is conditioned on whether Ga:=e holds. If exe-
cution of C depends on Ga:=e being true, then Ga:=e belongs to the context
ctx of C.
We now show how to construct Ga:=e for an assignment a := e in context
ctx . The value of e explicitly flows to a. So, a should be at least as sensitive
as e: T (e) v T (a). Because execution of a := e depends on Ga:=e, the context
of a := e is ctx ∪{Ga:=e}. Information flows implicitly from this context to a.
Variable a should thus be at least as sensitive as T (ctx ∪ {Ga:=e}). We thus
require T (ctx ) unionsq T (Ga:=e) v T (a). So, for Ga:=e to hold, both T (e) v T (a)
and T (ctx ) unionsq T (Ga:=e) v T (a) should hold. We conclude
Ga:=e ⇒ (T (e) v T (a) ∧ T (ctx ) unionsq T (Ga:=e) v T (a))
or equivalently
Ga:=e ⇒ (T (e) unionsq T (ctx ) unionsq T (Ga:=e) v T (a)) . (9)
One possible solution for Ga:=e in (9) is:
Ga:=e , (T (e) unionsq T (ctx ) v T (a)). (10)
To verify that (10) is a solution, first compute sensitivity:
T (Ga:=e) = T ( T (e) unionsq T (ctx ) v T (a) )
= T 2(e) unionsq T 2(ctx ) unionsq T 2(a) {due to (4)}
= T 2(e) unionsq T 2(ctx ) unionsq ⊥ {T 2(a) = ⊥}
= T 2(e) unionsq T 2(ctx ) {` unionsq ⊥ = `} (11)
Substituting T 2(e)unionsqT 2(ctx ) for T (Ga:=e), substituting T (e)unionsqT (ctx ) v T (a)
for Ga:=e in (9), and noticing that T
2(e) unionsq T 2(ctx ) v T (e) unionsq T (ctx ) (due to
monotonically decreasing label chains), equation (9) becomes equivalent to
a true statement, which is what we needed to verify solution (10).
Ga:=e in (10) is used by all dynamic flow sensitive enforcement mecha-
nisms we know. But, we seem to be the first to present it as a solution of
(9).
15
5.3 Operational Semantics for ∞-Enf
Enforcer∞-Enf uses (i) UT (see (8)) for deducing label chains and (ii) Ga:=e
(see (10)) for blocking possibly unsafe assignments. UT and Ga:=e mention
tags for variables and sensitivity T (ctx ) of the context but do not need ctx ,
T 2(ctx ), T 3(ctx ), etc. T (ctx ) is the join of the sensitivity of each guard and
each block condition that determines the reachability of a command. ∞-Enf
uses auxiliaries to maintain T (ctx ):
– cc (conditional context) keeps track of the sensitivity of the guards in
all conditional commands that encapsulate the next command to be
executed, and
– bc (blocking context) keeps track of the sensitivity of information re-
vealed by block conditions that might influence reachability of the next
command executed.
So, Aux∞-Enf = {cc, bc}. We now show how T (ctx ) is defined in terms of cc
and bc.
Auxiliary bc is a tag that (conservatively) stores a label at least as re-
strictive as the sensitivity of all block conditions that could have already
been evaluated. Any observation after assignment a := e reveals information
about Ga:=e and about context ctx in which Ga:=e is evaluated. So, when-
ever a block condition Ga:=e is checked, ∞-Enf updates bc with T (Ga:=e)
and T (ctx ):
bc := T (Ga:=e) unionsq T (ctx ). (12)
From (11) and monotonicity of label chains (i.e., T 2(ctx ) v T (ctx )), we then
get
bc := T 2(e) unionsq T (ctx ) (13)
which is equivalent to (12). No block condition has been evaluated before
execution starts, so bc is initialized to ⊥: Init∞-Enf (bc) = ⊥.
Auxiliary cc is implemented in∞-Enf using a stack. Whenever execution
enters a conditional command, the sensitivity of the corresponding guard is
pushed onto cc; upon exit the top element of cc is popped. bccc will denote
the join of all labels in cc. At the beginning of execution, no conditional
command has been entered, so cc is initialized to the empty stack  with
bc , ⊥. So, we have Init∞-Enf (cc) = .
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(Skip) 〈skip,M〉 → 〈stop,M〉
(AsgnA)
v = M(e) Ga:=e ` = M(T
2(e)) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc)
〈a := e,M〉 → 〈stop,M [a 7→ v, bc 7→ `]〉
(AsgnAFail)
v = M(e) ¬Ga:=e ` = M(T 2(e)) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc)
〈a := e,M〉 → 〈block,M [bc 7→ `]〉
(AsgnF)
v0 = M(e) ∀i ≥ 1: vi = M(T i(e)) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc)
〈w := e,M〉 → 〈stop,M [∀i ≥ 0:T i(w) 7→ vi]〉
Ga:=e is M(T (e)) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc) vM(T (a))
Figure 3: Operational semantics for skip and assignments.
Putting all together, sensitivity T (ctx ) is bccc unionsq bc. Substituting bccc unionsq bc
for T (ctx ) in (10), block condition Ga:=e becomes:
T (e) unionsq bccc unionsq bc v T (a). (14)
Substituting bccc unionsq bc for T (ctx ) in (13), the update of bc becomes:
bc := T 2(e) unionsq bccc unionsq bc. (15)
So, Ga:=e and the update of bc have now been expressed in terms of tags and
auxiliaries that ∞-Enf uses.
Rule AsgnA in Figure 3 uses (14) and (15). If Ga:=e does not hold, then
rule AsgnAFail is triggered. Notice that in AsgnAFail, bc is updated with a la-
bel representing the sensitivity of the context in which execution is blocked.
That label in bc dictates which principals are allowed to learn why an exe-
cution ended (i.e., due to a block versus due to a stop) without sensitive
information leaking.
In Figure 3, Rule AsgnF for assignment w := e to flexible variable w
implements (8), given T (ctx ) = bccc unionsq bc. So, the label chain of w is updated
as follows:
∀i ≥ 1: T i(w) := T i(e) unionsq bccc unionsq bc.
Rules for conditional commands are given in Figure 4. They adopt
techniques employed by other dynamic enforcement mechanisms (e.g., [14])
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to update auxiliary cc and handle implicit flows to variables and meta-
data that could have been updated in untaken branches. When execution
reaches a conditional command C, tuple 〈`,W,A〉 is pushed onto cc (writing
M(cc).push(〈`,W,A〉)); when execution exits C, tuple 〈`,W,A〉 is popped.
Here we define the elements of tuple 〈`,W,A〉.
– Element ` is the sensitivity of the guard e of conditional command
C. Including ` in cc while taken branch Ct of C is executed signifies
that the sensitivity of the context of Ct is the result of augmenting the
sensitivity of the context of C with the sensitivity of guard e.
– Element W is set targetFlex (Cu) of target flexible variables in untaken
branch Cu of C. If w ∈ W , then T i(w) for i ≥ 0 could have been up-
dated if Cu were executed. To capture implicit flow from the context
of Cu to T
i(w), when execution exits C, sensitivity T i+1(w) is aug-
mented with the sensitivity of the context of Cu, which is the same as
the context of Ct.
– Element A is set targetAnchor(Cu) of all anchor variables in untaken
branch Cu. If A is not empty and if Cu would have been executed,
then a block condition could have been evaluated, possibly causing
that execution to be blocked. So, reachability of a command following
C might be influenced by whether Cu has been executed, and thus, it
might be influenced by the context of Cu. So, when execution exits
C, auxiliary bc is augmented with the sensitivity of the context of Cu
(which is the same as the context of Ct).
Figure 5 gives rules for executing sequences of commands. Rule SeqF
asserts that execution stops once an assignment is blocked.
Given a lattice L, a command C, and a memory M initially healthy for
∞-Enf , L, and C, function trace∞-Enf (C,M) is defined by the operational
semantics presented in Figures 3, 4, and 5. We prove the following Theorem
in the Appendix.
Theorem 1. ∞-Enf is an enforcer on R for BNI.
Here is how ∞-Enf handles program (2).
– If m > 0 holds, then rule If1 is invoked. Having T (m > 0) = M,
W = {w}, and A = ∅, causes triple 〈M, {w}, ∅〉 to be pushed onto
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(If1)
M(e) 6= 0 W = targetFlex (C2)
A = targetAnchor(C2) cc
′ = M(cc).push(〈M(T (e)), W, A〉)
〈if e then C1 else C2 end,M〉 → 〈C1; exit,M [cc 7→ cc′]〉
(If2)
M(e) = 0 W = targetFlex (C1)
A = targetAnchor(C1) cc
′ = M(cc).push(〈M(T (e)), W, A〉)
〈if e then C1 else C2 end,M〉 → 〈C2; exit,M [cc 7→ cc′]〉
(Wl1)
M(e) 6= 0 cc′ = M(cc).push(〈M(T (e)), ∅, ∅〉)
〈while e do C end,M〉 → 〈C;while e do C end; exit,M [cc 7→ cc′]〉
(Wl2)
M(e) = 0 W = targetFlex (C )
A = targetAnchor(C) cc′ = M(cc).push(〈M(T (e)), W, A〉)
〈while e do C end,M〉 → 〈exit,M [cc 7→ cc′]〉
(Exit)
bc′ =
{
M(bc) unionsqM(bccc), if M(cc).top.A 6= ∅
M(bc), otherwise
M ′ = U(M,M(cc).top.W ) cc′ = cc.pop
〈exit,M〉 → 〈stop,M ′[cc 7→ cc′, bc 7→ bc′]〉
U(M,W ) ,
M [ ∀w∈W : ∀i ≥ 1: T i(w) 7→M(T i(w)) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc)]
Figure 4: Operational semantics for conditional commands.
conditional context cc, which was empty. To execute taken branch
w := h, rule AsgnF is invoked, which causes w to be associated with
label chain 〈H,M,M, . . .〉. Before execution exits the if -statement, rule
Exit is invoked, leaving the label chain of w unchanged and restoring
cc to the empty stack. Rule AsgnAFail is then invoked for assignment
m := w, because T (m) is not as restrictive as T (w). So, execution
blocks without assigning w to m.
– Ifm > 0 does not hold, then w is associated with label chain 〈M,M,M, . . .〉
at the end of the if -statement. Rule AsgnA is then invoked for assign-
ment m := w, which sets blocking context bc to M. Because bc = M
holds, AsgnAFail is invoked for assignment l := 1, and thus, execution
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(Seq1)
〈C1,M〉 → 〈stop,M ′〉
〈C1;C2,M〉 → 〈C2,M ′〉
(Seq2)
〈C1,M〉 → 〈C ′1,M ′〉 C ′1 6∈ {stop,block}
〈C1;C2,M〉 → 〈C ′1;C2,M ′〉
(SeqF)
〈C1,M〉 → 〈block,M ′〉
〈C1;C2,M〉 → 〈block,M ′〉
Figure 5: Operational semantics for sequences
blocks before performing the update.
Notice that principals assigned label L do not observe any updates to vari-
ables and elements of label chains. So, the leak of m (as described in §1) is
prevented when (2) is executed with ∞-Enf .
6 Enforcer k-Enf
An enforcer that uses infinite label chains cannot always be implemented with
finite memory. But an infinite label chain can be approximated by a finite la-
bel chain. First notice that infinite label chain Ω = 〈`1, . . . , `k, `k+1, `k+2, . . .〉
is conservatively approximated by infinite label chain Ω′ = 〈`1, . . . , `k, `k, `k, . . .〉,
where kth label `k is infinitely repeated. It is a conservative approximation,
because if Ω′ allows a principal p assigned label ` to observe the ith element of
Ω′, then Ω allows p to observe the ith element of Ω, too (but not vice versa).
This is because Ω and Ω′ agree up to the kth element and, for i ≥ k, the ith
element in Ω′ is at least as restrictive as the corresponding element in Ω due
to monotonically decreasing label chains: `k+1 v `k, `k+2 v `k, etc. Finite
label chain with m ≥ 0:
Ω′′ = 〈`1, . . . , `k, `k, . . . , `k︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
〉
also is a conservative approximation for Ω′ (recall no observation is allowed
for identifiers whose sensitivity is not defined). Consequently, an infinite
label chain Ω can be approximated by finite label chain Ω′′.
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(AsgnF)
v0 = M(e) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ k: vi = M(T i(e)) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc)
〈w := e,M〉 → 〈stop,M [∀i :0 ≤ i ≤ k :T i(w) 7→ vi]〉
U(M,W ) ,
M [ ∀w∈W : ∀i :1 ≤ i ≤ k: T i(w) 7→ T i(w) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc)].
Figure 6: Modified rules for k-Enf
We employ such finite approximations to derive enforcer k-Enf from
∞-Enf . Enforcer k-Enf uses the operational semantics rules of ∞-Enf to
compute up to the kth tag. Because rule AsgnA mentions T 2(x), we require
k ≥ 2. In ∞-Enf , only AsgnF and function U refers to T i(x) for i > 2. So in
k-Enf rule AsgnF and function U are modified to compute labels only for the
first k tags. See Figure 6 for the revised rule.
Enforcer k-Enf generates observations for updates up to the kth tag. To
generate an observation about an update to the kth tag, k-Enf conservatively
approximates the sensitivity of element T k(x) to be itself. So, k-Enf actually
is using label chains of length nk-Enf = k + 1 and it conservatively approxi-
mates an infinite label chain Ω = 〈`1, . . . , `k, `k+1, `k+2, . . .〉 that would have
been computed by ∞-Enf with finite label chain Ω′′ = 〈`1, . . . , `k, `k〉.
Similar to∞-Enf , enforcer k-Enf has Aux k-Enf = {cc, bc}, Initk-Enf (cc) =
, and Initk-Enf (bc) = ⊥. We prove the following theorem in the Appendix.
Theorem 2. k-Enf is an enforcer on R for k-BNI(L), for any lattice L and
k ≥ 2.
7 Permissiveness of k-Enf versus Chain Length
Approximation by shorter label chains has a penalty: permissiveness. The
details however are not straightforward. For k-Enf enforcers, the penalty
of shorter label chains will depend on the threat model and on assumptions
about initialization. This section gives theorems to characterize that trade-
off. And in the next section, we examine other classes of enforcers.
An enforcer E ′ is at least as permissive as an enforcer E if, for all exe-
cutions of each command, E ′ emits observations involving at least as many
identifiers as E. This comparison involves deciding whether identifiers (i.e.,
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variables and tags) that appear in a sequence θ of observations produced by
E, also appear in a sequence θ′ produced by E ′. To formalize this, we define
θ E θ′:
θ E θ′ ,
|θ| ≤ |θ′| ∧ (∀i: 1 ≤ i ≤ |θ|: dom(θ[i]) ⊆ dom(θ′[i]))
where θ[i] is the ith observation in sequence θ. Relation E does not depend
on values being stored in variables because enforcers E and E ′ are required
to compute the same values while executing the same command.
We compare permissiveness of enforcers relative to an underlying lattice
and some identifiers of interest. We start the comparison with pairs of mem-
ories that satisfy an initialization condition, such as equality on initial values
and label chains.
Definition 8 (At least as permissive as). Define an enforcer E ′ to be at
least as permissive as an enforcer E for initialization condition ρ, underlying
lattice L, and identifiers up to the kth tag (i.e., T k) with k ≥ 0:
E ≤k,Lρ E ′ ,
∀C,M,M ′: ρ(M,M ′)
∧M |= H0(E,L, C) ∧M ′ |= H0(E ′,L, C)
⇒ (∀` ∈ L: traceE(C,M)|k` E traceE′(C,M ′)|k` )
(16)
Notice, the consequent in definition (16) holds iff labels deduced by E are at
least as restrictive as labels deduced by E ′. Relation ≤k,Lρ is a preorder (i.e.,
reflexive and transitive relation) on enforcers.
For convenience, we introduce abbreviations:
– E <k,Lρ E
′ , E ≤k,Lρ E ′ ∧ E ′ 6≤k,Lρ E
– E ∼=k,Lρ E ′ , E ≤k,Lρ E ′ ∧ E ′ ≤k,Lρ E
Notice that from (16) we can prove that if ρ⇒ ρ′, then
E ≤k,Lρ′ E ′ ⇒ E ≤k,Lρ E ′. (17)
Also, if k ≤ k′, then E ≤k′,Lρ E ′ ⇒ E ≤k,Lρ E ′.
We now examine how lengths of label chains relate to the permissive-
ness of enforcers by comparing the permissiveness of enforcers k-Enf and
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(k + 1)-Enf for k ≥ 2. To perform this comparison, the initial memories
considered by k-Enf and (k+ 1)-Enf for executing a command should agree
on values in variables and on labels in tags, up to the kth. Define
M |k , {〈T i(x),M(T i(x))〉 | 0 ≤ i ≤ k
∧ x ∈ Var ∧ T i(x) ∈ dom(M)}
The desired initialization condition then is:
ρk(M,M
′) , M |k = M ′|k
Thus, initialization condition ρk allows a flexible variable w to be initially
associated with label chains, where `k+1 @ `k:
– Ω = 〈`1, `2, . . . , `k−1, `k, `k+1, `k+1〉 by (k + 1)-Enf ,
– Ω′ = 〈`1, `2, . . . , `k−1, `k, `k〉 by k-Enf .
We say that Ω exhibits a (k+ 1)-decrease because T k+1(w) @ T k(w). Notice
that for a label chain to exhibit a (k + 1)-decrease, the labels should belong
to a lattice with at least one non-bottom element. Here, Ω′ is a conservative
approximation of Ω.
Consequently, whenever (k + 1)-Enf initially associates flexible variable
w with a label chain Ω that exhibits a (k + 1)-decrease, enforcer k-Enf is
forced by initialization condition ρk to use conservative approximation Ω
′ for
Ω. So, as we prove in the Appendix, (k + 1)-Enf is strictly more permissive
than k-Enf .
Theorem 3. k-Enf <k,Lρk (k + 1)-Enf , for k ≥ 2 and any lattice L with at
least one non-bottom element.
Thus, longer label chains offer increased permissiveness for the k-Enf family
of enforcers, because they allow more principals to observe elements of these
label chains. Moreover, we conclude by transitivity that k-Enf <k,Lρk ∞-Enf ,
for any k ≥ 2.
There are cases where flexible variables initially store no information, and
thus, they are initially associated with bottom-label chains (i.e., 〈⊥, . . . ,⊥〉).
We say memory M is conventionally initialized when for set VarF of flexible
variables
αc(M) , ∀w∈VarF : ∀i ≥ 1:
T i(w)∈dom(M)⇒M(T i(w)) = ⊥.
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We also define initialization condition
c(M,M ′) , αc(M) ∧ ρ1(M,M ′)
which implies that two memories are conventionally initialized and agree on
values in anchor variables and on the first labels of these anchor variables.
A result analogous to Theorem 3 does not hold when <k,Lρk is replaced with
<k,Lc . With initialization condition c, label chains longer than two elements
do not enhance the permissiveness of k-Enf . This is because, for initialization
condition c, enforcer k-Enf produces label chains where the second element
is always repeated9 (e.g., 〈H,M,M, . . . ,M〉) due to the conservative update of
label chains of flexible variable induced by rules AsgnF in Figure 3 and Exit in
Figure 4. There, all elements of label chains of the involved flexible variables
are updated with the same label (i.e., the sensitivity of the context). We
prove the following theorem in the Appendix.
Theorem 4. k-Enf ∼=k,Lc (k + 1)-Enf for any lattice L and k ≥ 2.
Threat model specifics affect the permissiveness of longer label chains,
too. Consider a weakened threat model that allows observations of updates
to variables but not to tags. This model characterizes attackers that are co-
resident with program execution and can access the memory modified by the
target program. Label chains here are assumed to be stored in a protected
memory that only the enforcer can access. Enforcers here would be expected
to satisfy 0-BNI. Enforcer k-Enf satisfies k-BNI. So, k-Enf satisfies 0-BNI,
because 0-BNI is implied by k-BNI.
Under the weakened threat model, permissiveness of our enforcers is com-
pared using relation ≤0,Lρk , where superscript 0 indicates that only observa-
tions involving variables are considered for the comparison. Theorem 3 does
not apply, because relation <k,Lρk considers observations up to the kth tag
(due to superscript k) where k ≥ 2. But we do have the following Theorem,
which is proved in the Appendix.
Theorem 5. k-Enf ∼=0,Lρk (k + 1)-Enf for any lattice L and k ≥ 2.
Because c ⇒ ρk holds, property (17) and Theorem 5 gives k-Enf ∼=0,Lc (k +
1)-Enf for any lattice L and k ≥ 2. So, under the weakened threat model
and for both initialization conditions (i.e, ρk and c), the permissiveness of
k-Enf does not improve by using label chains of length greater than two.
9See Lemma 11 in the Appendix.
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Initialization Condition
ρk c
Threat Model
Strong X x
Weak x x
Figure 7: X indicates enhanced permissiveness from label chains with more
than two elements; x indicates no permissiveness gains for our family of k-Enf
enforcers with k ≥ 2.
Figure 7 summarizes the results presented in this section. These results
apply only to k-Enf . Thus, Theorems 4 and 5 do not preclude other enforcers
(e.g., optimizations of k-Enf enforcers) where longer label chains increase
permissiveness.
8 Other Enforcers
We now relate permissiveness with label chain length for enforcers other
than k-Enf . Here longer label chains might increase permissiveness. But
the results depend on the threat model, lattice size, and certain semantic
properties of enforcers: k-precise, k-varying, and k-dependent.
8.1 In the Strong Threat Model
Longer label chains are useful for an enforcer E under the strong threat model
provided there are executions of commands for which E produces label chains
whose elements
(i) are not redundant—they are not a function of other elements in the
same label chain, and
(ii) capture the real sensitivity of the elements they tag rather than con-
servatively approximating it.
Label chains that can be used as evidence for properties (i) and (ii) are
characterized below as being k-varying and k-precise. Notice that k-varying
label chains cannot exist when L has only one element.
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Definition 9 (k-varying). Label chains 〈`1, `2, . . . , `k〉 and 〈`′1, `′2, . . . , `′k〉
with labels from lattice L, are defined to be k-varying for k ≥ 2 iff
(∀i: 1 ≤ i < k: `i = `′i) ∧ `k 6= `′k.
Definition 10 (k-precise). Consider an enforcer E, lattice L, command C,
and conventionally initialized memory M such that M |= H0(E,L, C). As-
sume trace τ = traceE(C,M) produces label chain prefix Ω = 〈`1, . . . , `n〉 at
some state τ [j] after an assignment to a flexible variable w:
∃1 < j ≤ |τ |: ∃w ∈ VarF :
τ [j − 1] = 〈w := e;Cr,Mw〉 ∧ τ [j] = 〈Cr,Mr〉 ∧
∀i: 1 ≤ i ≤ n: T i(w) ∈ dom(Mr) ∧ Mr(T i(w)) = `i.
Label chain Ω is k-precise (for 1≤k≤n) at τ [j] when for each enforcer E ′:
if
– E ′ satisfies (k − 1)-BNI(L), and
– E ≤k−1,Lc E ′,
then
– trace τ ′ = traceE′(C,M ′) with M ′ |= H0(E ′,L, C) and c(M,M ′) pro-
duces label chain 〈`1, . . . , `k〉 at τ ′[j].
So, if Ω is k-precise, then any enforcer E ′ that satisfies (k − 1)-BNI(L) and
is at least as permissive as E (i.e., E ≤k−1,Lc E ′) will produce (at the same
execution point) the same first k elements that appear in Ω. Consequently,
the first k elements of Ω capture the real sensitivity of the elements they tag.
For brevity, we say that E produces some k-precise k-varying label chains
with elements in L iff there exist commands C,C ′ whose executions produce
label chains Ω,Ω′ such that:
– Ω is k-precise at the ith state of traceE(C,M), for some i and M with
M |= H0(E,L, C),
– Ω′ is k-precise at the jth state of traceE(C ′,M ′), for some j and M ′
with M ′ |= H0(E,L, C ′),
– Ω and Ω′ are k-varying.
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Longer label chains can offer increased permissiveness for an enforcer E,
under the strong threat model, provided E produces some k-precise k-varying
label chains. To see this, compare such an enforcer E with an enforcer E ′
that approximates the kth element of each label chain as a function of the
previous elements instead of performing, for example, an analysis of the code.
Definition 11 ((k−1)-dependent label chains). E ′ produces (k−1)-dependent
label chains for k − 1 ≥ 1 iff E ′ is an enforcer and for some function fE′:
∀x: ∀i: k−1 < i < nE′ : T i(x) = fE′(T (x), . . . , T k−1(x))
For example, k-Enf produces k-dependent label chains, because k-Enf uses
fk-Enf (T (x), . . . , T
k(x)) , T k(x) for computing T k+1(x). Notice, if an en-
forcer E ′ produces (k − 1)-dependent label chains, then that mechanism
cannot produce k-varying label chains.
An enforcer E ′ that produces (k−1)-dependent label chains cannot both
satisfy (k− 1)-BNI and be at least as permissive as E, which produces some
k-precise k-varying label chains: Assume for contradiction that E ′ satisfies
(k − 1)-BNI and is at least as permissive as E. Because the k-varying label
chains produced by E are k-precise, E ′ should then produce the same k-
varying label chains. But, we previously saw that if an enforcer E ′ produces
k-varying label chains, then E ′ does not produce (k − 1)-dependent label
chains, which is a contradiction. A detailed proof of Theorem 6 is found in
the Appendix.
Theorem 6. For a lattice L, for an enforcer E that satisfies (k−1)-BNI(L),
with k ≥ 2, and produces some k-precise k-varying label chains with elements
in L, and for an enforcer E ′ that produces (k − 1)-dependent label chains,
(i) if E ≤k−1,Lc E ′, then E ′ does not satisfy (k − 1)-BNI(L),
(ii) E and L exist.
For an enforcer E ′ that uses label chains of length k − 1 (i.e., produces
(k − 1)-dependent label chains), Theorem 6 implies that E ′ cannot be at
least as permissive as an enforcer E that uses label chains of length k. So,
in contrast to Theorem 4, which stipulates that k-Enf does not benefit from
longer label chains under conventional initialization, enforcer E in Theorem
6 does benefit.
Theorem 6 (ii) asserts that such an enforcer E and lattice L exist. So, it
is always possible to define, for each k > 1, an enforcer E that can produce
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k-precise k-varying label chains when executing some command C. Notice,
k-Enf cannot produce k-precise k-varying label chains.
Witness E and L for Theorem 6 (ii) In the Appendix, we describe
k-Eopt , which is an enforcer that satisfies (k − 1)-BNI and produces some
k-precise k-varying label chains during the execution of a certain command
C. C involves sequences of assignments and if commands whose branches
contain only one assignment. Such if commands will be called simple. We
construct k-Eopt by optimizing k-Enf for deducing k-precise k-varying labels
during the execution of such C. The optimization is based on the following
observation: ignoring context, if T i(w) = ⊥ at the end of both branches of a
simple if command, then, at the end of that if command, T i+1(w) does not
need to be updated with the sensitivity T (e) of the guard of that if command.
This optimization enables k-Eopt to produce some k-precise k-varying label
chains.
As Theorem 6 stipulates, any mechanism that approximates the third
label by repeating the second label in the label chain (i.e., produces 2-
dependent label chains) loses permissiveness against 3-Eopt (which can pro-
duce 3-precise 3-varying label chains). Example program (1)
if m > 0 then w := h else w := l end
illustrates. Assume anchor variable m is associated with label chain 〈M, L, L〉,
anchor variable h is associated with 〈H, L, L〉, anchor variable l is associated
with 〈L, L, L〉, and l 6= h holds. Without considering context m > 0, flexible
variable w would be associated either with 〈H, L, L〉 (due to w := h) or with
〈L, L, L〉 (due to w := l), when execution of one of these assignments ends.
Here, only w and T (w) reveal information about guard m > 0. So, at the
end of the if -statement, only T (w) and T 2(w) should be augmented with
T (m) = M. Thus, if m > 0 holds, then 3-Eopt associates w with 〈H,M, L〉 at
the end of the if -statement. Otherwise, 3-Eopt associates w with 〈M,M, L〉
at the end of the if -statement.
Notice that, starting from a common initialization, label chain 〈H,M, L〉
that 3-Eopt produces for w (when m > 0 holds) has a the second label
that is not repeated. Instead, the third label in that chain is strictly less
restrictive than the second label. However, 2-Enf would have associated w
with 〈H,M,M〉 when m > 0 holds. Thus, the label chain deduced by 3-Eopt
(which actually computes the first three elements in a label chains) for w
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is strictly more permissive than the label chain deduced by 2-Enf (which
actually computes the first two elements in a label chains and approximates
the third element by repeating the second one). So, this examples shows the
usefulness of computing label chains with at least 3 elements. The Appendix
extends this example to show the usefulness of label chains with at least k
elements, for all k > 3.
8.2 In the Weakened Threat Model
In the weakened threat model, label chains of length two can offer enhanced
permissiveness compared to label chains of length one: the metalabel enables
the decision to block assignment commands to be more permissive. (Previous
theorems concerned label chains with at least two elements). To illustrate,
it suffices to consider anchor-tailed commands, which are a sequence C;C ′
of commands where C does not involve any assignment to anchor variables
and C ′ is a sequence of assignments to anchor variables.
Let GEa:=e denote the condition used by an enforcer E for blocking an
assignment a := e to anchor variable a when execution reaches state 〈a :=
e;C ′,M ′〉 in a trace traceE(C,M). Boolean expression GEa:=e is satisfied in a
memory M ′ according to
M ′(GEa:=e) ⇔ 〈a := e;C ′,M ′〉 → 〈C ′,M ′′〉
is a subtrace of traceE(C,M).
For assignment a := e in an anchor-tailed command, GEa:=e may depend
on label chains of variables in
 assignment a := e itself (to capture explicit flows), and
 the context of that assignment (to capture implicit flows). By definition
of anchor-tailed commands, such an assignment is not encapsulated
in any conditional command, but it may follow other assignments to
anchor variables. So, the context of a := e only references variables
mentioned in assignments to anchor variables that precede a := e.
Let Va:=e denote the above set of variables. Then G
E
a:=e will be characterized
by:
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Definition 12 (k-dependent condition). GEa:=e is a k-dependent condition
for a := e in an anchor-tailed command iff GEa:=e depends at most on the first
k elements of the label chains of variables in Va:=e
GEa:=e = fE({T i(x) | x ∈ Va:=e ∧ 1 ≤ i ≤ k}),
for some function fE.
For example, 2-Enf uses 2-dependent Ga:=e.
We now show how the second label in a label chain makes the decision to
block assignment commands more permissive. Theorem 7, which is proved
in the Appendix, states that if an enforcer E uses 1-dependent GEa:=e, then
E cannot both satisfy 0-BNI and be at least as permissive as 2-Enf . Here is
why. E does not compute the sensitivity of labels referenced by block con-
dition GEa:=e and thus E does not compute the sensitivity of the information
conveyed by its decision to block a certain assignment a := e. In an effort
to satisfy 0-BNI and prevent leaking sensitive information, E must decide
always to block a := e, even though in some executions that assignment is
safe and allowed by 2-Enf .
Theorem 7. For an enforcer E and lattice L3 , 〈{L,M,H}, v, unionsq〉, if GEa:=e
is 1-dependent and 2-Enf ≤0,L3c E, then E does not satisfy 0-BNI(L3).
Thus, enforcer E that uses label chains of length one (i.e., GEa:=e is 1-dependent)
cannot be at least as permissive as 2-Enf , which uses label chains of length
two (i.e., Ga:=e is 2-dependent). So, for the weakened threat model, permis-
siveness can be improved when using two (instead of one) labels for each
variable.
Since most dynamic enforcement mechanisms proposed in the past satisfy
TINI, we might wonder whether Theorem 7 still holds when 0-BNI is replaced
by TINI. Under the weakened threat model, there are enforcers (e.g., EH,L
in the next section) that use 1-dependent GEa:=e, are at least as permissive
as 2-Enf and do satisfy TINI. So, Theorem 7 does not hold when 0-BNI is
replaced by TINI.
Familiar Two-level Lattice
Some authors use a two-level lattice L2 , 〈{L,H}, v, unionsq〉 with L @ H,
believing that their results will extend to arbitrary lattices. In this section,
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we give a result for L2 that does not hold for more complex lattices. Thus,
generalizing from L2 to arbitrary lattices is not always a sound proposition.
Consider L2 with the weakened threat model. Previous work [22] pro-
posed a flow-sensitive enforcement mechanism that uses only one label per
variable. We denote that enforcement mechanism by EH,L, which is derived
from k-Enf by associating each variable with only one tag. Figure 8 shows
the modified rules for EH,L. We prove below (Theorem 8) that Ga:=e defined
in Figure 8 is 1-dependent.
EH,L ensures that the sensitivity of each tag T (w) is always L, so there is
no need to explicitly keep track of T 2(w). The only way to encode informa-
tion tagged with H in T (w) is if T (w) is updated with different labels in a
conditional command that has a guard tagged with H. But, if the sensitivity
of the guard is H, then due to function U in Figure 8, tag T (w) will always be
updated to H at the end of that conditional command, because M(bccc) = H.
So, T (w) will reveal no information about the value of that sensitive guard.
Thus, the sensitivity of T (w) is L.
Define function traceEH,L(C,M) to map command C and memory M with
M |= H0(EH,L,L, C) to the entire trace that starts with state 〈C,M〉. We
have nEH,L = 1, AuxEH,L = {cc, bc}, InitEH,L(cc) = , and InitEH,L(bc) = ⊥.
Theorem 7 does not hold when L3 is replaced with L2 if E is EH,L. Instead,
Theorem 8 below holds; it states that EH,L satisfies 0-BNI and is strictly more
permissive than 2-Enf only when L2 is used.
Theorem 8. Enforcer EH,L uses 1-dependent Ga:=e, satisfies 0-BNI(L2), and
satisfies 2-Enf <0,L2c EH,L.
So Theorem 8, which is proved in the Appendix, contradicts expectations
that longer label chains can offer increased permissiveness. Moreover, this
theorem is an example where a result expressed in terms of L2 does not
necessarily generalize for arbitrary lattices.
Notice, though, that EH,L does not satisfy 0-BNI for arbitrary lattices.
For example, consider (2), which employs L3. Based on rules in Figure 8 and
rules If, Seq in §5.3, EH,L executes (2) as described in (i) and (ii) in §1. So,
executing (2) under EH,L leaks sensitive m > 0 to principals observing non-
sensitive variable l, and thus, 0-BNI is not satisfied. EH,L thus illustrates that
an enforcer designed to enforce two-level lattices cannot necessarily enforce
arbitrary lattices.
Figure 9 summarizes the results presented in this section. We do not have
a proof but we conjecture that label chains with more than two elements do
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(AsgnA)
v = M(e) Ga:=e ` = M(bccc) unionsqM(bc)
〈a := e,M〉 → 〈stop,M [a 7→ v, bc 7→ `]〉
(AsgnAFail)
v = M(e) ¬Ga:=e ` = M(bccc) unionsqM(bc)
〈a := e,M〉 → 〈block,M [bc 7→ `]〉
(AsgnF)
v0 = M(e) v1 = M(T (e)) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc)
〈w := e,M〉 → 〈stop,M [w 7→ v0, T (w) 7→ v1]〉
U(M,W ) ,M [ ∀w∈W : T (w) 7→ T (w) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc)]
Ga:=e is M(T (e)) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc) vM(T (a))
Figure 8: Modified rules for EH,L
Label Chain Length
Greater than 1 Greater than 2
Threat Model
Strong X X
Weak (L3) X ?
Weak (L2) x x
Figure 9: X indicates where labels chains with length greater than the one
indicated in the corresponding column can provide enhanced permissiveness;
x indicates where longer label chains do not enhance permissiveness; ? indi-
cates an open question.
not improve permissiveness for lattices with more than two elements under
the weakened threat model.
9 Related Work
Dynamic Enforcement Mechanisms and Leaks The formalization of
dynamic information flow enforcement mechanisms dates back to Bell and
LaPadula [8]. The community realized early that dynamic enforcement mech-
anisms for information flow control might introduce leaks not present in the
program itself. Denning [29], for instance, explains that blocking an execu-
tion and reporting the underlying violation might leak sensitive information.
Denning also gives examples where flow-sensitive labels generated by dy-
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namic enforcement mechanisms violate TINI. Our k-Enf enforcers do not
report the reason an execution terminates for exactly this reason. Also they
ensure that information is not leaked by observing flow-sensitive labels during
normally terminated or blocked executions.
Label Chains of Length One Most dynamic enforcement mechanisms
use label chains of length one. Purely dynamic enforcement mechanisms that
analyze only code that is executed and employ no-sensitive-upgrade (NSU)
or permissive-upgrade (PU) (e.g., [3], [4], [10], [19], [33]) satisfy TINI but not
BNI, because they leak sensitive information when blocking an execution. In
particular, NSU and PU are shown in [4, Figure 1] to block execution de-
pending on values of high confidentiality. There, BNI is not satisfied because
the final output of low confidentiality will be observed depending on a value
of high confidentiality. Other hybrid flow-sensitive enforcement mechanisms
(e.g., [14], [26]), which employ some static analysis during execution, do not
satisfy BNI, either, because observations of blocked traces might only be a
strict prefix of those generated by normally terminated traces, whereas BNI
requires equality. There are enforcement mechanisms (e.g., [1], [7]) that sat-
isfy BNI, but they either handle only L2 or lose permissiveness by tagging
variables with the same labels at the end of conditional commands indepen-
dent of which branch is actually taken. We are not aware of an enforcement
mechanism that uses label chains of length one, enforces labels from an ar-
bitrary lattice, satisfies BNI, and is at least as permissive as 2-Enf . We are
also not aware of an enforcement mechanism that uses label chains of length
one, enforces L2, satisfies BNI, and is at least as permissive as EH,L.
Label Chains of Length Two Certain dynamic enforcement mechanisms
use label chains of length two. Buiras et al. [12] propose a purely dynamic
enforcement mechanism that employs fixed metalabels to capture implicit
flows caused by conditional commands. The purely dynamic enforcement
mechanism in [12] causes insecure executions to diverge instead of blocking.
By enforcing only TINI, no security guarantee is given for executions that
are forced to diverge (because TINI considers only finite traces).
Bedford et al. [6] use label chains where the second element is flow sensi-
tive. That hybrid enforcement mechanism enforces TSNI on programs writ-
ten in a while-language that supports references. The enforcement mecha-
nism uses 2-dependent label chains and, therefore, Theorem 6 implies that
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this enforcement mechanism is not more permissive than an enforcer that
produces 3-precise 3-varying label chains (e.g., 3-Eopt).
Unbounded Label Chains Some enforcement mechanisms support label
chains of unbounded length. Zheng et al. [38] employ dependent types to
tag a label with another label, thus forming chains of labels. Their approach
can express a label recursively tagging itself, which can be seen as infinitely
repeating the last label of a chain. Examples presented in [38] employ label
chains of up to two elements (e.g., 〈`,⊥〉 and 〈`, `〉), but the authors acknowl-
edge [38, §3.3.2] that longer chains are sensible but do not show—as we do
in this paper—that permissiveness can benefit from longer label chains. We
explained (§7) why permissiveness can be lost when using label chains of
fixed length (instead of using longer label chains).
The enforcement mechanism presented in Zheng et al. [38] is mostly static,
so it does not exhibit the kinds of leaks our paper examines through flow
sensitive labels and blocking executions. Specifically, label chains in [38] are
given as input; they are not deduced by the enforcement mechanism. Con-
ditions on these labels are inlined by the programmer. If the static analysis
succeeds, then the program will satisfy TINI. So, a type-correct program can
be safely executed until normal termination. Techniques presented in [38]
involving label chains have been implemented in Jif [27,28]. We believe that
any framework that supports dependent types, such as [13] and [24], is likely
capable of expressing unbounded label chains.
Actions Other than Blocking Dynamic enforcement mechanisms can
take actions other than blocking when an unsafe command is about to be
executed. Enforcement mechanisms presented in [14] and [23], which handle
L2, modify or skip the execution of an unsafe command. Similar to [12],
the enforcement mechanism presented in [25] (which enforces labels from L2)
diverges when reaching an unsafe command. Some enforcement mechanisms
(e.g., [9], [17], [18], [34]) take no action, because they only update labels on
variables; they do not perform any checks.
Certain purely dynamic enforcement mechanisms (e.g., [20], [35]) recover
from exceptions caused by unsafe commands. They enforce error sensitive
noninterference, which we believe is stronger than BNI. One technique they
employ is assigning the same labels to variables after conditional commands,
independent of the branch that is taken. Here, some permissiveness might
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be lost against 2-Enf , which allows labels on variables to depend on taken
branches.
Comparing Enforcement Mechanisms Russo et al. [31] study trade-
offs between static and dynamic security analysis. They prove impossibility
of a purely dynamic information-flow monitor that satisfies TINI and accepts
programs certified by the Hunt and Sands classical flow-sensitive static anal-
ysis [21]. They first define basic semantics that purely dynamic information-
flow monitor may extend. Then, they introduce properties (i.e., not look
ahead, not look aside) for the purely dynamic enforcement mechanisms they
consider. Their impossibility theorem has the same style as our Theorem
7: an enforcement mechanism with the above properties cannot both satisfy
TINI and be at least as permissive as [21]. Our Theorem 6 instead compares
permissiveness of any two enforcement mechanisms that satisfy particular
properties. And our permissiveness relation ≤k,Lρ is more general than the
one presented in [31], because it is defined on any two enforcers and handles
arbitrary lattices (not just L2) and initialization conditions.
Bielova et al. [11] present a taxonomy of five representative flow-sensitive
information flow enforcement mechanisms (no-sensitive-upgrade, permissive-
upgrade, hybrid monitor, secure multi-execution, and multiple facets), in
terms of soundness, precision, and transparency, which stipulates that en-
forcement mechanisms do not alter the semantics of safe executions. Ter-
mination-Aware Noninterference (TANI) is the soundness goal, and it is
expressed in terms of knowledge semantics. If an enforcement mechanism
diverges the execution of an unsafe command satisfies TANI, then this mech-
anism does not leak sensitive information by taking this action. The theo-
retical framework considered in [11] assumes labels are taken from L2. Also,
it assumes that a terminating execution produces one output, at the end,
tagged L; if an execution diverges, no output is produced. So, TANI guaran-
tees that dynamic enforcement mechanisms do not introduce leaks when it
diverges executions in the framework of [11]. Our section 8.2 explains that
there is no danger these mechanisms could encode sensitive information in
the flow-sensitive labels, because the framework in [11] is restricted to L2.
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A Appendix
A.1 Definitions
The following definitions are used in the proofs appearing in this appendix.
 We abbreviate τ |S` by τ |`, when S is the set of all variables and their
tags.
 We extend the projection of a memory with respect to a label ` to
include bc (blocking context) and cc (conditional context):
M |` =
{〈q,M(q)〉 | q, T (q) ∈ dom(M) ∧ M(T (q)) v `} ∪
{〈bc,M(bc)〉 |M(bc) v `} ∪
{〈cc,M(cc)〉 |M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) v `}
(18)
 Define equality of sequences of observations when omitting the empty
sets:
 =obs 
∅ =obs 
 =obs ∅
Θ ⇀ θ =obs Θ
′ ⇀ θ′ iff
Θ = Θ′ ∧ θ =obs θ′, or
Θ = ∅ ∧ Θ′ 6= ∅ ∧ θ =obs Θ′ ⇀ θ′, or
Θ 6= ∅ ∧ Θ′ = ∅ ∧ Θ ⇀ θ =obs θ′
 Define kstut(M) to hold when the kth label in all label chains in M is
infinitely repeated:
kstut(M) , ∀x∈dom(M): ∀i > k:
T i(x)∈dom(M)⇒M(T i(x)) = M(T k(x))
for k ≥ 1
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 We write mon(M) to denote that all label chains in M are monotoni-
cally decreasing:
mon(M) , ∀x∈dom(M): ∀i ≥ 1:
T i+1(x)∈dom(M)⇒M(T i+1(x)) vM(T i(x))
 We write M =k M
′ iff
1. ∀x: ∀0 ≤ i ≤ k: M(T i(x)) = M ′(T i(x)),
2. M(cc) = M ′(cc), and
3. M(bc) = M ′(bc).
 To prove inductively that our enforcers satisfy BNI, we strengthen BNI
to BNI+ and prove BNI+ instead.
BNI+(E,L, C). ∀` ∈ L: ∀M,M ′:
If
M |= H(E,L, C) ∧ M ′ |= H(E,L, C),
M |` = M ′|`,M(cc) = M ′(cc),mon(M),mon(M ′)
τ = traceE(C,M),
τ ′ = traceE(C,M ′),
where τ = 〈C,M〉 ∗→ 〈Ct,Mt〉, τ ′ = 〈C,M ′〉 ∗→ 〈C ′t,M ′t〉, and Ct,
C ′t are terminations (i.e., stop or block),
then:
c1 If Ct and C
′
t are both stop, then τ |` =obs τ ′|`, Mt|` = M ′t|`, and
Mt(cc) = M
′
t(cc).
c2 If Ct or C
′
t is block, then τ |` =obs τ ′|`.
c3 If Ct is stop, C
′
t is block, and M
′
t(bc) 6v `, then Mt(bc) 6v `.
c4 If Ct is stop, C
′
t is block, 〈C ′tp,M ′tp〉 → 〈C ′t,M ′t〉 are the last two
states of τ ′, and M ′tp(bccc) v `, then there exists 〈C ′′,M ′′〉 ∈ τ ,
with C ′′ = C ′tp and M
′′|` = M ′tp|`.
 For enforcers k-Enf with 2 ≤ k ≤ ∞, EH,L, and k-Eopt with k ≥ 2,
we extend the domain of function traceE(C,M) to also include any
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memory M such that M |= H(E,L, C) holds.
Also, if M |= H(E,L, C) holds, then for any M ′ in traceE(C,M) and
any subcommand C ′ of C, we have M ′ |= H(E,L, C ′) (based on the
corresponding operational semantics).
A.2 Soundness of ∞-Enf and k-Enf for k ≥ 2
Theorem 1. ∞-Enf is an enforcer on R for BNI.
Proof. It is easy to prove that ∞-Enf is an enforcer on R and satisfies re-
strictions (E1), (E2), and (E3) by induction on the rules of∞-Enf . We omit
the details.
To prove that∞-Enf satisfies BNI, we will prove that k-BNI(∞-Enf ,L, C)
holds for a lattice L, a command C, and k ≥ 0. From Lemma 1, we have
that BNI+(∞-Enf ,L,C) holds. By definition, M |= H0(∞-Enf ,L, C) and
M ′ |= H0(∞-Enf ,L, C) imply M(cc) = M ′(cc),mon(M),mon(M ′). Also,
τ |` =obs τ ′|` implies τ |k` =obs τ ′|k` . Thus, BNI+(∞-Enf ,L,C) implies k-
BNI(∞-Enf ,L, C). Because k, C, and L were arbitrary, we then get that
∞-Enf enforces BNI.
Lemma 1. For a command C and lattice L, BNI+(∞-Enf ,L,C) holds.
Proof. Let ` ∈ L. We use structural induction on C.
1. C is skip:
From rule Skip, we get Ct = C
′
t = stop. So, c2, c3, and c4 are trivially
true.
We prove c1. We have, τ |` =obs  and τ ′|` =obs . Because Mt = M and
M ′t = M
′, we get Mt|` = M ′t|` and Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc). So, c1 holds.
2. C is a := e:
From M |` = M ′|` and M(T 2(a)) = M ′(T 2(a)) = ⊥, we get
M(T (a)) = M ′(T (a)). (19)
2.1. M(T (a)) v `
We first prove that the command is executed normally in both mem-
ories or blocked in both memories. W.l.o.g, assume that the com-
mand is executed normally in M . We prove that the command is
executed normally in M ′, too. Because the command is executed
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normally in M , rule AsgnA in Figure 3 has been triggered, meaning
that M(T (e)) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc) v M(T (a)) holds. From hypothe-
sis (2.1.), we then get M(T (e)) v `, M(bccc) v `, and M(bc) v `.
Because M |` = M ′|`, we then get M(cc) = M ′(cc) and M(bc) =
M ′(bc). From mon(M ) and M(T (e)) v `, we get M(T 2(e)) v `
and M(T 3(e)) v `. From Lemma 5 and M |` = M ′|`, we then get
M(T 2(e)) = M ′(T 2(e)), M(T (e)) = M ′(T (e)), M(e) = M ′(e). From
(19), we then get that M ′(T (e)) unionsq M ′(bccc) unionsq M ′(bc) v M ′(T (a))
holds. So, rule AsgnA is triggered, meaning that the command is ex-
ecuted normally in M ′. Taking the contrapositive of the statement
we just proved (i.e., if the command is executed normally in M , then
it will be executed normally in M ′), we get that if the command is
blocked in M ′, then it will be blocked in M . Because M and M ′ are
arbitrary, we consequently have that the command is either (i) exe-
cuted normally in both memories or (ii) blocked in both memories.
So, c3 and c4 are trivially true. To prove c1 and c2, we examine cases
(i) and (ii).
2.1.1. The command is executed normally in both memories.
c2 is trivially true.
We prove c1. We have:
τ = 〈a := e,M〉 → 〈stop,M [a 7→M(e), bc 7→ `g]〉
τ ′ = 〈a := e,M′〉 → 〈stop,M ′[a 7→M ′(e), bc 7→ `′g]〉,
where
`g = M(T
2(e)) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc) and
`′g = M
′(T 2(e)) unionsqM ′(bccc) unionsqM ′(bc).
We have τ |` = τ ′|` = 〈a,M(e)〉, because M(e) = M ′(e). Also,
`g = `
′
g. So, Mt(bc) = M
′
t(bc). Because Mt(cc) = M(cc) =
M ′(cc) = M ′t(cc), then Mt(cc) = M
′
t(cc) holds. Because
Mt(a) = M
′
t(a), Mt(bc) = M
′
t(bc), and Mt(cc) = M
′
t(cc),
then we get Mt|` = M ′t|`. So c1 holds.
2.1.2. The command is blocked in both memories.
τ = 〈a := e,M〉 → 〈block,M [bc 7→ `g]〉
τ ′ = 〈a := e,M′〉 → 〈block,M ′[bc 7→ `′g]〉.
So, τ |` = τ ′|` = , and thus c2 holds. Also, c1 is trivially true.
2.2. M(T (a)) 6v `
We then have τ |` =obs  and τ ′|` =obs , and thus c2 holds.
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To prove c1, assume Ct = C
′
t = stop. We show Mt(cc) = M
′
t(cc)
and Mt|` = M ′t|`.
Because M(cc) = M ′(cc) and M ′t(cc) = M
′(cc), we have Mt(cc) =
M ′t(cc).
We now proveMt|` = M ′t|` as per (18). BecauseM(T (a)),M ′(T (a)) 6v
`, then Mt and M
′
t do not need to agree on a. If Mt(bc) 6v `,
then Mt|` = M ′t|` trivially holds. Assume instead Mt(bc) v `. So,
rule AsgnA in Figure 3 then gives M(T 2(e)) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc) v `.
Thus, M(T 2(e)) v `, M(bccc) v `, and M(bc) v `. From mon(M )
and M(T 2(e)) v `, we get M(T 3(e)) v `. From M |` = M ′|`,
M(T 3(e)) v `, and Lemma 5, we get M(T 2(e)) = M ′(T 2(e)). From
M |` = M ′|`, M(bccc) v `, andM(bc) v `, we get: M(bccc) = M ′(bccc)
and M(bc) = M ′(bc). Because AsgnA in Figure 3 gives Mt(bc) =
M(T 2(e)) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc) and M ′t(bc) = M ′(T 2(e)) unionsqM ′(bccc) unionsq
M ′(bc), we then have Mt(bc) = M ′t(bc). From Mt(cc) = M
′
t(cc), we
then get Mt|` = M ′t|`. So, c1 holds.
To prove c3, assume Ct is stop, C
′
t is block, and M
′
t(bc) 6v `.
We must show Mt(bc) 6v `. We show the contrapositive. Assume
Mt(bc) v `, then following the same arguments as above, we get
Mt(bc) = M
′
t(bc), and thus, M
′
t(bc) v `, as wanted. So, c3 holds.
To prove c4, assume Ct is stop, C
′
t is block, 〈C ′tp,M ′tp〉 → 〈C ′t,M ′t〉
are the last two states of τ ′, and M ′tp(bccc) v `. So, M ′tp = M ′ and
C ′tp = a := e. We have that 〈C ′′,M ′′〉 in c4 is 〈a := e,M〉, which
satisfies C ′′ = C ′tp and M
′′|` = M ′tp|`. Thus c4 holds.
3. C is w := e
τ = 〈w := e,M〉 → 〈stop,Mt〉
τ ′ = 〈w := e,M ′〉 → 〈stop,M ′t〉
c2, c3, and c4 are trivially true.
We prove c1. Mt(cc) = M
′
t(cc) holds because we have M(cc) = M
′(cc),
Mt(cc) = M(cc), and M
′
t(cc) = M
′(cc).
3.1. ∃r ≥ 1: Mt(T r(w)) v `
From mon(M ), we then get ∀i ≥ r: Mt(T i(w)) v `. Then we have
∀i ≥ r :M(T i(e)) v `, M(bccc) v `, and M(bc) v `. From, M |` =
M ′|` and Lemma 5, we then get ∀i ≥ r − 1 :M(T i(e)) = M ′(T i(e)),
M(cc) = M ′(cc), and M(bc) = M ′(bc). So, ∀i ≥ r− 1:Mt(T i(w)) =
M ′t(T
i(w)), and thus, ∀i ≥ r: M ′t(T i(w)) v `.
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 If r = 1, we then get Mt|` = M ′t|` and τ |` = τ ′|`. Thus c1 holds.
 Assume r > 1 holds. Then we have ∀i: 1 < i < r: Mt(T i(w)) 6v
`. Because ∀i ≥ r − 1 : Mt(T i(w)) = M ′t(T i(w)), we then
get M ′t(T
r−1(w)) 6v `. From mon(M ′) we then get ∀i < r :
M ′t(T
i(w)) 6v `. Thus, Mt|` = M ′t|` and τ |` = τ ′|`. Thus c1
holds.
3.2. ∀i ≥ 1: Mt(T i(w)) 6v `
By symmetry of preceding case, ∀i ≥ 1: M ′t(T i(w)) 6v `. So,τ |` =obs 
and τ ′|` =obs . Because ∀i ≥ 1: Mt(T i(w)) 6v ` and ∀i ≥ 1: M ′t(T i(w)) 6v
` holds, we get Mt|` = M ′t|`. Thus c1 holds.
4. C1;C2
4.1. C1 terminates normally in τ and τ
′.
Let
τ = 〈C1;C2,M〉 ∗→ 〈C2,M2〉 ∗→ 〈C2t,Mt〉 and
τ ′ = 〈C1;C2,M ′〉 ∗→ 〈C2,M ′2〉 ∗→ 〈C ′2t,M ′t〉.
Consider:
τ1 = 〈C1,M〉 ∗→ 〈stop,M2〉,
τ2 = 〈C2,M2〉 ∗→ 〈C2t,Mt〉,
τ ′1 = 〈C1,M ′〉 ∗→ 〈stop,M ′2〉,
τ ′2 = 〈C2,M ′2〉 ∗→ 〈C ′2t,M ′t〉.
From c1 of IH on C1, we get τ1|` =obs τ ′1|`, M2|` = M ′2|`, and M2(cc) =
M ′2(cc). From mon(M ), mon(M
′) and Lemma 2, we get mon(M2 ),
mon(M ′2 ). So, we can apply IH on C2.
To prove c1, assume C2t = C
′
2t = stop. From IH on C2, we get
τ2|` =obs τ ′2|`, Mt|` = M ′t|`, and Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc). From τ1|` =obs τ ′1|`
and τ2|` =obs τ ′2|`, we get τ |` =obs τ ′|`. Thus c1 holds.
To prove c2, assume C2t = block or C
′
2t = block. From IH on C2,
we get τ2|` =obs τ ′2|`. From τ1|` =obs τ ′1|` and τ2|` =obs τ ′2|`, we get
τ |` =obs τ ′|`. Thus c2 holds.
To prove c3, assume C2t = stop, C
′
2t = block, and M
′
t(bc) 6v `.
From IH on C2, we get Mt(bc) 6v `. Thus c3 holds.
To prove c4, assume C2t = stop, C
′
2t = block, 〈C ′tp,M ′tp〉 → 〈C ′2t,M ′t〉
are the last two states of τ ′, and M ′tp(bccc) v `. Then 〈C ′tp,M ′tp〉 →
〈C ′2t,M ′t〉 are the last two states of τ ′2. From IH on C2, we get that
there exists 〈C ′′,M ′′〉 ∈ τ2, with C ′′ = C ′tp and M ′′|` = M ′tp|`. Thus,
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there exists 〈C ′′,M ′′〉 ∈ τ , with C ′′ = C ′tp and M ′′|` = M ′tp|`. Thus
c4 holds.
4.2. C1 is blocked in both τ, τ
′
Similar to the above case, we apply IH on C1.
4.3. C1 is blocked in τ , terminates normally in τ
′ (C2 may term/block in
τ ′).
c1 is trivially true.
Let:
τ = 〈C1;C2,M〉 ∗→ 〈C1t;C2,Mt〉 and
τ ′ = 〈C1;C2,M ′〉 ∗→ 〈C2,M ′2〉 ∗→ 〈C ′2t,M ′t〉.
Consider:
τ1 = 〈C1,M〉 ∗→ 〈C1t,Mt〉,
τ ′1 = 〈C1,M ′〉 ∗→ 〈stop,M ′2〉,
τ ′2 = 〈C2,M ′2〉 ∗→ 〈C ′2t,M ′t〉.
So, we have
τ |` = τ1|` and τ ′|` = τ ′1|` ⇀ τ ′2|`. (20)
We prove c3. We have Ct = C1t = block. Assume C
′
t = C
′
2t = stop
and Mt(bc) 6v `. We prove M ′t(bc) 6v `. For IH on C1, we get
M ′2(bc) 6v `. From Lemma 7, we then get M ′t(bc) 6v `. Thus c3 holds.
We prove c4. We have Ct = block. Assume C
′
2t = stop, that
〈Ctp;C2,Mtp〉 → 〈C1t;C2,Mt〉 are the last two states of τ , and that
Mtp(bccc) v ` holds. Then 〈Ctp,Mtp〉 → 〈C1t,Mt〉 are the last two
states of τ1. From IH on C1, we get that there exists 〈C ′′,M ′′〉 ∈ τ ′1,
with C ′′ = Ctp and M ′′|` = Mtp|`. Thus, there exists 〈C ′′;C2,M ′′〉 ∈
τ ′, with C ′′ = Ctp and M ′′|` = Mtp|`. Thus c4 holds.
We prove c2. From IH on C1, we get we get τ1|` =obs τ ′1|`. Given
also (20), to prove τ |` =obs τ ′|`, it suffices that τ ′2|` = . So, we prove
τ ′2|` = . Assume the last transition of τ1 is 〈C1tp,Mtp〉 → 〈C1t,Mt〉.
τ1 is blocked due to AsgnAFail, so C1tp is a := e;C
′.
4.3.1. Mtp(bc) 6v `
From Lemma 7 and 〈C1tp,Mtp〉 → 〈C1t,Mt〉, we haveMtp(bc) v
Mt(bc). Hypothesis (4.3.1.) then gives Mt(bc) 6v `. From
IH[c3] on C1, we get M
′
2(bc) 6v `. From Lemma 4, τ ′2|` = .
Thus c2 holds.
4.3.2. Mtp(bc) v ` and Mtp(cc) v `
From IH[c4] on C1, there exists 〈C1tp,M ′1〉 ∈ τ ′1 such that
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Mtp|` = M ′1|`. So, Mtp(bc) = M ′1(bc) and Mtp(cc) = M ′1(cc).
Because τ1 is blocked, we haveMtp(T (e))unionsqMtp(bccc)unionsqMtp(bc) 6v
Mtp(T (a)). Since the inequality is satisfied in τ
′
1, it means that
the value of T (e) is different in M ′1 and Mtp. So, M
′
1(T
2(e)) 6v
`. Consider 〈C1,M ′〉 ∗→ 〈C1tp,M ′1〉 → 〈Cn,Mn〉 a prefix of τ ′1.
From AsgnA, we then have Mn(bc) 6v `. From Lemma 7, we
then get M ′2(bc) 6v `. From Lemma 4, we then have τ ′2|` = .
Thus c2 holds.
4.3.3. Mtp(bc) v ` and Mtp(bccc) 6v `
From AsgnAFail, Mtp(bccc) vMt(bc). So, Mt(bc) 6v `. We work
similarly to case 4.3.1..
5. if e then C1 else C2 end
5.1. M(bccc) v ` and M(T (e)) v `
From mon(M ) and M(T (e)) v `, we have M(T 2(e)) v `. Because
M |` = M ′|` and Lemma 5, we then have M(T (e)) = M ′(T (e)) and
M(e) = M ′(e). So, τ and τ ′ get the same branch, say C1.
τ = 〈if e then C1 else C2 end,M〉 → 〈C1; exit,M1〉 ∗→ 〈Ct,Mt〉
τ ′ = 〈if e then C1 else C2 end,M ′〉 → 〈C1; exit,M ′1〉 ∗→ 〈C ′t,M ′t〉.
From M1(cc) = M(cc).push(〈M(T (e)),W,A〉), M(cc) = M ′(cc),
M(T (e)) = M ′(T (e)), andM ′1(cc) = M
′(cc).push(〈M ′(T (e)),W,A〉),
we get M1(cc) = M
′
1(cc).
We prove M1|` = M ′1|` as per (18). Because M |` = M ′|`, it is trivially
true when M1(bc) 6v `. Assume M1(bc) v `. Because M1(cc) =
M ′1(cc) holds, it suffices to also prove M1(bc) = M
′
1(bc). Because
M1(bc) = M(bc), we then get M(bc) v `. From M |` = M ′|`, we
then get M(bc) = M ′(bc). Because M ′1(bc) = M
′(bc), we then get
M1(bc) = M
′
1(bc). So, M1|` = M ′1|`.
From mon(M ), mon(M ′) and Lemma 2, we get mon(M1 ), mon(M ′1 ).
We apply IH on C1; exit and get c1, c2, c3, and c4.
5.2. M(bccc) 6v ` or M(T (e)) 6v `
We first prove thatM ′(bccc) 6v ` orM ′(T (e)) 6v ` holds. IfM(T (e)) 6v
`, then from M |` = M ′|` and Lemma 6, we get M ′(T (e)) 6v `. Now,
if M(bccc) 6v `, then M(cc) = M ′(cc) gives M ′(bccc) 6v `. Thus, we
have M ′(bccc) 6v ` or M ′(T (e)) 6v `.
So, Lemma 3 gives:
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(i) τ |` =obs  and τ ′|` =obs .
(ii) If Ct = stop (or C
′
t = stop), and w ∈ targetFlex (C), then
∀i :Mt(T i(w)) 6v ` ( or ∀i :M ′t(T i(w)) 6v ` ).
(iii) If Ct = stop (or C
′
t = stop), and targetAnchor(C) 6= ∅ then
Mt(bc) 6v ` or (M ′t(bc) 6v `).
So, c2 holds.
We prove c1. Assume Ct = C
′
t = stop. Because τ |` =obs  and
τ ′|` =obs , it suffices to prove Mt|` = M ′t|` and Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc).
From Lemma 8, we get M(cc) = Mt(cc) and M
′(cc) = M ′t(cc).
From M(cc) = M ′(cc), we then get Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc). We prove
Mt|` = M ′t|`. If Mt(T i+1(x)) v `, then (ii) gives x 6∈ targetFlex (C).
So, Mt(T
i(x)) = M(T i(x)), M ′(T i(x)) = M ′t(T
i(x)), Mt(T
i+1(x)) =
M(T i+1(x)), M ′(T i+1(x)) = M ′t(T
i+1(x)). Thus, M(T i+1(x)) v `.
From M |` = M ′|`, we then have M ′(T i+1(x)) v ` and M(T i(x)) =
M ′(T i(x)). By transitivity, Mt(T i(x)) = M ′t(T
i(x)) andM ′t(T
i+1(x)) v
`. Assume Mt(bc) v `. So, (iii) gives targetAnchor(C) = ∅. So,
M(bc) = Mt(bc) and M
′(bc) = M ′t(bc). From Mt(bc) v `, we then
get M(bc) v `. From M |` = M ′|`, we then get M(bc) = M ′(bc).
Thus, Mt(bc) = M
′
t(bc). So, Mt|` = M ′t|`. Thus c1 holds.
We prove c3. If C ′t = block, then targetAnchor(C) 6= ∅. So, (iii)
gives Mt(bc) 6v `. Thus c3 holds.
We prove c4. We have that M ′(bccc) 6v ` or M ′(T (e)) 6v `.
So, if C ′t = block, then M
′
tp(bccc) 6v `. Thus c4 holds.
6. while e do C1 end
Induction on the maximum number of iterations in τ and τ ′.
Base case: Both τ and τ ′ take (Wl2).
τ = 〈while e do C1 end,M〉 → 〈exit,Me〉 → 〈stop,Mt〉
τ ′ = 〈while e do C1 end,M′〉 → 〈exit,M ′e〉 → 〈stop,M ′t〉.
So, c2, c3, c4 are trivially true.
We prove c1. We have τ |` =obs  and τ ′|` =obs .
6.1. M(T (e)) v `:
We prove Me(cc) = M
′
e(cc). From M(T (e)) v ` and mon(M ), we
then have M(T 2(e)) v `. From M |` = M ′|` and Lemma 5, we then
get M(T (e)) = M ′(T (e)). Both τ and τ ′ have the same W and A.
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So, from M(cc) = M ′(cc) and M(T (e)) = M ′(T (e)), we then get
Me(cc) = M
′
e(cc).
We now prove Me|` = M ′e|`. If Me(bc) 6v `, then it is trivial, given
M |` = M ′|`. Assume Me(bc) v `. Given Me(cc) = M ′e(cc), it suffices
to prove Me(bc) = M
′
e(bc). We have M(bc) = Me(bc) and M
′(bc) =
M ′e(bc). Because Me(bc) v `, we then get M(bc) v `. From M |` =
M ′|`, we then get M(bc) = M ′(bc). Because M(bc) = Me(bc) and
M ′(bc) = M ′e(bc), we then get by transitivity Me(bc) = M
′
e(bc).
So, Me(cc) = M
′
e(cc) and Me|` = M ′e|`. From Lemma 2, mon(M ),
and mon(M ′), we get mon(Me) and mon(Me). We use the proof for
exit to get Mt|` = M ′t|` and Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc). Thus c1 holds.
6.2. M(T (e)) 6v `:
In case (6.1.), we showed that M(T (e)) v ` implies M(T (e)) =
M ′(T (e)), which gives M ′(T (e)) v `. The contrapositive of this
statement is that M ′(T (e)) 6v ` gives M(T (e)) 6v `. Because M,M ′
are arbitrary and because M(T (e)) 6v ` (hypothesis of this case), we
then get M ′(T (e)) 6v `.
We prove Mt(cc) = M
′
t(cc). From Lemma 8, we get M(cc) = Mt(cc)
and M ′(cc) = M ′t(cc). From M(cc) = M
′(cc), we then get Mt(cc) =
M ′t(cc).
We prove Mt|` = M ′t|`. Using Lemma 3, if Mt(T i+1(x)) v `, then x 6∈
targetFlex (C). So, Mt(T
i(x)) = M(T i(x)), M ′(T i(x)) = M ′t(T
i(x)),
Mt(T
i+1(x)) = M(T i+1(x)), M ′(T i+1(x)) = M ′t(T
i+1(x)). Thus,
M(T i+1(x)) v `. From M |` = M ′|`, we then have M ′(T i+1(x)) v `
and M(T i(x)) = M ′(T i(x)). By transitivity, Mt(T i(x)) = M ′t(T
i(x))
and M ′t(T
i+1(x)) v `. Assume Mt(bc) v `. From Lemma 3, we
then get that targetAnchor(C) = ∅. So, M(bc) = Mt(bc) and
M ′(bc) = M ′t(bc). From Mt(bc) v ` and Lemma 7, we get M(bc) v `.
From M |` = M ′|`, we then get M(bc) = M ′(bc). Thus, by transi-
tivity, we get Mt(bc) = M
′
t(bc). And because Mt(cc) = M
′
t(cc), we
consequently have Mt|` = M ′t|`. Thus c1 holds.
Induction case:
6.1. M(bccc) v ` and M(T (e)) v `
From mon(M ), we then have M(T 2(e)) v `. From M |` = M ′|` and
Lemma 5, we then get M(T (e)) = M ′(T (e)) and M(e) = M ′(e). So,
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τ and τ ′ take the same branch. If both take (Wl2), then we follow the
Base case.
Assume that both take (Wl1):
τ = 〈while e do C1 end,M〉 → 〈C1; while e do C1 end; exit,M1〉 ∗→
〈Ct,Mt〉,
τ ′ = 〈while e do C1 end,M ′〉 → 〈C1; while e do C1 end; exit,M ′1〉 ∗→
〈C ′t,M ′t〉.
We get M1(cc) = M
′
1(cc) from M(cc) = M
′(cc) and M(T (e)) =
M ′(T (e)).
We prove M1|` = M ′1|`. Assume M1(bc) v `. Because M1(bc) =
M(bc), we then get M(bc) v `. From M |` = M ′|`, we then get
M(bc) = M ′(bc). Because M ′1(bc) = M
′(bc), we then get M1(bc) =
M ′1(bc). So, M1|` = M ′1|`.
We get mon(M1 ) and mon(M1 ), from Lemma 2, mon(M ), and mon(M
′).
6.1.1. C1 terminates normally in the 1st iteration in τ and τ
′.
τ = 〈while e do C1 end,M〉 → 〈C1; while e do C1 end; exit,M1〉
∗→ 〈while e do C1 end; exit,M2〉 ∗→ 〈Ct,Mt〉,
τ ′ = 〈while e do C1 end,M ′〉 → 〈C1; while e do C1 end; exit,M ′1〉∗→ 〈while e do C1 end; exit,M ′2〉 ∗→ 〈C ′t,M ′t〉.
Consider:
τ1 = 〈C1,M1〉 ∗→ 〈stop,M2〉
τ ′1 = 〈C1,M ′1〉 ∗→ 〈stop,M ′2〉
BecauseM1(cc) = M
′
1(cc), M1|` = M ′1|`, mon(M1 ), and mon(M1 ),
we can apply IH[c1] on C1. So, we get τ1|` =obs τ ′1|`, M2|` =
M ′2|`, and M2(cc) = M ′2(cc). From mon(M1 ), mon(M ′1 ) and
Lemma 2, we get mon(M2 ), mon(M
′
2 ).
Consider traces:
τ2 = 〈while e do C1 end,M2〉 ∗→ 〈C3,M3〉
τ ′2 = 〈while e do C1 end,M ′2〉 ∗→ 〈C ′3,M ′3〉
that terminate (normally or blocked). Because M2|` = M ′2|`,
M2(cc) = M
′
2(cc), mon(M2 ), and mon(M
′
2 ), we can apply IH
on the max-number of iterations on τ2 and τ
′
2.
We prove c2. Say that Ct is block. Then C3 should be block.
From IH[c2] on τ2 and τ
′
2, we then get τ2|` =obs τ ′2|`. Because
we have τ |` =obs τ1|` ⇀ τ2|`, τ ′|` =obs τ ′1|` ⇀ τ ′2|`, τ1|` =obs τ ′1|`,
and τ2|` =obs τ ′2|`, we get τ |` =obs τ ′|`. So, c2 holds.
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We similarly prove c3 and c4.
We prove c1. Assume τ and τ ′ terminate normally:
τ = 〈while e do C1 end,M〉 → 〈C1; while e do C1 end; exit,M1〉
∗→ 〈while e do C1 end; exit,M2〉 ∗→ 〈exit,M3〉 → 〈stop,Mt〉,
τ ′ = 〈while e do C1 end,M ′〉 → 〈C1; while e do C1 end; exit,M ′1〉∗→ 〈while e do C1 end; exit,M ′2〉 ∗→ 〈exit,M ′3〉 → 〈stop,M ′t〉.
Then τ2 and τ
′
2 terminate normally. So, we have
τ2 = 〈while e do C1 end,M2〉 ∗→ 〈stop,M3〉
τ ′2 = 〈while e do C1 end,M ′2〉 ∗→ 〈stop,M ′3〉
By IH[c1] on τ2 and τ
′
2, we then get τ2|` =obs τ ′2|`, M3|` = M ′3|`
and M3(cc) = M
′
3(cc). Because τ |` =obs τ1|` ⇀ τ2|`, τ ′|` =obs
τ ′1|` ⇀ τ ′2|`, τ1|` =obs τ ′1|`, and τ2|` =obs τ ′2|`, we get τ |` =obs τ ′|`.
To prove c1, we also need to prove that Mt|` = M ′t|` and
Mt(cc) = M
′
t(cc). Consider:
τ3 = 〈exit,M3〉 → 〈stop,Mt〉
τ ′3 = 〈exit,M ′3〉 → 〈stop,M ′t〉.
From mon(M2 ), mon(M
′
2 ) and Lemma 2, we get mon(M3 ),
mon(M ′3 ). BecauseM3|` = M ′3|` andM3(cc) = M ′3(cc), mon(M3 ),
and mon(M ′3 ), we can use the proof for exit (case 7.) to get
Mt|` = M ′t|` and Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc). So, c1 holds.
6.1.2. C1 blocked in both τ and τ
′ during 1st iteration.
We use IH on C1.
6.1.3. C1 blocked in τ , terminates normally in τ
′.
τ = 〈while e do C1 end,M〉 → 〈C1; while e do C1 end; exit,M1〉
∗→ 〈C1t; while e do C1 end; exit,Mt〉,
τ ′ = 〈while e do C1 end,M ′〉 → 〈C1; while e do C1 end; exit,M ′1〉∗→ 〈while e do C1 end; exit,M ′2〉 ∗→ 〈C ′t,M ′t〉.
Consider:
τ1 = 〈C1,M1〉 ∗→ 〈C1t,Mt〉
τ ′1 = 〈C1,M ′1〉 ∗→ 〈stop,M ′2〉
τ ′2 = 〈while e do C1 end; exit,M ′2〉 ∗→ 〈C ′t,M ′t〉
IH can be applied to τ1 and τ
′
1, because M1|` = M ′1|`, M1(cc) =
M ′1(cc), mon(M
′
1 ), and C1 is a subcommand of while e do C1 end.
We invoke (4.3.) for τ1, τ
′
1, and τ
′
2.
6.2. M(bccc) 6v ` or M(T (e)) 6v `
Consider:
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τw =
〈if e then (C1; while e do C1 end) else skip end,M〉
∗→ 〈Cwt,Mwt〉, and
τw =
〈if e then (C1; while e do C1 end) else skip end,M ′〉
∗→ 〈C ′wt,M ′wt〉.
We invoke case 5.2. for τw, τ
′
w, and we get:
c1w If Cwt and C
′
wt are both stop, then τw|` =obs τ ′w|`, Mwt|` =
M ′wt|`, and Mwt(cc) = M ′wt(cc).
c2w If Cwt or C
′
wt is block, then τw|` =obs τ ′w|`.
c3w If Cwt is stop, C
′
wt is block, and M
′
wt(bc) 6v `, then Mwt(bc) 6v
`.
We prove c1. Assume Ct and C
′
t are both stop. Because Ct = Cwt
and C ′t = C
′
wt, we have that Cwt and C
′
wt are both stop. From c1w,
we have τw|` = τ ′w|`, Mwt|` = M ′wt|`, and Mwt(cc) = M ′wt(cc). We
have Mt = Mwt, M
′
t = M
′
wt, τ |` =obs τw|`, and τ ′|` =obs τ ′w|`. So,
τ |` =obs τ ′|`, Mt|` = M ′t|`, and Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc). Thus c1 holds.
Similarly, we get c2 and c3.
c4 is trivially true: from M(bccc) 6v ` or M(T (e)) 6v ` we get
M ′tp(bccc) 6v `.
7. exit
We have:
τ = 〈exit,M〉 → 〈stop,Mt〉
τ ′ = 〈exit,M ′〉 → 〈stop,M ′t〉.
c2, c3, c4 are trivially true.
We prove c1. We have τ |` =obs  and τ ′|` =obs . So, we need to prove
Mt|` = Mt|` and Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc). Because M(cc) = M ′(cc), Mt(cc) =
M(cc).pop, and M ′t(cc) = M
′(cc).pop, we then get Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc). We
now prove Mt|` = Mt|`.
7.1. Mt(bccc) unionsqMt(bc) 6v ` and M(cc).top.A 6= ∅.
We first prove thatMt(bc) 6v ` andM ′t(bc) 6v `. BecauseM(cc).top.A 6=
∅, we have Mt(bc) = M(bc) unionsqM(bccc). Because Mt(bccc) v M(bccc),
we get Mt(bccc)unionsqM(bc) vM(bccc)unionsqM(bc), which becomes Mt(bccc)unionsq
M(bc)unionsqM(bccc) vM(bccc)unionsqM(bc)unionsqM(bccc), which becomesMt(bccc)unionsq
Mt(bc) v M(bccc) unionsq M(bc), due to Mt(bc) = M(bc) unionsq M(bccc).
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From Mt(bccc) unionsq Mt(bc) 6v ` we get M(bccc) unionsq M(bc) 6v `. From
Mt(bc) = M(bc)unionsqM(bccc), we then have Mt(bc) 6v `. From M(bccc)unionsq
M(bc) 6v ` and M |` = M ′|`, we get M ′(bccc) unionsqM ′(bc) 6v `. Because
M(cc).top.A 6= ∅ and M(cc) = M ′(cc), we have M ′(cc).top.A 6= ∅,
too. So, M ′t(bc) = M
′(bc) unionsqM ′(bccc). From M ′(bccc) unionsqM ′(bc) 6v `,
we then have M ′t(bc) 6v `. So, Mt(bc) 6v ` and M ′t(bc) 6v `.
Only variables in W change their labels. Let x ∈ M(cc).top.W . Be-
cause M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) 6v `, we have ∀i ≥ 1.Mt(T i(x)) 6v `. Because
M(cc) = M ′(cc), we get x ∈ M ′(cc).top.W , too. From M ′t(bc) 6v `,
we have M ′(bccc) unionsqM ′(bc) 6v `, and thus, ∀i ≥ 1.M ′t(T i(x)) 6v `. So,
Mt|` = M ′t|`. Thus c1 holds.
7.2. Mt(bccc) unionsqMt(bc) 6v ` and M(cc).top.A = ∅.
Because M(cc).top.A = ∅, we have Mt(bc) = M(bc). We have
Mt(bccc) v M(bccc). We get Mt(bccc) unionsqM(bc) v M(bccc) unionsqM(bc),
which becomes Mt(bccc)unionsqMt(bc) vM(bccc)unionsqM(bc), due to Mt(bc) =
M(bc). From Mt(bccc)unionsqMt(bc) 6v `, we then have M(bccc)unionsqM(bc) 6v
`. Because M |` = M ′|`, we also get M ′(bccc) unionsqM ′(bc) 6v `.
We prove that if Mt(bc) v `, then Mt(bc) = M ′t(bc). Assume
Mt(bc) v `. From Mt(bc) = M(bc), we then get M(bc) v `. From
M |` = M ′|`, we then get M(bc) = M ′(bc). Because M(cc).top.A = ∅
and M(cc) = M ′(cc), we have that M ′(cc).top.A = ∅. So, M ′t(bc) =
M ′(bc). By transitivity, we then get Mt(bc) = M ′t(bc).
From Mt(cc) = M
′
t(cc), Mt(bc) = M
′
t(bc), and Mt(bccc)unionsqMt(bc) 6v `,
we then get M ′t(bccc) unionsqM ′t(bc) 6v `.
Only variables in W change their labels. Let x ∈ M(cc).top.W .
Because M(bccc) unionsq M(bc) 6v `, we have ∀i ≥ 1.Mt(T i(x)) 6v `.
Because M(cc) = M ′(cc), we get x ∈ M ′(cc).top.W , too. Be-
cause M ′(bccc) unionsq M ′(bc) 6v `, we have ∀i ≥ 1.M ′t(T i(x)) 6v `. So,
Mt|` = M ′t|`. Thus c1 holds.
7.3. Mt(bccc) unionsqMt(bc) v `
So, Mt(bc) v `. From Lemma 7, we get M(bc) v `. From M |` = M ′|`
and M(bc) v `, we also get M(bc) = M ′(bc). From M(cc) = M ′(cc),
we then get Mt(bc) = M
′
t(bc).
 Let M(bccc) unionsq M(bc) v `. Let x ∈ M(cc).top.W . Because
M(cc) = M ′(cc), we get x ∈M ′(cc).top.W . We have:
Mt(T
i(x)) v ` ⇒ M(T i(x)) v ` ⇒ M(T i−1(x)) = M ′(T i−1(x))
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and M ′(T i(x)) v `.
Because M(cc) = M ′(cc) and M(bc) = M ′(bc), we then have
Mt(T
i−1(x)) = M ′t(T
i−1(x)) and M ′t(T
i(x)) v `. Thus, Mt|` =
M ′t|`. Thus c1 holds.
 Let M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) 6v `.
So, M ′(bccc)unionsqM ′(bc) 6v `. Let x ∈M(cc).top.W . Consequently,
we have that ∀i ≥ 1: Mt(T i(x)) 6v `. Because M(cc) = M ′(cc),
we get x ∈ M ′(cc).top.W , and thus ∀i ≥ 1: M ′t(T i(x)) 6v `.
Thus, Mt|` = M ′t|`. Thus c1 holds.
Lemma 2. Let 〈C,M〉 ∗→ 〈C ′,M ′〉 be a trace generated by ∞-Enf . If
mon(M), then mon(M ′).
Proof. We first prove the statement for one-step transition: 〈C,M〉 → 〈C ′,M ′〉,
and then we use induction on the number of steps in 〈C,M〉 ∗→ 〈C ′,M ′〉. We
prove the statement for one-step transition, using induction on the rules of
∞-Enf ’s operational semantics. Assume mon(M). We prove mon(M ′).
1. (Skip):
Because M = M ′, we then get mon(M ′).
2. (AsgnA):
Trivially true, because no label chain is being updated, and thus, mon(M ′).
3. (AsgnAFail):
Same arguments as in above case.
4. (AsgnF):
From mon(M ′), we have that for every x we have
∀i ≥ 1: M(T i+1(x)) vM(T i(x)),
So, we get ∀i ≥ 1: M(T i+1(e)) vM(T i(e)). We then have
∀i ≥ 1: M(T i+1(e)) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc) vM(T i(e)) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc),
and thus ∀i ≥ 1: M ′(T i+1(w)) vM ′(T i(w)). So, mon(M ′).
5. (If1),(If2),(Wl1),(Wl2):
Trivially true, because no label chain is being updated, and thus, mon(M ′).
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6. (Exit):
Only label chains of w ∈ V change. From mon(M), we have for i ≥ 1,
M(T i+1(w)) v M(T i(w)). Thus, M(T i+1(w)) unionsq M(bccc) unionsq M(bc) v
M(T i(w))unionsqM(bccc)unionsqM(bc). So, M ′(T i+1(w)) vM ′(T i(w)). So, mon(M ′).
7. (Seq1),(Seq2),(SeqF):
We use the IH.
Lemma 3. If C does not include exit (or i-exit), if τ = 〈C,M〉 ∗→ 〈C ′,M ′〉
is generated by ∞-Enf and M(bccc) unionsq M(bc) 6v `, or C is a conditional
command (executed under If, If’, or Wl rule—not IfS rules) with guard e and
M(T (e)) 6v `, then
(i) τ |` =obs .
(ii) if C ′ = stop and w ∈ targetFlex (C), then M ′(T i(w)) 6v `, for all
T i(w) ∈ dom(M ′) where i ≥ 1.
(iii) if C ′ = stop and targetAnchor(C) 6= ∅, then M ′(bc) 6v `.
Proof. Induction on C (which should not include exit).
1. a := e
Assume M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) 6v `.
If C ′ = block, then τ |` = , so (i) holds, and (ii), (iii) are trivially true.
Assume C ′ = stop. So, M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) vM(T (a)). Because M(bccc) unionsq
M(bc) 6v `, we then get M(T (a)) 6v `. Thus τ |` =obs  and (i) holds.
(ii) is trivially true.
We have M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) v M ′(bc). Because M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) 6v `, we
then get M ′(bc) 6v `. Thus (iii) holds.
2. w := e
Assume M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) 6v `.
(iii) is trivially true.
Because M(bccc)unionsqM(bc) 6v ` and ∀i ≥ 1: M(bccc)unionsqM(bc) vM ′(T i(w)),
we get ∀i ≥ 1: M ′(T i(w)) 6v `. Thus (ii) holds.
Also, τ |` =obs . Thus (i) holds.
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3. C1;C2
Assume M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) 6v `.
 Assume τ involves only the execution of C1.
So, τ is blocked, and thus, (ii), (iii) are trivially true.
We prove (i). Because τ involves only the blocked execution of C1,
consider τ1 = 〈C1,M〉 ∗→ 〈block,M ′〉. From IH on C1, we get
τ1|` =obs . Because τ |` = τ1|`, we then get τ |` =obs . Thus (i) holds.
 Assume τ involves execution of C1 and C2.
Then C1 is executed to normal termination. Consider:
τ1 = 〈C1,M〉 ∗→ 〈stop,M1〉.
Also, C2 might be executed to termination or blocked. Consider:
τ2 = 〈C2,M1〉 ∗→ 〈C ′,M ′〉.
From Lemma 8, we get M(cc) = M1(cc). From Lemma 7, we get
M(bc) v M1(bc). So, M(bc) unionsqM(cc) v M1(bc) unionsqM1(bccc). From
M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) 6v `, we then have M1(bc) unionsqM1(bccc) 6v `.
We prove (i). From IH on C1, we get τ1|` =obs . From IH on C2, we
get τ2|` =obs . Because τ |` =obs τ1|` ⇀ τ2|`, we get τ |` =obs . Thus
(i) holds.
We prove (ii). Assume C ′ = stop and w ∈ targetFlex (C1;C2).
Then w ∈ targetFlex (C1) or w ∈ targetFlex (C2). Assume w ∈
targetFlex (C2). From IH on C2, we get ∀i ≥ 1: M ′(T i(w)) 6v `. Thus
(ii) holds. Assume w 6∈ targetFlex (C2). From w ∈ targetFlex (C1;C2),
we get w ∈ targetFlex (C1). IH on C1 gives ∀i ≥ 1: M1(T i(w)) 6v
`. Because w 6∈ targetFlex (C2), we have ∀i ≥ 1: M1(T i(w)) =
M ′(T i(w)). So, ∀i ≥ 1: M ′(T i(w)) 6v `. Thus (ii) holds.
We prove (iii). Assume C ′ = stop and targetAnchor(C1 ; C2 ) 6= ∅.
Then targetAnchor(C1 ) 6= ∅ or targetAnchor(C2 ) 6= ∅. Assume that
targetAnchor(C2 ) 6= ∅. From IH on C2, we get M ′(bc) 6v `. Thus
(iii) holds. Assume targetAnchor(C2 ) = ∅. Because we have that
targetAnchor(C1 ; C2 ) 6= ∅, we then get targetAnchor(C1 ) 6= ∅. From
IH on C1, we get M1(bc) 6v `. From Lemma 7, we have M1(bc) v
M ′(bc). So, we have M ′(bc) 6v `. Thus (iii) holds.
4. if e then C1 else C2 end
Assume M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) 6v ` or M(T (e)) 6v `. W.l.o.g. assume that τ
involves the execution of C1.
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So:
τ = 〈if e then C1 else C2 end,M〉 → 〈C1; exit,M1〉 ∗→ 〈C ′,M ′〉.
Consider:
τ1 = 〈C1,M1〉 ∗→ 〈C ′1,M ′1〉.
We have M(bc) = M1(bc) and M(bccc) vM1(bccc). So, M(bccc)unionsqM(bc) v
M1(bccc) unionsq M1(bc). If M(bccc) unionsq M(bc) 6v `, we then have M1(bc) unionsq
M1(bccc) 6v `. If M(T (e)) 6v `, we then have M1(bc) unionsq M1(bccc) 6v `,
because M(T (e)) vM1(bccc). So, in any case, M1(bc)unionsqM1(bccc) 6v `. So,
we can apply IH on C1.
We prove (i). From IH on C1, we get τ1|` =obs . Because τ |` = τ1|`, we
have τ |` =obs . Thus (i) holds.
We prove (ii). Assume C ′ = stop and w ∈ targetFlex (C ). Then C ′1 =
stop and w ∈ targetFlex (C1 ) or w ∈ targetFlex (C2 ). We have:
τ = 〈if e then C1 else C2 end,M〉 → 〈C1; exit,M1〉 ∗→ 〈exit,M ′1〉 →
〈C ′,M ′〉 and
τ1 = 〈C1,M1〉 ∗→ 〈stop,M ′1〉.
Assume w ∈ targetFlex (C1 ). From IH on C1, we get ∀i ≥ 1: M ′1(T i(w)) 6v
`. Due to the rule for exit, we get ∀i ≥ 1: M ′1(T i(w)) v M ′(T i(w)). So,
∀i ≥ 1: M ′(T i(w)) 6v `. Thus (ii) holds.
Assume w 6∈ targetFlex (C1 ). From w ∈ targetFlex (C ), we then have w ∈
targetFlex (C2 ). So, w ∈ M1(cc).top.W . From Lemma 8, we then have
w ∈ M ′1(cc).top.W . Due to the rule for exit, we get ∀i ≥ 1: M ′1(bccc) unionsq
M ′1(bc) v M ′(T i(w)). We have M1(bccc) unionsqM1(bc) v M ′1(bccc) unionsqM ′1(bc).
So, M ′1(bccc)unionsqM ′1(bc) 6v `. Thus, ∀i ≥ 1: M ′(T i(w)) 6v `. Thus (ii) holds.
We prove (iii). Assume C ′ = stop and targetAnchor(C) 6= ∅ Then C ′1 =
stop and targetAnchor(C1) 6= ∅ or targetAnchor(C2 ) 6= ∅.
Assume targetAnchor(C1 ) 6= ∅. From IH on C1, we get M ′1(bc) 6v `. From
Lemma 7, we get M ′1(bc) v M ′(bc). Thus, we have M ′(bc) 6v `. Thus
(iii) holds.
Assume targetAnchor(C1 ) = ∅. From targetAnchor(C ) 6= ∅, we then
have targetAnchor(C2 ) 6= ∅. So, M1(cc).top.A 6= ∅. From Lemma 8, we
then have M ′1(cc).top.A 6= ∅. Due to the rule for exit, we get M ′(bc) =
M ′1(bccc) unionsqM ′1(bc). We have M1(bccc) unionsqM1(bc) v M ′1(bccc) unionsqM ′1(bc). So,
M ′1(bccc) unionsqM ′1(bc) 6v `. Thus, M ′(bc) 6v `. Thus (iii) holds.
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5. while e do C1 end
We use induction on the number of iterations executed in τ , and IH on
C1, similar to the above cases.
Lemma 4. If τ = 〈C,M〉 ∗→ 〈C ′,M ′〉 is generated by ∞-Enf , and M(bc) 6v
`, then τ |` = .
Proof. By structural induction on C and Lemma 7.
Lemma 5. If M |` = M ′|` and M(T i(e)) v `, for i ≥ 1, then M(T i−1(e)) =
M ′(T i−1(e)).
Proof. We use structural induction on e.
1. e is n:
By definition M(n) = M ′(n) = n. By definition M(T i(n)) = M ′(T i(n)) =
⊥, for i ≥ 1.
2. e is x:
From M |` = M ′|` and M(T i(x)) v `, we have M(T i−1(x)) = M ′(T i−1(x)).
3. e is e1 ⊕ e2:
We have M(T i(e)) = M(T i(e1)) unionsqM(T i(e2)). From M(T i(e)) v `, we
then get M(T i(e1)) v ` and M(T i(e2)) v `. By IH on e1 and e2, we
get M(T i−1(e1)) = M ′(T i−1(e1)) and M(T i−1(e2)) = M ′(T i−1(e2)). We
have M(e) = M(e1)⊕M(e2) = M ′(e1)⊕M ′(e2) = M ′(e). For i ≥ 1, we
have M(T i(e)) = M(T i(e1)) unionsqM(T i(e2)) = M ′(T i(e1)) unionsqM ′(T i(e2)) =
M ′(T i(e)).
Lemma 6. If M |` = M ′|`, mon(M ), mon(M ′) and M(T i(e)) 6v `, then
M ′(T i(e)) 6v `.
Proof. We prove it by contradiction. Assume M ′(T i(e)) v `. From mon(M ),
we then have M ′(T i+1(e)) v `. From Lemma 5, we then get M(T i(e)) =
M ′(T i(e)). So, M(T i(e)) v `, which is a contradiction.
Lemma 7. Let 〈C,M〉 ∗→ 〈C ′,M ′〉 be a trace generated by ∞-Enf . Then
M(bc) vM ′(bc).
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Proof. We first prove that: if 〈C,M〉 → 〈C ′,M ′〉 is generated by ∞-Enf ,
then M(bc) v M ′(bc). To prove this, we use induction on the rules for
∞-Enf ’s operational semantics. We then use induction on the number of
steps in 〈C,M〉 → 〈C ′,M ′〉.
Lemma 8. Let 〈C,M〉 ∗→ 〈stop,Mt〉 be a trace generated by ∞-Enf and let
C have no exit (or i-exit), then M(cc) = Mt(cc).
Proof. We use structural induction on C.
Lemma 9. Let 〈C,M〉 ∗→ 〈C ′,M ′〉 be a trace generated by ∞-Enf . If
2stut(M), then 2stut(M ′).
Proof. We first prove the statement for one-step transition:
〈C,M〉 → 〈C ′,M ′〉, and then we use induction on the number of steps in
〈C,M〉 ∗→ 〈C ′,M ′〉. We prove the statement for one-step transition, using
induction on the rules of ∞-Enf ’s operational semantics. Assume, for all x,
we have M(T 2(x)) vM(T (x)) and ∀i > 1: M(T 2(x)) = M(T i(x)).
1. (Skip):
Because M = M ′, we then get M ′(T 2(x)) vM ′(T (x)) and
∀i > 1: M ′(T 2(x)) = M ′(T i(x)).
2. (AsgnA):
Trivially true, because no label chain is being updated, and thus, we have
∀i ≥ 1: M(T i(x)) = M ′(T i(x)).
3. (AsgnAFail):
Same arguments as in above case.
4. (AsgnF):
Because for every x we have M(T 2(x)) v M(T (x)), we get M(T 2(e)) v
M(T (e)). We then have
M(T 2(e)) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc) vM(T (e)) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc),
and thus M ′(T 2(w)) vM ′(T (w)).
Similarly, we get ∀i > 1: M ′(T 2(w)) = M ′(T i(w)).
5. (If1),(If2),(Wl1),(Wl2):
Trivially true, because no label chain is being updated, and thus,
∀i ≥ 1: M(T i(x)) = M ′(T i(x)).
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6. (Exit):
Only label chains of w ∈ W change. We have M ′(T 2(w)) = M(T 2(w)) unionsq
M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) and M ′(T (w) = M(T (w)) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc). Because
M(T 2(w)) v M(T (w)), we then get M ′(T 2(w)) v M ′(T (w)). Similarly,
we get ∀i > 1: M ′(T 2(w)) = M ′(T i(w)).
7. (Seq1),(Seq2),(SeqF):
We use IH.
Theorem 2. k-Enf is an enforcer on R for k-BNI(L), for any L and k ≥ 2.
Proof. It is easy to prove that k-Enf is an enforcer on R and satisfies restric-
tions (E1), (E2), and (E3) by induction on the rules for k-Enf . We omit the
details.
We now prove k-BNI(k-Enf ,L, C), for a command C, a lattice L, and
k ≥ 2. Consider ` ∈ L. Take M,M ′ with M |= H0(k-Enf ,L, C), M ′ |=
H0(k-Enf ,L, C), M |` = M ′|`, and finite traces τ = tracek-Enf (C,M) and
τ ′ = tracek-Enf (C,M ′), where τ = 〈C,M〉 ∗→ 〈Ct,Mt〉, and τ ′ = 〈C,M ′〉 ∗→
〈C ′t,M ′t〉.
We prove τ |k` =obs τ ′|k` or equivalently τ |` =obs τ ′|`, because k-Enf gen-
erates observation up to kth tag. From M |= H0(k-Enf ,L, C) and M ′ |=
H0(k-Enf ,L, C), we get M(cc) = M ′(cc), mon(M), and mon(M ′). There
exists MI such that MI |= H0(∞-Enf ,L, C), MI =k M , and kstut(MI).
Similarly, there exists M ′I such that M
′
I |= H0(∞-Enf ,L, C), M ′I =k M ′, and
kstut(M ′I).
We prove MI |` = M ′I |`. Due to M |` = M ′|`, MI =k M , and M ′I =k
M ′, it suffices to examine ∀x: ∀i > k: T i(x). Assume MI(T i(x)) v `.
From kstut(MI), we then get MI(T
k(x)) v `. From MI =k M , we then
have M(T k(x)) v `. By definition of k-Enf , we have T k+1(x) = T k(x),
and thus M(T k+1(x)) v `. From M |` = M ′|`, we then get M(T k(x)) =
M ′(T k(x)). From MI =k M , kstut(MI), M ′I =k M
′, and kstut(M ′I), we have
MI(T
i−1(x)) = M ′I(T
i−1(x)) and MI(T i(x)) = M ′I(T
i(x)). So, MI |` = M ′I |`.
We have MI(cc) = M
′
I(cc), due to M(cc) = M
′(cc), MI =k M , and
M ′I =k M
′. We have mon(MI), due to mon(M), MI =k M , and kstut(MI).
Similarly, we have mon(M ′I).
Consider
τI = trace∞-Enf (C,MI) = 〈C,MI〉 ∗→ 〈Ct,MIt〉, and
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τ ′I = trace∞-Enf (C,M
′
I) = 〈C,M ′I〉 ∗→ 〈C ′t,M ′It〉.
From Lemma 10, and applying induction on the number of steps in τ and τ ′,
we get τI |k` = τ |` and τ ′I |k` = τ ′|`. Because∞-Enf satisfies BNI+ (Lemma 1),
we get τI |` =obs τ ′I |`. We then get τI |k` =obs τ ′I |k` . So, τ |` =obs τ ′|`.
Lemma 10. Consider τ = 〈C,M〉 → 〈Cn,Mn〉 be a step under k-Enf with
k ≥ 2. Let M ′ =k M , kstut(M ′), and τ ′ = 〈C,M ′〉 → 〈C ′n,M ′n〉 be a step
under ∞-Enf . Then, M ′n =k Mn, kstut(M ′n), Cn = C ′n, and τ |` = τ ′|k` .
Proof. Structural induction on C.
1. C is skip:
We have M = Mn and M
′ = M ′n. So, M
′
n =k Mn and kstut(M
′
n). Also,
Cn = C
′
n = stop and τ |` = τ ′|k` = .
2. C is a := e:
Ga:=e is T (e) unionsq M(bccc) unionsq bc v T (a). Because M ′ =k M and k ≥ 2,
we have M(e) = M ′(e), M(T (e)) = M ′(T (e)), M(T 2(e)) = M ′(T 2(e)),
M(T (a)) = M ′(T (a)), M(cc) = M ′(cc), M(bc) = M ′(bc). So, τ and τ ′
both are generated from AsgnA, or both from AsgnAFail. So, Cn = C
′
n. Also,
Mn(bc) = M
′
n(bc). Thus, M
′
n =k Mn. Because no label chain changed,
kstut(M ′) gives kstut(M ′n). Because M(e) = M
′(e), we also get τ |` = τ ′|k` .
3. C is w := e:
We have Cn = C
′
n = stop. We have ∀0 ≤ i ≤ k:
M ′n(T
i(w)) = M ′(T i(e)) unionsqM ′(cc) unionsqM ′(bc) =
M(T i(e)) unionsqM(cc) unionsqM(bc) = Mn(T i(w)).
Also, ∀i > k, we have M ′n(T i(w)) = M ′n(T k(w)). So, M ′n =k Mn and
kstut(M ′n). We have τ |` = τ ′|k` , because ∀0 ≤ i ≤ k + 1 we have
Mn(T
i(w)) = M ′n(T
i(w)).
4. C is if e then C1 else C2 end:
From M ′ =k M , we get M(e) = M ′(e), M(T (e)) = M ′(T (e)), M(cc) =
M ′(cc), M(bc) = M ′(bc). Both τ and τ ′ take the same branch. Say C1:
τ = 〈C,M〉 → 〈C1; exit,M1〉
τ ′ = 〈C,M ′〉 → 〈C1; exit,M ′1〉.
We have M1(cc) = M
′
1(cc). So, M
′
1 =k M1. Because no label chain
changed, kstut(M ′) gives kstut(M ′1). Also, τ |` = τ ′|` =  and Cn = C ′n =
C1; exit.
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5. C is while e do C1 end:
Similarly to above.
6. C is C1;C2:
By IH on C1.
7. C is exit:
We have Cn = C
′
n = stop. Also τ |` = τ ′|` = . From M ′ =k M , we
get M(cc) = M ′(cc) and M(bc) = M ′(bc). So, Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc) and
Mt(bc) = M
′
t(bc). Only variables in W change. Assume w ∈ W . We have
that
∀0 ≤ i ≤ k: M ′n(T i(w)) = M ′(T i(w)) unionsqM ′(cc) unionsqM ′(bc) =
M(T i(w)) unionsqM(cc) unionsqM(bc) = Mn(T i(w)).
Alos, ∀i > k, we have M ′n(T i(w)) = M ′n(T k(w)). So, M ′n =k Mn and
kstut(M ′n).
Lemma 11. If 〈C,M〉 → 〈C ′,M ′〉 according to k-Enf , and 2stut(M), then
2stut(M ′).
Proof. Assume 〈C,MI〉 → 〈C ′I ,M ′I〉 according to ∞-Enf , where MI =k M
and kstut(MI). From Lemma 10, we get M
′
I =k M
′ and kstut(M ′I). Because
2stut(M), MI =k M , and kstut(MI), we have 2stut(MI). From Lemma 9,
we get 2stut(M ′I). From M
′
I =k M
′, we then get 2stut(M ′).
A.3 Optimized Enforcer k-Eopt
We sketch the construction of k-Eopt . We add two rules for if command
(one for each truth value of the guard) to k-Enf . These new rules apply to a
simple if command. We add a premise to the existing rules for if command,
so that these rules are triggered when this if command is not simple. The new
rules for simple if command augment the taken branch with a new delimiter
i-end, and we add one rule for i-end to k-Enf ; this rule sets certain labels of
label chains to ⊥. Notice, there are programs where k-Eopt produces more
permissive label chains than those produced by k-Enf .
Figure 10 gives the rules for augmenting k-Enf in order to obtain k-Eopt .
Function isSimple(C,M, i) decides whether a command C is simple:
(i) C is of the form if a > 0 then wi := e else wi := n end,
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(IfS1)
∃i: 1 ≤ i ≤ k: isSimple(if e then C1 else C2 end,M, i)
M(e) 6= 0 cc′ = M(cc).push(〈M(T (e)), ∅, ∅〉
〈if e then C1 else C2 end,M〉 → 〈C1; i-exit,M [cc 7→ cc′]〉
(IfS2)
∃i: 1 ≤ i ≤ k: isSimple(if e then C1 else C2 end,M, i)
M(e) = 0 cc′ = M(cc).push(〈M(T (e)), ∅, ∅〉
〈if e then C1 else C2 end,M〉 → 〈C2; i-exit,M [cc 7→ cc′]〉
(Exit IfS)
cc′ = cc.pop
〈i-exit,M〉 → 〈stop,M [∀j: i<j≤k: T j(wi) 7→ ⊥, cc 7→ cc′]〉
Figure 10: Rules for simple if command
(ii) a is an anchor variable,
(iii) wi is a flexible variable,
(iv) i = 1 and M(T (e)) = ⊥, or
i > 1, M(T i−1(e)) 6= ⊥, and M(T i(e)) = ⊥,
(v) n is a constant,
(vi) C is context-free (e.g., M(cc) =  and M(bc) = ⊥).
Notice that if isSimple(C,M, i) holds, then isSimple(C,M, j) does not hold
for j 6= i, due to (iv) and monotonically decreasing label chains.
As an example, we show how k-Eopt deduces label chains for the following
simple if :
if m > 0 then w := h else w := 4 end (21)
where anchor variable m is associated with 〈M,⊥,⊥,⊥〉, anchor variable h
is associated with 〈H,⊥,⊥,⊥〉, and h 6= 4. Without considering the context
(i.e., m > 0), flexible variable w would be associated with either 〈H,⊥,⊥,⊥〉
(due to w := h) or 〈⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥〉 (due to w := 4), when execution of assign-
ments ends. Here, only w and T (w) reveal information about guard m > 0.
So, at the end of the conditional command, only T (w) and T 2(w) should be
updated with the sensitivity of the context T (m) = M. Thus, if m > 0, then
w is associated with 〈H,M,⊥,⊥〉, at the end of the conditional command.
64
Otherwise, w is associated with 〈M,M,⊥,⊥〉. Notice that, in both cases,
the meta-meta label of w is strictly less restrictive than its metalabel. So,
using the metalabel to specify its own sensitivity would be conservative. In
particular, using rules from k-Enf , w would be associated with 〈M,M,M,M〉
or 〈H,M,M,M〉 at the end of the execution. Consequently, k-Enf deduces
less permissive label chains than k-Eopt .
Consider now how k-Eopt produces label chains for the following simple
if :
if a > 0 then wi := e else wi := n end
where T (a) = A, T j(e) 6= ⊥ for j < i, and T j(e) = ⊥ for j ≥ i. Without
considering the context, we have
∀j ≥ i: T j(wi) = ⊥
at the end of both branches. Only T j(wi), for j < i, reveal information about
guard a > 0. So, at the end of the conditional command, only T j+1(wi), for
j < i, should be updated with T (a) = A. Thus, at the end of the conditional
command, we always have
∀j > i: T j(wi) = ⊥.
So, when execution exits a simple if command, T j(wi) can be set to ⊥, for
every j > i.
Consider now lattice L3 , 〈{H,M, L},v〉 with ⊥ = L @ M @ H and the
following program:
if m > 0 then w := h else w := 4 end;
if l > 0 then w′ := w else w := m end;
w′′ := w′
where l is anchor variable with T (l) = ⊥ and w′, w′′ are flexible variables.
If m 6> 0 and l > 0, then w′′ is associated with 〈M,M,⊥,⊥〉. If l 6> 0, then
w′′ is associated with 〈M,⊥,⊥,⊥〉. So, k-Eopt produces 2-precise 2-varying
label chains for the target variable w′′. Such an example can be extended to
show that k-Eopt can produce k-precise k-varying label chains.
For enforcer k-Eopt , we have nk-Eopt = k + 1, Aux k-Eopt = {cc, bc},
Initk-Eopt(cc) = , and Initk-Eopt(bc) = ⊥.
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Soundness of k-Eopt
Lemma 12. k-Eopt is an enforcer on R for k-BNI with k ≥ 2.
Proof. We first add the rules in Figure 10 to k-Enf and retrieve k-Eopt .
Also, we substitute (If1) and (If2) with:
(If1’)
@i: 1 ≤ i ≤ k: isSimple(if e then C1 else C2 end,M, i)
M(e) 6= 0 W = targetFlex (C2)
A = targetAnchor(C2) cc
′ = M(cc).push(〈M(T (e)), W, A〉)
〈if e then C1 else C2 end,M〉 → 〈C1; exit,M [cc 7→ cc′]〉
(If2’)
@i: 1 ≤ i ≤ k: isSimple(if e then C1 else C2 end,M, i)
M(e) = 0 W = targetFlex (C1)
A = targetAnchor(C1) cc
′ = M(cc).push(〈M(T (e)), W, A〉)
〈if e then C1 else C2 end,M〉 → 〈C2; exit,M [cc 7→ cc′]〉
It is easy to prove that k-Eopt is an enforcer on R and satisfies restrictions
(E1), (E2), and (E3) by induction on the rules for k-Eopt .10 We omit the
details.
We prove that BNI+(k-Eopt ,L,C) holds, for a command C and a lattice
L.
Assume ` ∈ L and
M |` = M ′|`,
M(cc) = M ′(cc),mon(M),mon(M ′)
τ = 〈C,M〉 ∗→ 〈Ct,Mt〉 according to k-Eopt ,
τ ′ = 〈C,M ′〉 ∗→ 〈C ′t,M ′t〉 according to k-Eopt
where Ct and C
′
t are terminations (normal or blocked).
We prove c1, c2, c3, and c4. We use structural induction on C. We build
on the proof of Lemma 1. That proof uses lemmata 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8,
which all still hold for k-Eopt .
If C is skip or a := e, then k-Eopt and ∞-Enf use the same rules. So, we
10For k-Eopt , we could use exit and introduce a new auxiliary for tracking when a
simple if is executed. For simplicity, we instead introduce a new conditional delimiter
i-exit and extend definition 〈C,M〉 =0 〈C ′,M ′〉 to hold even if the syntax of conditional
delimiters that appear in C and C ′ is different.
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follow the same proof as in Case 1 and Case 2 of Lemma 1.
If C is w := e, then k-Eopt and ∞-Enf use the same rule up to the kth tag.
So, we follow the same proof as in Case 3 of Lemma 1 by bounding r ≤ k
and i ≤ k and recalling T k(x) = T k+1(x) (dy definition of k-Eopt).
If C is C1;C2, while e do Ct end, or exit, then k-Eopt and ∞-Enf use the
same rules up to the kth tag. We follow the same proof as in Cases 4,6,7 of
Lemma 1 by bounding i ≤ k and recalling T k(x) = T k+1(x) (dy definition of
k-Eopt).
Now, it suffices to prove that BNI+(k-Eopt ,L,C) holds, where C is an
if . We first prove that if isSimple(C,M, i) holds for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k, then
isSimple(C,M ′, i) holds, too. Because isSimple(C,M, i) holds, we get:
C is of the form if a > 0 then wi := ei else wi := n end, (22)
a is an anchor variable, (23)
wi is a flexible variable, (24)
i = 1 and M(T (ei)) = ⊥, or
i > 1 and M(T i−1(ei)) 6= ⊥ and M(T i(ei)) = ⊥ (25)
n is a constant, (26)
C is context-free (e.g., M(cc) =  and M(bc) = ⊥). (27)
 From (25), mon(M), and M |` = M ′|`, we have M(T i(ei)) = M ′(T i(ei))
and if i > 1, then M(T i−1(ei)) = M ′(T i−1(ei)).
So,
i = 1 and M ′(T (ei)) = ⊥, or
i > 1 and M ′(T i−1(ei)) 6= ⊥ and M ′(T i(ei)) = ⊥
(28)
 From (27), we have M(cc) = . From M(cc) = M ′(cc), we then get
M ′(cc) = . (29)
 From (27), we have M(bc) = ⊥. From M |` = M ′|`, we then get
M ′(bc) = ⊥. (30)
From (22), (23), (24), (28), (26), (29), and (30), we get that isSimple(C,M ′, i)
holds. So, if isSimple(C,M, i) holds, then isSimple(C,M ′, i) holds, too. Sim-
ilarly, if isSimple(C,M ′, i) holds, then isSimple(C,M, i) holds. Thus, τ and
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τ ′ both use IfS or If’. If both τ and τ ′ use If’ (i.e, If1’ or If2’), then we follow
Case 5 of Lemma 1.
So, it remains to handle the case where τ and τ ′ both use IfS. A simple
if does not contain assignments to anchor variables. So, a trace of a simple
if never stops before normal termination. Thus, c2, c3, and c4 are trivially
true.
We prove c1. Assume C is if a > 0 then wi := ei else wi := n end and
M |` = M ′|`,
M(cc) = M ′(cc),mon(M),mon(M ′)
τ = 〈C,M〉 → 〈Cb; i-exit,Mb〉 → 〈i-exit,Me〉 → 〈stop,Mt〉,
τ ′ = 〈C,M ′〉 → 〈C ′b; i-exit,M ′b〉 → 〈i-exit,M ′e〉 → 〈stop,M ′t〉
where Cb and C
′
b are either wi := ei or wi := n.
We prove τ |` =obs τ ′|`, Mt|` = M ′t|`, and Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc), in the case
τ and τ ′ both use IfS (i.e, IfS1 or IfS2). From M(cc) = M ′(cc), IfS, and
Exit IfS, we get Mt(cc) = M
′
t(cc). It remains to prove that τ |` =obs τ ′|` and
Mt|` = M ′t|`.
We first compute the possible label chains that wi may be associated
with at different points of the execution of C. Notice that by the definition
of simple if we have bccc = ⊥ and bc = ⊥ at the beginning of its execution.
(I) After execution of wi := ei:
From AsgnF, IfS, and (25) we have:
∀j: 1 ≤ j < i: T j(wi) = T j(ei) unionsq T (a) and
∀j: i ≤ j ≤ k: T j(wi) = T (a).
(II) After execution of wi := n:
From AsgnF and IfS we have:
∀j: 1 ≤ j ≤ k: T j(wi) = T (a).
(III) After execution of i-exit when a > 0 holds:
From Exit IfS and (I) we have:
∀j: 1 ≤ j < i: T j(wi) = T j(ei) unionsq T (a) and T i(wi) = T (a) and
∀j: i < j ≤ k: T j(wi) = ⊥.
(IV) After execution of i-exit when a 6> 0 holds:
From Exit IfS and (II) we have:
∀j: 1 ≤ j ≤ i: T j(wi) = T (a) and ∀j: i < j ≤ k: T j(wi) = ⊥.
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By definition of anchor variables, M(T 2(a)) = ⊥. From M |` = M ′|`, we then
get M(T (a)) = M ′(T (a)).
We prove τ |` =obs τ ′|` and Mt|` = M ′t|`.
1. M(T (a)) v `:
From M |` = M ′|`, we get M(a) = M ′(a). So, τ and τ ′ take the same
branch. We first prove τ |` =obs τ ′|`. Because these observations might
involve only wi and its associated label chain, it suffices to show that:
for j such that 1 ≤ j ≤ k + 1, if Me(T j(wi)) v `, then M ′e(T j(wi)) v `
and Me(T
j−1(wi)) = M ′e(T
j−1(wi)). We examine two cases based on the
branch that is executed.
 Branch wi := ei is executed.
Consider j such that i+ 1 ≤ j ≤ k + 1.
Due to (I), we have Me(T
j−1(wi)) = M ′e(T
j−1(wi)) = M(T (a)). Be-
cause T k+1(wi) = T
k(wi), we also have that
Me(T
k+1(wi)) = M
′
e(T
k+1(wi)) = M(T (a)).
Consider j = i. Me(T
j(wi)) v ` and M ′e(T j(wi)) v ` hold be-
cause from (I), we have Me(T
j(wi)) = M
′
e(T
j(wi)) = M(T (a)) and
M(T (a)) v `. From (25) and M |` = M ′|` we have M(T i−1(ei)) =
M ′(T i−1(ei)), and thus, (I) gives Me(T j−1(wi)) = M(T i−1(ei)) unionsq
M(T (a)) = M ′(T i−1(ei)) unionsqM ′(T (a)) = M ′e(T j−1(wi)).
Consider j < i. Assume Me(T
j(wi)) v `. Then, from (I), we have
M(T j(ei)) v `. From M |` = M ′|` and Lemma 5, we then have
M(T j−1(ei)) = M ′(T j−1(ei)). For j = 1, we then have M(ei) =
M ′(ei). For j 6= 1, (I) givesMe(T j−1(wi)) = M(T j−1(ei))unionsqM(T (a)) =
M ′(T j−1(ei)) unionsqM ′(T (a)) = M ′e(T j−1(wi)).
 Branch wi := n is executed.
From (II) and because T k+1(wi) = T
k(wi), we get
∀j: 1 ≤ j ≤ k + 1: Me(T j(wi)) = M ′e(T j(wi)) = M(T (a)).
Also, Me(wi) = M
′
e(wi) = n.
So, τ |` =obs τ ′|` holds.
We now prove Mt|` = M ′t|`. Because Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc) and because bc is
not modified, it suffices to prove Mt|` = M ′t|` for the label chain of wi. We
prove for j with 1 ≤ j ≤ k+1 that if Mt(T j(wi)) v `, then M ′t(T j(wi)) v `
and Mt(T
j−1(wi)) = M ′t(T
j−1(wi)). We examine two cases based on the
branch that is executed.
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 Branch wi := ei is executed.
From (III) and because T k+1(wi) = T
k(wi), we get
∀j: i ≤ j ≤ k + 1: Mt(T j(wi)) = M ′t(T j(wi)).
So, it suffices to examine j ≤ i.
Consider j = i. From (25) and M |` = M ′|` we have M(T i−1(ei)) =
M ′(T i−1(ei)), and thus, (III) gives Mt(T j−1(wi)) = M(T i−1(ei)) unionsq
M(T (a)) = M ′(T i−1(ei)) unionsqM(T (a)) = M ′t(T j−1(wi)).
Consider j < i. Assume Mt(T
j(wi)) v `. Then, from (III), we have
M(T j(ei)) v `. From M |` = M ′|`, we then have M(T j−1(ei)) =
M ′(T j−1(ei)). For j = 1, we then have M(ei) = M ′(ei). For
j 6= 1, we then have Mt(T j−1(wi)) = M(T j−1(ei)) unionsq M(T (a)) =
M ′(T j−1(ei)) unionsqM ′(T (a)) = M ′t(T j−1(wi)).
 Branch wi := n is executed.
From (IV) and because T k+1(wi) = T
k(wi), we get
∀j: 1 ≤ j ≤ k + 1: Mt(T j(wi)) = M ′t(T j(wi)).
Also, Mt(wi) = M
′
t(wi) = n.
Thus, Mt|` = M ′t|` holds.
2. M(T (a)) 6v `:
Traces τ and τ ′ may take different branches. From (I), (II), M(T (a)) 6v `,
and because T k+1(wi) = T
k(wi), we get that:
∀j: 1 ≤ j ≤ k + 1: Me(T j(wi)) 6v ` ∧M ′e(T j(wi)) 6v `.
Thus, τ |` =obs  and τ ′|` =obs .
We now prove Mt|` = M ′t|`. Because Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc) and because bc
is not modified, it suffices to prove Mt|` = M ′t|` for the label chain of
wi. We prove for j with 1 ≤ j ≤ k + 1 that if Mt(T j(wi)) v `, then
M ′t(T
j(wi)) v ` and Mt(T j−1(wi)) = M ′t(T j−1(wi)). (III) and (IV) give
∀j: 1 ≤ j ≤ i: T j(wi) 6v `. It then suffices to prove that the following
holds:
∀j: i ≤ j ≤ k + 1: Mt(T j(wi)) = M ′t(T j(wi)).
For j = i, we have Mt(T
j(wi)) = M(T (a)) = M
′
t(T
j(wi)). For j with i <
j < k + 1, we have Mt(T
j(wi)) = ⊥ = M ′t(T j(wi)). Because T k+1(wi) =
T k(wi), we also have Mt(T
k+1(wi)) = ⊥ = M ′t(T k+1(wi)). So, Mt|` = M ′t|`
holds.
So, BNI+(k-Eopt ,L,C) holds. Because BNI+(k-Eopt ,L,C) implies that k-
BNI(k-Eopt ,L,C) holds, we get that k-BNI(k-Eopt ,L,C) holds, too.
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A.4 Permissiveness of k-Enf versus Chain Length
Theorem 3. k-Enf <k,Lρk (k + 1)-Enf , for k ≥ 2 and any lattice L with at
least one non-bottom element.
Proof. We first prove k-Enf ≤k,Lρk (k+1)-Enf . Consider τ = tracek-Enf (C,M)
withM |= H0(k-Enf ,L, C). ConsiderM ′ such thatM ′ |= H0((k+1)-Enf ,L, C),
M |k = M ′|k, and τ ′ = trace(k+1)-Enf (C,M ′). Using induction on the num-
ber of steps in τ and Lemma 13, we get that τ |k`  τ ′|k` , for all ` ∈ L. So,
k-Enf ≤k,Lρk (k + 1)-Enf .
To prove k-Enf <k,Lρk (k + 1)-Enf , it suffices to also show that (k +
1)-Enf 6≤k,Lρk k-Enf . Because L contains at least one non-bottom element `,
with ⊥ @ `, there exists M1 such that M1 |= H0((k + 1)-Enf ,L, C),
τ = trace(k+1)-Enf (w := w1,M1) = 〈w := w1,M1〉 → 〈stop,M2〉,
and M1(T
k+1(w1)) @M1(T k(w1)).
There exists M ′1 such that M
′
1 |= H0(k-Enf ,L, C), M1|k = M ′1|k, and
τ ′ = tracek-Enf (w := w1,M ′1) = 〈w := w1,M ′1〉 → 〈stop,M ′2〉.
From M1|k = M ′1|k, we have M ′1(T k(w1)) = M1(T k(w1)). By definition of
k-Enf (i.e., ∀x :T k+1(x) = T k(x)), we then have
M ′1(T
k+1(w1)) = M
′
1(T
k(w1)) = M1(T
k(w1)) AM1(T k+1(w1)),
and thus, we get M ′2(T
k+1(w)) A M2(T k+1(w)). So, τ generates observation
involving T k(w) to label M2(T
k+1(w)), but τ ′ does not generate observation
involving T k(w) to label M2(T
k+1(w)). So, (k + 1)-Enf 6≤k,Lρk k-Enf . Thus,
k-Enf <k,Lρk (k + 1)-Enf .
Lemma 13. Consider step τ = 〈C,M1〉 → 〈C2,M2〉 generated by k-Enf for
k ≥ 2. Consider step τ ′ = 〈C,M ′1〉 → 〈C ′2,M ′2〉 generated by (k + 1)-Enf . If
M1 =k M
′
1, then C2 = C
′
2, M2 =k M
′
2, and τ |k`  τ ′|k` , for all `.
Proof. By structural induction on C.
Theorem 4. k-Enf ∼=k,Lc (k + 1)-Enf for any lattice L and k ≥ 2
Proof. We prove k-Enf ≤k,Lc (k + 1)-Enf and (k + 1)-Enf ≤k,Lc k-Enf .
Consider conventionally initialized memory M with M |= H0(k-Enf ,L, C)
and τ = tracek-Enf (C,M). ConsiderM
′ such thatM ′ |= H0((k+1)-Enf ,L, C),
ρ1(M,M
′), and τ ′ = trace(k+1)-Enf (C,M ′). So, M ′ is conventionally ini-
tialized, too. Thus, we have 2stut(M) and 2stut(M ′). Also, because M
and M ′ are conventionally initialized and ρ1(M,M ′) holds, we get that
M =k M
′ holds. Using induction on the number of steps in τ and Lemma
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14, we get that τ |k` = τ ′|k` , for all ` ∈ L. So, k-Enf ≤k,Lc (k + 1)-Enf and
(k + 1)-Enf ≤k,Lc k-Enf . Thus, k-Enf ∼=k,Lc (k + 1)-Enf .
Lemma 14. Consider step τ = 〈C,M1〉 → 〈C2,M2〉 generated by k-Enf for
k ≥ 2. Consider step τ ′ = 〈C,M ′1〉 → 〈C ′2,M ′2〉 generated by (k + 1)-Enf . If
M1 =k M
′
1, 2stut(M1), and 2stut(M
′
1), then C2 = C
′
2, M2 =k M
′
2, 2stut(M2),
2stut(M ′2), and τ |k` = τ ′|k` , for all `.
Proof. By structural induction on C.
Theorem 5. k-Enf ∼=0,Lρk (k + 1)-Enf for any lattice L and k ≥ 2.
Proof. Lemma 15 gives 2-Enf ∼=0,Lρ2 k-Enf for any lattice L and k ≥ 2. Be-
cause ρk ⇒ ρ2, we then get 2-Enf ∼=0,Lρk k-Enf for k ≥ 2. By transitivity, we
then have k-Enf ∼=0,Lρk (k + 1)-Enf .
Lemma 15. 2-Enf ∼=0,Lρ2 k-Enf for any lattice L and k > 2.
Proof. We prove k-Enf ≤0,Lρ2 2-Enf and 2-Enf ≤0,Lρ2 k-Enf . Consider memory
M with M |= H0(2-Enf,L, C) and τ = trace2-Enf(C,M). Consider memory
M ′ such that M ′ |= H0(k-Enf ,L, C), ρ2(M,M ′), and τ ′ = tracek-Enf (C,M ′).
Using induction on the number of steps in τ and Lemma 16, we get that
τ |0` = τ ′|0` , for all ` ∈ L. So, k-Enf ≤0,Lρ2 2-Enf and 2-Enf ≤0,Lρ2 k-Enf . Thus,
2-Enf ∼=0,Lρ2 k-Enf .
Lemma 16. Consider step τ = 〈C,M1〉 → 〈C2,M2〉 generated by k-Enf for
k ≥ 2. Consider step τ ′ = 〈C,M ′1〉 → 〈C ′2,M ′2〉 generated by 2-Enf .
If M1 =2 M
′
1, then C2 = C
′
2, M2 =2 M
′
2, and τ |0` = τ ′|0` , for all `.
Proof. By structural induction on C.
A.5 Other Enforcers
Strong Threat Model
Theorem 6. For a lattice L, for an enforcer E that satisfies (k−1)-BNI(L),
with k ≥ 2, and produces some k-precise k-varying label chains with elements
in L, and for an enforcer E ′ that produces (k − 1)-dependent label chains,
if E ≤k−1,Lc E ′, then E ′ does not satisfy (k − 1)-BNI(L).
Enforcer E and lattice L exist.
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Proof. First we prove that E and L exist. Lemma 17 gives that k-Eopt is an
enforcer, satisfies (k − 1)-BNI(Lk), and produces some k-precise k-varying
label chains with elements in Lk, which is defined in (31). So, L exists and
it can be Lk, and E exists and it can be k-Eopt .
Assume a lattice L and an enforcer E that satisfies (k − 1)-BNI(L) and
produces some k-precise k-varying label chains with elements in L:
Ω = 〈`1, `2, . . . , `k〉 and Ω′ = 〈`1, `2, . . . , `′k〉
with `k 6= `′k. Assume an enforcer E ′ that produces (k − 1)-dependent label
chains and E ≤k−1,Lc E ′.
We prove that E ′ does not satisfy (k − 1)-BNI(L). Assume for con-
tradiction that E ′ satisfies (k − 1)-BNI(L). We have that there are j, C,
and M |= H0(E,L, C) such that Ω is k-precise at the jth state of τ =
traceE(C,M). There exists a memory M1 such that M1 is conventionally ini-
tialized, M1 |= H0(E ′,L, C) holds, and ρ1(M,M1). Let τ1 = traceE′(C,M1).
By definition of k-precise and because E ≤k−1,Lc E ′ and E ′ satisfies (k − 1)-
BNI(L), we then get that τ1 produces Ω at the jth state. So, by definition,
1 ≤ j ≤ |τ1| and there exists w such that:
τ1[j − 1] = 〈w := e;Cr,Mw〉, τ1[j] = 〈Cr,Mr〉,
∀i: 1 ≤ i ≤ k: Mr(T i(w)) = `i.
Working similarly for Ω′, we get:
τ2[s− 1] = 〈w′ := e′;C ′r,M ′w〉, τ2[s] = 〈C ′r,M ′r〉,
∀i: 1 ≤ i < k: M ′r(T i(w′)) = `i, M ′r(T k(w′)) = `′k
for τ2 = traceE′(C
′,M2), conventionally initialized memory M2 with M2 |=
H0(E ′,L, C ′), and 1 ≤ s ≤ |τ2|. Because E ′ uses (k − 1)-dependent label
chains, there exists a function f such that:
Mr(T
k(w)) = f(Mr(T (w)), . . . ,Mr(T
k−1(w)))
M ′r(T
k(w′)) = f(M ′r(T (w
′)), . . . ,M ′r(T
k−1(w′))).
Because ∀i: 1 ≤ i < k: Mr(T i(w)) = M ′r(T i(w′)) = `i, we then have that
Mr(T
k(w)) = M ′r(T
k(w′)) holds. But Mr(T k(w)) = `k, M ′r(T
k(w′)) = `′k,
and `k 6= `′k give Mr(T k(w)) 6= M ′r(T k(w′)), which is a contradiction.
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Lemma 17. For k ≥ 2, k-Eopt is an enforcer, satisfies (k − 1)-BNI(Lk),
and produces k-precise k-varying label chains with elements in Lk, which is
defined in (31).
Proof. Lemma 12 gives that k-Eopt is an enforcer on R for k-BNI. Thus,
k-Eopt satisfies (k − 1)-BNI(Lk).
Lemma 18 gives the possible label chains that k-Eopt produces for each
zj in pgmk, which is defined below. Lemma 19 gives that these label chains
are k-precise. The last label chain in (Zk−1) is 〈`k−1, `k−1, . . . , `k−1,⊥〉 and
has length k. The penultimate label chain in (Zk) is 〈`k−1, `k−1, . . . , `k−1, `k〉
and has length k. The above two label chains take elements from Lk and
they are k-varying.
Definition of pgmk for k ≥ 2
Let pgmk be the following program:
if a1 > 0 then w1 := 0 else w1 := 1 end;
z1 := w1;
if a2 > 0 then w2 := z1 else w2 := 2 end;
z2 := w2;
. . .
if ak−1 > 0 then wk−1 := zk−2 else wk−1 := k − 1 end;
zk−1 := wk−1;
if ak > 0 then wk := zk−1 else wk := k end;
zk := wk;
where all wk and zk are flexible variables. Assume lattice Lk of labels such
that
`0 A `1 A `2 A . . . A `k A ⊥ (31)
Assume Lk consists only of ⊥, `j, for 0 ≤ j ≤ k. Assume pgmk is executed
with conventionally initialized memory M under k-Eopt, where M(T (aj)) =
`j, for 0 ≤ j ≤ k and k ≥ 2.
(Z1) After the execution of z1 := w1, this is the possible chain for z1:
T (z1) T
2(z1) . . . T
k(z1)
〈 `1 ⊥ . . . ⊥ 〉
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(Z2) After the execution of z2 := w2, these are the possible 2 chains for z2:
T (z2) T
2(z2) T
3(z2) . . .
〈 `1 `2 ⊥ . . . 〉 a2 > 0
〈 `2 `2 ⊥ . . . 〉 a2 6> 0
(Z3) After the execution of z3 := w3, these are the possible 3 chains for z3:
T (z3) T
2(z3) T
3(z3) T
4(z3) . . .
〈 `1 `2 `3 ⊥ . . . 〉 a2 > 0 ∧ a3 > 0
〈 `2 `2 `3 ⊥ . . . 〉 a2 6> 0 ∧ a3 > 0
〈 `3 `3 `3 ⊥ . . . 〉 a3 6> 0
. . .
(Zj) After the execution of zj := wj, these are the possible j chains for zj:
T T 2 T 3 . . . T j−1 T j T j+1. . .
〈`1 `2 `3 . . . `j−1 `j ⊥ . . . 〉 a2, a3, . . ., aj > 0
〈`2 `2 `3 . . . `j−1 `j ⊥ . . . 〉 a2 6> 0 ∧ a3, . . . , aj > 0
〈`3 `3 `3 . . . `j−1 `j ⊥ . . . 〉 a3 6> 0 ∧ a4, . . . , aj > 0
. . .
〈`j−1 `j−1 `j−1 . . . `j−1 `j ⊥ . . . 〉 aj−1 6> 0 ∧ aj > 0
〈`j `j `j . . . `j `j ⊥ . . . 〉 aj 6> 0
(Zk) After the execution of zk := wk, these are the possible k chains for zi:
T T 2 T 3 . . . T k−1T k
〈`1 `2 `3 . . . `k−1 `k〉 a2 > 0 ∧ a3 > 0 ∧ . . . ∧ aj > 0
〈`2 `2 `3 . . . `k−1 `k〉 a2 6> 0 ∧ a3 > 0 ∧ . . . ∧ ak > 0
〈`3 `3 `3 . . . `k−1 `k〉 a3 6> 0 ∧ . . . ∧ ak > 0
. . .
〈`k−1 `k−1 `k−1 . . . `k−1 `k〉 ak−1 6> 0 ∧ ak > 0
〈`k `k `k . . . `k `k〉 ak 6> 0
Lemma 18. The label chains presented after pgmk are the only possible
chains that k-Eopt produces for variables zj, where k ≥ 2 and 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
Proof. Induction on j.
Base case: j = 1.
When execution reaches C1:
if a1 > 0 then w1 := 0 else w1 := 1 end
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with a memory M ′, then isSimple(C1,M ′, 1) is always satisfied. Using IfS,
Exit IfS, and AsgnF rules, we get that z1 is always associated with: 〈`1,⊥, . . . ,⊥〉.
Induction case:
IH: chains presented after pgmk for zj−1, with j > 1, are the only possible
chains that k-Eopt produces for zj−1.
We prove that chains presented after pgmk are the only possible chains
that k-Eopt produces for zj. When execution reaches Cj:
if aj > 0 then wj := zj−1 else wj := j end
with some memory M ′, then using IH on zj−1 we get that isSimple(Cj,M ′, j)
is always satisfied. So, rules IfS and Exit IfS are used while executing Cj.
1. aj > 0
Assignment wj := zj−1 is executed. From IH, IfS and AsgnF, we have that
wj is associated after wj := zj−1 with one of the following j − 1 label
chains:
T T 2 T 3 . . . T j−1 T j T j+1 . . .
〈`1 `2 `3 . . . `j−1 `j `j . . . 〉 a2, a3, . . . ,
aj−1 > 0
〈`2 `2 `3 . . . `j−1 `j `j . . . 〉 a2 6> 0 ∧ a3, . . . ,
aj−1 > 0
〈`3 `3 `3 . . . `j−1 `j `j . . . 〉 a3 6> 0 ∧ a4, . . . ,
aj−1 > 0
. . .
〈`j−1 `j−1 `j−1 . . . `j−1 `j `j . . . 〉 aj−1 6> 0
From Exit IfS, we have that wj is associated at the end of Cj with one of
the following j − 1 label chains:
T T 2 T 3 . . . T j−1 T j T j+1 . . .
〈`1 `2 `3 . . . `j−1 `j ⊥ . . . 〉 a2, a3, . . . ,
aj−1 > 0
〈`2 `2 `3 . . . `j−1 `j ⊥ . . . 〉 a2 6> 0∧
a3, ..., aj−1>0
〈`3 `3 `3 . . . `j−1 `j ⊥ . . . 〉 a3 6> 0∧
a4, ..., aj−1>0
. . .
〈`j−1 `j−1 `j−1 . . . `j−1 `j ⊥ . . . 〉 aj−1 6> 0
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2. aj 6> 0
Assignment wj := j is executed. From IfS and AsgnF, we have that wj is
associated after wj := j with the following label chain:
T T 2 T 3 . . . T j−1 T j T j+1 . . .
〈 `j `j `j . . . `j `j `j . . . 〉
From Exit IfS, we have that wj is associated at the end of Cj with the
following label chain:
T T 2 T 3 . . . T j−1 T j T j+1 . . .
〈 `j `j `j . . . `j `j ⊥ . . . 〉
So, using AsgnF and the j above possible label chains produced for wj at the
end of Cj, we get that label chains presented after pgmk for zj are the only
possible label chains that k-Eopt produces for zj.
Lemma 19. The label chains produced by k-Eopt for each zj in pgmk are
k-precise, where k ≥ 2 and 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
Proof. Consider j such that 1 ≤ j ≤ k and k ≥ 2. We prove that the label
chains for zj produced by k-Eopt are k-precise. We use induction on the
number n of elements in these label chains, where 1 ≤ n ≤ k.
Base case: n = 1
We prove that the label chains produced by k-Eopt for zj are 1-precise.
Consider τ = tracek-Eopt(pgmk,M), where M is conventionally initialized
and M |= H0(k-Eopt ,Lk, pgmk). Then τ [s − 1] = 〈zj := wj;C,M0〉 and
τ [s] = 〈C,M1〉 for some 1 < s ≤ |τ |. Trace τ produces label chain Ω =
〈M1(T (zj)),M1(T 2(zj)), . . . ,M1(T k(zj))〉 at the sth state.
We prove that Ω is 1-precise. Ω may be one of the j possible label chains
in (Zj). So, the only possible labels for M1(T (zj)) are `1, `2, . . . , `j. Let
M1(T (zj)) = `i for 1 ≤ i ≤ j. Only the ith label chain in (Zj) has T (zj) = `i.
So, it should be the case that
M(ai) 6> 0,M(ai+1) > 0, . . .M(aj) > 0 if i 6= j
M(aj) 6> 0 if i = j
(32)
Consider an enforcer D that satisfies 0-BNI(Lk) and k-Eopt ≤0,Lkc D. Con-
sider memory M ′ with M ′ |= H0(D,Lk, pgmk), ρ1(M,M ′) and also τ ′ =
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traceD(pgmk,M
′). It should be the case that τ ′[s] = 〈C,M ′1〉, because other-
wise ∀` ∈ Lk: τ |0` E τ ′|0` (and k-Eopt ≤0,Lkc D) would not hold.
We prove M ′1(T (zj)) = M1(T (zj)) = `i. Assume for contradiction that
M ′1(T (zj)) 6= M1(T (zj)). Either M ′1(T (zj)) 6@ M1(T (zj)) or M ′1(T (zj)) @
M1(T (zj)) holds. FromM
′
1(T (zj)) 6@M1(T (zj)) andM ′1(T (zj)) 6= M1(T (zj)),
we get τ |0`i 6E τ ′|0`i , which implies that k-Eopt 6≤0,Lkc D, which is a contradic-
tion. Assume M ′1(T (zj)) @ M1(T (zj)). From M ′1(T (zj)) @ M1(T (zj)) and
M1(T (zj)) = `i, we then have M
′
1(T (zj)) @ `i. Let ` = M ′1(T (zj)). There
exists M ′′′ such that M ′′′ |= H0(k-Eopt ,Lk, pgmk) and
M and M ′′′ agree on everything except for ai > 0 (33)
So M ′′′ is conventionally initialized.
Let τ ′′′ = tracek-Eopt(pgmk,M
′′′). We have τ ′′′[s− 1] = 〈zj := wj;C,M ′′′0 〉
and τ ′′′[s] = 〈C,M ′′′1 〉. There exists M ′′ such that M ′′ |= H0(D,Lk, pgmk)
and ρ1(M
′′′,M ′′) hold.
Let τ ′′ = traceD(pgmk,M
′′). We should have τ ′′[s−1] = 〈zj := wj;C,M ′′0 〉
and τ ′′[s] = 〈C,M ′′1 〉, because otherwise ∀` ∈ Lk: τ ′′′|0` E τ ′′|0` (and k-Eopt ≤0,Lkc
D) would not hold.
Because M is conventionally initialized, and because we have ρ1(M,M
′),
ρ1(M
′′′,M ′′), and (33), we get that M ′ and M ′′ agree on everything except
for ai > 0. In particular, from ρ1(M,M
′) and (32) we get M ′(T (ai)) =
M(T (ai)) = `i and
M ′(ai) 6> 0,M ′(ai+1) > 0, . . .M ′(aj) > 0 if i 6= j
M ′(aj) 6> 0 if i = j
(34)
From (32), (33), and ρ1(M
′′′,M ′′), we get
M ′′(ai) > 0,M ′′(ai+1) > 0, . . .M ′′(aj) > 0 if i 6= j
M ′′(aj) > 0 if i = j
(35)
Because M ′ and M ′′ agree on everything except for ai and because we have
M ′(T (ai)) = `i 6v `, we get M ′|` = M ′′|`. So, based on pgmk, we get
M ′′1 (zj) < i and M
′
1(zj) = i for 1 ≤ i ≤ j. Thus, M ′1(zj) 6= M ′′1 (zj).
Because M ′1(T (zj)) = `, observation 〈zj,M ′1(zj)〉 appears in τ ′|0` . If
M ′′1 (zj) 6v `, then observation 〈zj,M ′′1 (zj)〉 does not appear in τ ′′|0` , and thus
D does not satisfy 0-BNI(Lk). If M ′′1 (zj) v `, then observation 〈zj,M ′′1 (zj)〉
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appears in τ ′′|0` . But because M ′1(zj) 6= M ′′1 (zj), D does not satisfy 0-
BNI(Lk). So, in any case D does not satisfy 0-BNI(Lk), which is a con-
tradiction. So, M ′1(T (zj)) = M1(T (zj)). Thus, the label chain produced by
k-Eopt for zj is 1-precise.
Induction case:
IH: The label chains for zj are n-precise, for 1 ≤ n < k.
We prove that the label chains for zj are (n+ 1)-precise.
If n + 1 ≥ j + 1, then T n+1(zj) = ⊥, and thus using IH we get that the
label chains for zj are (n+ 1)-precise.
Assume 1 ≤ n < j. Consider τ = tracek-Eopt(pgmk,M) for a con-
ventionally initialized memory M with M |= H0(k-Eopt ,Lk, pgmk). Then
τ [s− 1] = 〈zj := wj;C,M0〉 and τ [s] = 〈C,M1〉 for some 1 < s ≤ |τ |. Trace
τ produces label chain Ω = 〈M1(T (zj)),M1(T 2(zj)), . . . ,M1(T k(zj))〉 at the
sth state.
We prove that Ω is (n + 1)-precise. Ω may be one of the j possible
label chains in (Zj). So, we get M1(T
n+1(zj)) = `m, for 1 ≤ m ≤ j. Con-
sider an enforcer D that satisfies n-BNI(Lk) and k-Eopt ≤n,Lkc D. Assume
τ ′ = traceD(pgmk,M
′), for memory M ′ with M ′ |= H0(D,Lk, pgmk) and
ρ1(M,M
′). It should be the case that τ ′[s − 1] = 〈zj := wj;C,M ′0〉 and
τ ′[s] = 〈C,M ′1〉, because otherwise k-Eopt ≤n,Lkc D would not hold. From
IH, n-BNI(Lk, D), and k-Eopt ≤n,Lkc D we get that
∀t: 1 ≤ t ≤ n: M ′1(T t(zj)) = M1(T t(zj)). (36)
We prove M ′1(T
n+1(zj)) = M1(T
n+1(zj)). Assume for contradiction that
M ′1(T
n+1(zj)) 6= M1(T n+1(zj)). Either M ′1(T n+1(zj)) 6@ M1(T n+1(zj)) or
M ′1(T
n+1(zj)) @ M1(T n+1(zj)) holds. From M ′1(T n+1(zj)) 6@ M1(T n+1(zj))
and M ′1(T
n+1(zj)) 6= M1(T n+1(zj)), we get k-Eopt 6≤n,Lkc D, which is a con-
tradiction.
Assume M ′1(T
n+1(zj)) @ M1(T n+1(zj)). So M ′1(T n+1(zj)) @ `m. Let ` =
M ′1(T
n+1(zj)). There exists memoryMm such thatMm |= H0(k-Eopt ,Lk, pgmk)
and Mm = M [¬(M(am) > 0)], which denotes that Mm and M agree on ev-
erything expect for am > 0: (Mm(am) > 0) = ¬(M(am) > 0). So, Mm is
conventionally initialized.
Let τm = tracek-Eopt(pgmk,Mm). So, τm[s − 1] = 〈zj := wj;C,Mm0〉 and
τm[s] = 〈C,Mm1〉. From Lemma 20, we get
Mm1(T
n(zj)) 6= M1(T n(zj)). (37)
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There exists M ′′ with M ′′ |= H0(D,Lk, pgmk), ρ1(Mm,M ′′), and τ ′′ =
traceD(pgmk,M
′′). We should have τ ′′[s−1] = 〈zj := wj;C,M ′′0 〉 and τ ′′[s] =
〈C,M ′′1 〉, because otherwise ∀` ∈ Lk: τm|n` E τ ′′|n` (and k-Eopt ≤n,Lkc D)
would not hold. From ρ1(Mm,M
′′), ρ1(M,M ′), and Mm = M [¬(M(am) >
0)], and because M,Mm are conventionally initialized, we get that M
′ and
M ′′ agree on everything except for am: M ′(am > 0) = ¬M ′′(am > 0).
From ρ1(M,M
′) and M(T (am)) = `m, we get M ′(T (am)) = `m and then
M ′′(T (am)) = `m. From `m 6v `, we then get M ′|` = M ′′|`. By IH, n-
BNI(Lk, D), and k-Eopt ≤n,Lkc D we get M ′′1 (T n(zj)) = Mm1(T n(zj)). From
(36) and (37) we then get M ′1(T
n(zj)) 6= M ′′1 (T n(zj)).
Because M ′1(T
n+1(zj)) = `, observation 〈T n(zj),M ′1(T n(zj))〉 appears in
τ ′|n` . If M ′′1 (T n+1(zj)) 6v `, then observation 〈T n(zj),M ′′1 (T n(zj))〉 does not
appear in τ ′′|n` , and thus n-BNI(Lk, D) does not hold. If M ′′1 (T n+1(zj)) v `,
then observation 〈T n(zj),M ′′1 (T n(zj))〉 appears in τ ′′|n` . But because we have
M ′1(T
n(zj)) 6= M ′′1 (T n(zj)), n-BNI(Lk, D) does not hold. So, in any case
n-BNI(Lk, D) does not hold, which is a contradiction. So, M ′1(T n+1(zj)) =
M1(T
n+1(zj)). Thus, the label chains produced by k-Eopt for zj are (n+ 1)-
precise.
Lemma 20. Consider τ = tracek-Eopt(pgmk,M), where M is convention-
ally initialized, τ [s − 1] = 〈zj := wj;C,M0〉 and τ [s] = 〈C,M1〉. Assume
M1(T
n+1(zj)) = `m, with 1 ≤ n < j, 1 ≤ j ≤ k, and 1 ≤ m ≤ j. Then for
τ ′ = tracek-Eopt(pgmk,M
′) with M ′ = M [¬(M(am > 0))], τ ′[s − 1] = 〈zj :=
wj;C,M
′
0〉, and τ ′[s] = 〈C,M ′1〉,
we get M1(T
n(zj)) 6= M ′1(T n(zj)).
Proof. 1. M1(T (zj)) = `m
From (Zj) and M1(T
n+1(zj)) = `m, we then get that 2 ≤ n + 1 ≤ m. So,
1 ≤ n ≤ m − 1. Also, M1(T n(zj)) = `m. Such a label chain M1(Ωzj) for
zj is generated when M(am) 6> 0 ∧M(am+1) > 0 ∧ . . . ∧M(aj) > 0. So,
for M ′ we should have M ′(am) > 0 ∧M ′(am+1) > 0 ∧ . . . ∧M ′(aj) > 0,
because M ′ = M [¬(M(am > 0))]. Thus, M ′1(Ωzj) should be one of the
label chains that appear above M1(Ωzj) in (Zj). From 1 ≤ n ≤ m− 1, we
then have M ′1(T
n(zj)) 6= `m. So, M1(T n(zj)) 6= M ′1(T n(zj)).
2. M1(T (zj)) 6= `m
From (Zj) and M1(T
n+1(zj)) = `m, we then have M1(T
n(zj)) = `m−1 and
n = m − 1 (so m 6= 1). Also, M should have M ′(am) > 0 ∧M ′(aM+1) >
0 ∧ . . . ∧ M ′(aj) > 0. So, M ′ should have M ′(am) 6> 0 ∧ M ′(aM+1) >
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0 ∧ . . . ∧M ′(aj) > 0, because M ′ = M [¬(M(am > 0))]. Thus, M ′1(Ωzj)
is the mth label chain in (Zj). So, M
′
1(T
n(zj)) = M
′
1(T
m−1(zj)) = `m.
Thus, M1(T
n(zj)) 6= M ′1(T n(zj)).
Weakened Threat Model
Theorem 7. For an enforcer E and lattice L3, if GEa:=e is 1-dependent and
2-Enf ≤0,L3c E, then E does not satisfy 0-BNI(L3).
Proof. We have L = 〈{L,M,H},v〉 where L @ M @ H and ⊥ = L.
Consider program pgm:
wa := ma;
if mb > 0 then wb := mb else wb := h end;
if l > 1 then wc := wa else wc := wb end;
w := wc;
m := w;
l := 1
where l,ma,mb,m, h are anchor variables with T (l) = L, T (ma) = T (mb) =
T (m) = M, and T (h) = H, and w,wa, wb, wc are flexible variables.
2-Enf produces the following labels when executes pgm with a conven-
tionally initialized memory:
mb > 0 mb 6> 0
l > 1
wa : 〈M, L〉
wb : 〈M,M〉
w : 〈M, L〉
wa : 〈M, L〉
wb : 〈H,M〉
w : 〈M, L〉
l 6> 1
wa : 〈M, L〉
wb : 〈M,M〉
w : 〈M,M〉
wa : 〈M, L〉
wb : 〈H,M〉
w : 〈H,M〉
We first prove that, for all executions, T (w) produced by 2-Enf is 1-
precise.
Consider τ = trace2-Enf (pgm,M), where M is conventionally initialized and
M |= H0(2-Enf ,L, pgm). There exists s such that τ [s−1] = 〈w := wc;Cr,Mw〉
and τ [s] = 〈Cr,Mr〉.
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We prove that Mr(T (w)) is 1-precise. Consider E
′ an enforcer that sat-
isfies 0-BNI(L) and 2-E ≤0,Lc E ′. Assume τ ′ = traceE′(pgm,M ′) where
M ′ |= H0(E ′,L, pgm) and
ρ1(M,M
′). (38)
From 2-Enf ≤0,Lc E ′, we get ∀` ∈ L: τ |0` E τ ′|0` . So, it should be the case that
τ ′[s − 1] = 〈w := wc;Cr,M ′w〉 and τ ′[s] = 〈Cr,M ′r〉. We prove M ′r(T (w)) =
Mr(T (w)).
1. M(l) 6> 1 and M(mb) > 0 (a1)
We have Mr(T (w)) = M. We prove M
′
r(T (w)) = M. It should be the case
that M ′r(T (w)) v M, because otherwise τ |0M E τ ′|0M would not hold, since
observation 〈w,Mr(w)〉 would belong to τ |0M, but no observation involving
w would belong to τ ′|0M.
Assume for contradiction that M ′r(T (w)) @ M. So, M ′r(T (w)) = L. From
(38) and (a1), we get
M ′(l) 6> 1 and M ′(mb) > 0 (39)
There exists a memory M ′′ such that M ′′ |= H0(E ′,L, pgm) and:
M ′|L = M ′′|L, (40)
M ′′(mb) 6> 0, (41)
M ′(mb) 6= M ′′(h) (42)
Let τ ′′ = traceE′(pgm,M ′′). From (40) and because T (l) = L, we get
M ′(l) = M ′′(l). (43)
From M ′(l) 6> 1, we then get
M ′′(l) 6> 1. (44)
If M ′′r (T (w)) 6= L, then E ′ does not satisfy 0-BNI(L), because (40) and
M ′r(T (w)) = L, and thus, observation 〈w,M ′r(w)〉 is included in τ ′|0L but no
observation involving w is included in τ ′′|0L. So, M ′′r (T (w)) = L. Because
E ′ is an enforcer and due to (44), (39), and (41), we have:
M ′r(w) = M
′
r(wc) = M
′
r(wb) = M
′(mb) and
M ′′r (w) = M
′′
r (wc) = M
′′
r (wb) = M
′′(h).
82
From (42), we then have M ′r(w) 6= M ′′r (w). So, E ′ does not satisfy 0-BNI
given (40), because τ ′|0L includes observation 〈w,M ′r(w)〉, τ ′′|0L includes
observation 〈w,M ′′r (w)〉, andM ′r(w) 6= M ′′r (w). But this is a contradiction.
Thus, M ′r(T (w)) = M.
2. M(l) 6> 1 and M(mb) 6> 0 (a2)
We have Mr(T (w)) = H. We prove that M
′
r(T (w)) = H. If M
′
r(T (w)) =
L, then we follow the arguments of the above case, where (39) would
be M ′(mb) 6> 0 and (41) would be M ′′(mb) > 0, and we are lead to a
contradiction.
Assume for contradiction that M ′r(T (w)) = M. There exists M
′′ such that
M ′′ |= H0(E ′,L, pgm) and
M ′|M = M ′′|M, (45)
M ′(h) 6= M ′′(h). (46)
Let τ ′′ = traceE′(pgm,M ′′). From (45), we get
M ′(l) = M ′′(l), (47)
M ′(mb) = M ′′(mb). (48)
From (38), (a2), (47), and (48), we get
M ′(l) 6> 1,M ′′(l) 6> 1,M ′(mb) 6> 0, and M ′′(mb) 6> 0. (49)
It should be the case that M ′′r (T (w)) = M, because otherwise E
′ would
not satisfy 0-BNI(L), which is a contradiction. Because E ′ is an enforcer
and due to (49), we have:
M ′r(w) = M
′
r(wc) = M
′
r(wb) = M
′(h) and
M ′′r (w) = M
′′
r (wc) = M
′′
r (wb) = M
′′(h).
From (46), we then have M ′r(w) 6= M ′′r (w). So, given (45), E ′ does not
satisfy 0-BNI(L), which is a contradiction. Thus, M ′r(T (w)) = H.
3. M(l) > 1 (a3)
We have Mr(T (w)) = M. We prove that M
′
r(T (w)) = M. It should be the
case that M ′r(T (w)) v M, because otherwise τ |0M E τ ′|0M would not hold.
Assume for contradiction that M ′r(T (w)) @ M. So, M ′r(T (w)) = L. There
exists M ′′ such that
M ′|L = M ′′|L, (50)
M ′(ma) 6= M ′′(ma) (51)
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Let τ ′′ = traceE′(C,M ′′). From (50), we get
M ′(l) = M ′′(l). (52)
From (38) and (a3), we then have
M ′(l) > 1 and M ′′(l) > 1. (53)
If M ′′(T (w)) 6= L, then E ′ does not satisfy 0-BNI(L), which is a contra-
diction.
Assume M ′′(T (w)) = L. Because E ′ is an enforcer and due to (53), we
have
M ′r(w) = M
′
r(wc) = M
′
r(wa) = M
′(ma) and
M ′′r (w) = M
′′
r (wc) = M
′′
r (wa) = M
′′(ma).
From (51), we have M ′r(w) 6= M ′′r (w). So, given (50), E ′ does not satisfy
0-BNI(L), which is a contradiction. Thus, M ′r(T (w)) = M.
So, for all executions, T (w) produced by 2-Enf is 1-precise.
Consider an enforcer E that uses 1-dependent GEa:=e and 2-Enf ≤0,Lc E.
We prove that E does not satisfy 0-BNI(L). Assume for contradiction that
E satisfies 0-BNI(L). We examine whether E decides to block the execution
of pgm for the following exhaustive list of cases: l > 1, l 6> 1 ∧mb > 0, and
l 6> 1 ∧mb 6> 0. From that, we will show that E does not satisfy 0-BNI(L),
which is a contradiction.
1. l > 1:
There exists a conventionally initialized memory M with
M |= H0(2-Enf ,L, pgm) and M(l) > 1.
Let τ ′ = trace2-Enf (pgm,M). There exists memory M1 such that M1 |=
H0(E,L, pgm), ρ1(M,M1), and τ1 = traceE(pgm,M1). Because 2-Enf ≤0,Lc
E, we have ∀` ∈ L: τ ′|0` E τ1|0` . From ρ1(M,M1), we have
M1(l) > 1. (54)
Because M(l) > 1, enforcer 2-Enf executes l := 1, and thus, 〈l, 1〉 ∈ τ ′|0L.
From ∀`: τ ′|0` E τ1|0` , we then get 〈l, 1〉 ∈ τ1|0L. Thus, 〈l := 1,Mr〉 →
〈stop,Ms〉 should be a subtrace of τ1. Thus, we have
Mr(G
E
l:=1) = true. (55)
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Because pgm is an anchor-tailed command, we can have Vl:=1 = {l,m,w}.
Because E uses 1-dependent GEl:=1, we get that
Mr(G
E
l:=1) = f(Mr(T (l)),Mr(T (m)),Mr(T (w))). (56)
Because, for all executions, T (w) produced by 2-Enf is 1-precise, and
because 2-Enf ≤0,Lc E, E satisfies 0-BNI(L), and ρ1(M,M1), we get
Mr(T (l)) = L,Mr(T (m)) = M,Mr(T (w)) = M. (57)
From (55) and (56), we then get
f(L,M,M) = true. (58)
2. l 6> 1 and mb > 0:
There exists a conventionally initialized memory M ′ with
M ′ |= H0(2-Enf ,L, pgm) M ′(l) 6> 1 and M ′(mb) > 0.
Let τ ′ = trace2-Enf (pgm,M ′). There existsM2 such thatM2 |= H0(E,L, pgm),
ρ1(M
′,M2), and τ2 = traceE(pgm,M2). Because 2-Enf ≤0,Lc E, we have
that ∀` ∈ L: τ ′|0` E τ2|0` . From ρ1(M ′,M2), we have
M2(l) 6> 1 ∧ M2(mb) > 0. (59)
Because M ′(l) 6> 1, and M ′(mb) > 0, enforcer 2-Enf executes m := w,
and thus, 〈m, ν〉 ∈ τ ′|0M. From ∀`: τ ′|0` E τ2|0` , we then get 〈m, ν〉 ∈ τ2|0M.
Thus, 〈m := w; l := 1,Mm〉 → 〈l := 1,Mr〉 should be a subtrace of τ2.
Because pgm is an anchor-tailed command, we can have Vl:=1 = {l,m,w}.
Because E uses 1-dependent GEl:=1, we get that
Mr(G
E
l:=1) = f(Mr(T (l)),Mr(T (m)),Mr(T (w))). (60)
Because, for all executions, T (w) produced by 2-Enf is 1-precise, and
because 2-Enf ≤0,Lc E, E satisfies 0-BNI(L), and ρ1(M ′,M2), we get
Mr(T (l)) = L,Mr(T (m)) = M,Mr(T (w)) = M. (61)
So, Mr(G
E
l:=1) = f(L,M,M) = true, due to (58). So, E executes l := 1,
and thus, 〈l, 1〉 ∈ τ2|0L. (c1)
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3. l 6> 1 and mb 6> 0:
There exists a conventionally initialized memory M ′′ with
M ′′ |= H0(2-Enf ,L, pgm), dom(M ′′) = dom(M ′), M ′|L = M ′′|L, M ′′(l) 6>
1, and M ′′(mb) 6> 0.
Let τ ′′ = trace2-Enf (pgm,M ′′). There existsM3 such thatM3 |= H0(E,L, pgm),
ρ1(M
′′,M3), and τ3 = traceE(pgm,M3). Because 2-Enf ≤0,Lc E, we have
that ∀` ∈ L: τ ′′|0` E τ3|0` . From ρ1(M ′′,M3), we have
M3(l) 6> 1 ∧ M3(mb) 6> 0. (62)
From dom(M ′′) = dom(M ′), M ′|L = M ′′|L, ρ1(M ′′,M3), c(M ′′), ρ1(M ′,M2),
c(M ′), we then get M2|L = M3|L. Enforcer 2-Enf executes w := wc, and
thus, 〈w, ν〉 ∈ τ ′′|0H. From ∀`: τ ′′|0` E τ3|0` , we then get 〈w, ν〉 ∈ τ3|0H.
Thus, 〈w := wc;m := w; l := 1,Mw〉 → 〈m := w; l := 1,Mm〉 should be a
subtrace of τ3. We examine two cases: τ3 either executes m := w or not.
3.1. τ3 does not execute m := w.
So, l := 1 is not executed either. (c2)
Thus, τ2|0L 6= τ3|0L, due to (c1) and (c2).
From M2|L = M3|L, we then get that E does not satisfy 0-BNI(L).
3.2. τ3 executes m := w.
Then h is leaked tom. There existsM4 such thatM4 |= H0(E,L, pgm)
and
M3|M = M4|M, (63)
M3(h) 6= M4(h). (64)
From (63) and (62), we get
M3(l) = M4(l) 6> 1, (65)
M3(mb) = M4(mb) 6> 0. (66)
Let τ4 = traceE(pgm,M4). If τ4 does not execute m := w, then
τ3|M 6= τ4|M. If τ4 executes m := w, then (64) implies τ3|M 6= τ4|M,
because in both traces τ3 and τ4 the value of m equals the value of
h. So, in both cases, E does not satisfy 0-BNI(L).
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(AsgnA)
v = M(e) Ga:=e ` = M(bccc) unionsqM(bc)
〈a := e,M〉 → 〈stop,M [a 7→ v, bc 7→ `]〉
(AsgnAFail)
v = M(e) ¬Ga:=e ` = M(bccc) unionsqM(bc)
〈a := e,M〉 → 〈block,M [bc 7→ `]〉
(AsgnF)
ν0 = M(e) ν1 = M(T (e)) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc)
〈w := e,M〉 → 〈stop,M [w 7→ ν0, T (w) 7→ ν1]〉
U(M,W ) ,M [ ∀w∈W : T (w) 7→ T (w) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc)]
Figure 11: Modified rules for EH,L
Familiar Two-level Lattice
Theorem 8. Enforcer EH,L uses 1-dependent Ga:=e, satisfies 0-BNI(L2), and
satisfies 2-Enf <0,L2c EH,L.
Proof. Lemma 24 gives that EH,L is an enforcer and uses 1-dependent Ga:=e.
Lemma 21 gives that EH,L satisfies 0-BNI(L2). Lemma 22 gives that 2-Enf <0,L2c
EH,L holds.
Lemma 21. EH,L satisfies 0-BNI(L2).
Proof. We retrieve EH,L from ∞-Enf by replacing rules for assignments and
function U used in exit with the corresponding definitions in Figure 11.
Because BNI+(∞-Enf ,L2,C) holds, then BNI+(EH,L,L2,C) holds where C
is any command different from assignment and exit, provided all Lemmata
used to prove Lemma 1 hold for rules in Figure 11. In particular, Lemmata
2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 5, and 6 still hold. Now, it suffices to prove BNI+(EH,L,L2,C)
where C is an assignment or exit.
For EH,L, the domain of memories contain only variables and tags of
these variables. So, in the definition of BNI+, projections M |` and τ |k` equal
projection M |0` and τ |0` , correspondingly. Also, mon(M) is trivially true for
any such memory So, the definition on BNI+ becomes: For all ` ∈ L2,M,M ′
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if
M |0` = M ′|0` ,
M(cc) = M ′(cc)
τ = traceEH,L(C,M) = 〈C,M〉 ∗→ 〈Ct,Mt〉,
τ ′ = traceEH,L(C,M
′) = 〈C,M ′〉 ∗→ 〈C ′t,M ′t〉
where Ct and C
′
t are terminations (i.e., stop or block), then:
c1 If Ct and C
′
t are both stop, then τ |0` =obs τ ′|0` , Mt|0` = M ′t|0` , and Mt(cc) =
M ′t(cc).
c2 If Ct or C
′
t is block, then τ |0` =obs τ ′|0` .
c3 If Ct is stop, C
′
t is block, and M
′
t(bc) 6v `, then Mt(bc) 6v `.
c4 If Ct is stop, C
′
t is block, 〈C ′tp,M ′tp〉 → 〈C ′t,M ′t〉 are the last two states
of τ ′, and M ′tp(bccc) v `, then there exists 〈C ′′,M ′′〉 ∈ τ , with C ′′ = C ′tp
and M ′′|` = M ′tp|`.
Because ` ∈ L2,we have that ` is either L or H. If ` = H, then BNI+ is
trivially satisfied, because hypothesis M |0` = M ′|0` implies M = M ′. Thus,
we prove BNI+ for
` = L. (67)
1. C is a := e:
We prove that M(T (a)) = M ′(T (a)). If M(T (a)) = L, then M |` = M ′|`
gives M ′(T (a)) = L. If M(T (a)) = H, then M |` = M ′|` gives M ′(T (a)) =
H. So, M(T (a)) = M ′(T (a)).
1.1. M(T (a)) v `
We first prove that the command is executed normally in both memo-
ries or blocked in both memories. W.l.o.g, assume that the command
is executed normally in M . That is, M(T (e)) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc) v
M(T (a)) holds. This implies that M(T (e)) v `, M(bccc) v `, and
M(bc) v `. Because M |` = M ′|`, we get M(cc) = M ′(cc) and
M(bc) = M ′(bc). From M(T (e)) v ` and M |` = M ′|`, we then get
M ′(T (e)) v `. From (67), we then have M(T (e)) = M ′(T (e)) = L.
Thus, M ′(T (e)) unionsqM ′(bccc) unionsqM ′(bc) v M ′(T (a)) holds. So, in both
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cases the command is executed normally. Thus, the command is ex-
ecuted normally in both memories or blocked in both memories. So,
c3 and c4 are trivially true.
1.1.1. The command is executed normally in both memories.
c2 is trivially true.
We prove c1. We have:
τ = 〈a := e,M〉 → 〈stop,M [a 7→M(e), bc 7→ `g]〉
τ ′ = 〈a := e,M′〉 → 〈stop,M ′[a 7→M ′(e), bc 7→ `′g]〉,
where `g = M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) and `′g = M ′(bccc) unionsqM ′(bc). We
have τ |` = τ ′|` = 〈a,M(e)〉, because M(e) = M ′(e). Also,
`g = `
′
g. So, Mt(bc) = M
′
t(bc). Because Mt(cc) = M(cc) =
M ′(cc) = M ′t(cc), Mt(cc) = M
′
t(cc) holds. Because Mt(a) =
M ′t(a), Mt(bc) = M
′
t(bc), and Mt(cc) = M
′
t(cc), we get Mt|` =
M ′t|`. Thus c1 holds.
1.1.2. The command is blocked in both memories.
τ = 〈a := e,M〉 → 〈block,M [bc 7→ `g]〉
τ ′ = 〈a := e,M′〉 → 〈block,M ′[bc 7→ `′g]〉.
So, τ |` =obs  and τ ′|` =obs . Thus c2 holds. c1 is trivially
true.
1.2. M(T (a)) 6v `
We have τ |` =obs  and τ ′|` =obs . Thus c2 holds.
We prove c1. Assume Ct = C
′
t = stop. BecauseM(T (a)),M
′(T (a)) 6v
`, Mt and M
′
t do not need to agree on a. Assume Mt(bc) v `. So,
M(T 2(e)) unionsqM(bccc) unionsqM(bc) v `. Thus, M(T 2(e)) v `, M(bccc) v
`, and M(bc) v `. From mon(M ) and M(T 2(e)) v `, we get
M(T 3(e)) v `. From M |` = M ′|`, M(T 3(e)) v `, M(bccc) v
`, M(bc) v `, and Lemma 5, we get: M(T 2(e)) = M ′(T 2(e)),
M(bccc) = M ′(bccc), and M(bc) = M ′(bc). So, Mt(bc) = M ′t(bc).
From M(cc) = M ′(cc), we get M(cc) = M ′(cc). From Mt(cc) =
M(cc) and M ′t(cc) = M
′(cc), we then get Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc). Thus,
Mt|` = M ′t|` and Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc). Thus c1 holds.
We prove c3. Assume Ct is stop, C
′
t is block, and M
′
t(bc) 6v `. We
prove Mt(bc) 6v `. We prove the contrapositive. Assume Mt(bc) v `,
then following the same arguments as above, we getMt(bc) = M
′
t(bc),
and thus, M ′t(bc) v `, as wanted.
We prove c4. Assume Ct is stop, C
′
t is block, 〈C ′tp,M ′tp〉 → 〈C ′t,M ′t〉
are the last two states of τ ′, and M ′tp(bccc) v `. So, M ′tp = M ′ and
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C ′tp = a := e. We have that 〈C ′′,M ′′〉 = 〈a := e,M〉, which satisfies
C ′′ = C ′tp and M
′′|` = M ′tp|`. Thus c4 holds.
2. C is w := e
τ = 〈w := e,M〉 → 〈stop,Mt〉
τ ′ = 〈w := e,M ′〉 → 〈stop,M ′t〉
c2, c3, and c4 are trivially true.
We prove c1. Mt(cc) = M
′
t(cc) holds due to M(cc) = M
′(cc), Mt(cc) =
M(cc), and M ′t(cc) = M
′(cc).
2.1. Mt(T (w)) v `
Then M(T (e)) v `, M(bccc) v `, and M(bc) v `. From, M |` =
M ′|` and (67), we then get M(e) = M ′(e), M(T (e)) = M ′(T (e)),
M(cc) = M ′(cc), and M(bc) = M ′(bc). So, Mt(w) = M ′t(w) and
Mt(T (w)) = M
′
t(T (w)). Thus, Mt|` = M ′t|` and τ |` = τ ′|`. Thus c1
holds.
2.2. Mt(T (w)) 6v `
By symmetry of preceding case, M ′t(T (w)) 6v `. So, τ |` =obs  and
τ ′|` =obs . Also Mt|` = M ′t|`. Thus c1 holds.
3. exit
τ = 〈exit,M〉 → 〈stop,Mt〉
τ ′ = 〈exit,M ′〉 → 〈stop,M ′t〉.
c2, c3, c4 are trivially true.
We prove c1. We have τ |` =obs  and τ ′|` =obs . So, we need to prove
Mt|` = Mt|` and Mt(cc) = M ′t(cc). From M(cc) = M ′(cc), we get
M(cc) = M ′(cc). BecauseMt(cc) = M(cc).pop andM ′t(cc) = M
′(cc).pop,
we then get Mt(cc) = M
′
t(cc). We now prove Mt|` = Mt|`.
3.1. Mt(bccc) unionsqMt(bc) 6v ` and M(cc).top.A 6= ∅.
Because M(cc).top.A 6= ∅, we have Mt(bc) = M(bc) unionsqM(bccc). We
have Mt(bccc) v M(bccc). We get Mt(bccc) unionsq M(bc) v M(bccc) unionsq
M(bc), which becomes Mt(bccc) unionsq M(bc) unionsq M(bccc) v M(bccc) unionsq
M(bc)unionsqM(bccc), which becomes Mt(bccc)unionsqMt(bc) vM(bccc)unionsqM(bc).
So, M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) 6v `. So, Mt(bc) 6v `. Because M |` = M ′|`, we
also get M ′(bccc) unionsqM ′(bc) 6v `.
M(cc).top.A 6= ∅ and M(cc) = M ′(cc) give M ′(cc).top.A 6= ∅, too.
So, M ′t(bc) = M
′(bc) unionsqM ′(bccc). Thus, M ′t(bc) 6v `.
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From Mt(bc) 6v ` and M ′t(bc) 6v `, we get Mt(bccc) unionsqMt(bc) 6v ` and
M ′t(bccc) unionsqM ′t(bc) 6v `.
Only variables in W change their labels. Let x ∈ M(cc).top.W .
Because M(bccc) unionsq M(bc) 6v `, we have Mt(T (x)) 6v `. Because
M(cc) = M ′(cc), we get x ∈M ′(cc).top.W , too. Because M ′(bccc) unionsq
M ′(bc) 6v `, we have M ′t(T (x)) 6v `. So, Mt|` = M ′t|`. Thus c1 holds.
3.2. Mt(bccc) unionsqMt(bc) 6v ` and M(cc).top.A = ∅.
Because M(cc).top.A = ∅, we have Mt(bc) = M(bc). We have
Mt(bccc) v M(bccc). We get Mt(bccc) unionsqM(bc) v M(bccc) unionsqM(bc),
which becomes Mt(bccc) unionsqMt(bc) vM(bccc) unionsqM(bc). So, M(bccc) unionsq
M(bc) 6v `. Because M |` = M ′|`, we also get M ′(bccc) unionsqM ′(bc) 6v `.
M(cc).top.A = ∅ and M(cc) = M ′(cc) give M ′(cc).top.A = ∅. So,
M ′t(bc) = M
′(bc).
Assume Mt(bc) v `. Then M(bc) v `. From M |` = M ′|`, we then
get M(bc) = M ′(bc). Thus, Mt(bc) = M ′t(bc).
We prove M ′t(bccc) unionsq M ′t(bc) 6v `. Assume for contradiction that
M ′t(bccc) unionsqM ′t(bc) v `. Then M ′t(bc) v `. Following the same argu-
ments as above, we get Mt(bc) = M
′
t(bc). Because Mt(cc) = M
′
t(cc),
we then get Mt(bc) unionsqMt(cc) = M ′t(bc) unionsqM ′t(cc), which is a contra-
diction. So, M ′t(bccc) unionsqM ′t(bc) 6v `.
Only variables in V change their labels. Let x ∈ M(cc).top.W . Be-
cause M(bccc)unionsqM(bc) 6v `, we have Mt(T (x)) 6v `. Because M(cc) =
M ′(cc), we get x ∈M ′(cc).top.W , too. Because M ′(bccc)unionsqM ′(bc) 6v
`, we have M ′t(T (x)) 6v `. So, Mt|` = M ′t|`. Thus c1 holds.
3.3. Mt(bccc) unionsqMt(bc) v `
So, Mt(bc) v `. From Lemma 7, we get M(bc) v `. From M |` = M ′|`
and M(bc) v `, we also get M(bc) = M ′(bc). From M(cc) = M ′(cc),
we then get Mt(bc) = M
′
t(bc).
 Let M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) v `.
Let x ∈M(cc).top.W . Because M(cc) = M ′(cc), we get
x ∈M ′(cc).top.W . We have:
Mt(T (x)) v `⇒M(T (x)) v `⇒M(x) = M ′(x) andM ′(T (x)) v
`.
Because M(cc) = M ′(cc) and M(bc) = M ′(bc), we then have
Mt(x) = M
′
t(x) and M
′
t(T (x)) v `. Thus, Mt|` = M ′t|`. Thus c1
holds.
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 Let M(bccc) unionsqM(bc) 6v `.
So, M ′(bccc)unionsqM ′(bc) 6v `. Let x ∈M(cc).top.W . So, Mt(T (x)) 6v
`. Because M(cc) = M ′(cc), we get x ∈M ′(cc).top.V , and thus
M ′t(T (x)) 6v `. Thus, Mt|` = M ′t|`. Thus c1 holds.
Case 4.3.2. in the proof of Lemma 1 mentions AsgnA.
We reexamine this case when rule AsgnA in Figure 11 is instead used:
– Mtp(bc) v ` and Mtp(cc) v `
From IH[c4] on C1, there exists 〈C1tp,M ′1〉 ∈ τ ′1 such that Mtp|` = M ′1|`.
So, Mtp(bc) = M
′
1(bc) and Mtp(cc) = M
′
1(cc). Because τ1 is blocked, we
have Mtp(T (e))unionsqMtp(bccc)unionsqMtp(bc) 6vMtp(T (a)). Since the inequality
is satisfied in τ ′1, it means that the value of T (e) is different in M
′
1 and
Mtp. But this contradicts Mtp|` = M ′1|`. Indeed, Mtp|` = M ′1|` implies
that M ′1(T (e)) and Mtp(T (e)) should either be both L or both H. Thus,
this case is no longer possible once a two-level lattice is considered.
Thus, BNI+(EH,L,L2,C) holds. BNI+ implies 0-BNI. So, EH,L satisfies 0-
BNI.
Lemma 22. 2-Enf <0,L2c EH,L
Proof. We first prove 2-Enf ≤0,L2c EH,L. Consider conventionally initial-
ized memory M with M |= H0(2-Enf ,L2, C). Consider memory M ′ with
M ′ |= H0(EH,L,L2, C) and ρ1(M,M ′). Assume τ ′ = traceEH,L(C,M ′) and
τ = trace2-Enf (C,M). By definition, we have M
′(cc) = M(cc) =  and
M ′(bc) = M(bc) = ⊥.
We write M ′ ve M iff
1. ∀x: M ′(x) = M(x),
2. ∀a: M ′(T (a)) = M(T (a)),
3. ∀w: M ′(T (w)) vM(T (w)),
4. M ′(bc) vM(bc),
5. ∀i ≥ 0: M ′(bcc.popic) vM(bcc.popic) ∧
M ′(cc.popi.top.A) = M(cc.popi.top.A) ∧
M ′(cc.popi.top.W ) = M(cc.popi.top.W )
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where cc.popi pops the top i elements from cc and cc.pop0 = cc.
So, M ′ ve M holds. By induction on the number of steps in τ and Lemma
23, we get that ∀` ∈ L2: τ |0` E τ ′|0` . So, 2-Enf ≤0,L2c EH,L.
Now, we prove EH,L 6≤0,L2c 2-Enf . Consider program pgm:
if h > 0
w := h
else
w := l
end;
h := w;
l := 1
For every execution under 2-Enf we have:
 w is associated with 〈H,H〉,
 bc is H when reaching l := 1,
 so l := 1 is blocked.
For every execution under EH,L we have:
 w is associated with H,
 bc is L when reaching l := 1,
 so l := 1 is allowed.
Thus, EH,L produces observation 〈l, 1〉, but 2-Enf does not. So, EH,L 6≤0,L2c
2-Enf . From 2-Enf ≤0,L2c EH,L, we then have 2-Enf <0,L2c EH,L. Notice that
the same program pgm works for 2-Eopt, too. And thus we get 2-Eopt <0,L2c
EH,L.
Lemma 23. If 〈C1,M1〉 → 〈C2,M2〉 under 2-Enf , and 〈C1,M ′1〉 → 〈C ′2,M ′2〉
under EH,L, and M
′
1 ve M1, then C2 = C ′2 and M ′2 ve M2 hold or C2 = block
holds.
Proof. We use induction on C1. Assume C2 6= block. We prove C2 = C ′2
and M ′2 ve M2.
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1. C1 is a := e.
We have C2 = stop. Then M1(T (e)) unionsqM1(bccc) unionsqM1(bc) v M1(T (a))
holds. Due to M ′1 ve M1, we then get M ′1(T (e)) unionsqM ′1(bccc) unionsqM ′1(bc) v
M ′1(T (a)). So, C
′
2 = stop. Also, M2(a) = M1(e) = M
′
1(e) = M
′
2(a).
Because M ′2(bc) = M
′
1(bccc)unionsqM ′1(bc) and M2(bc) = M1(T (e))unionsqM1(bccc)unionsq
M1(bc), hypothesis M
′
1 ve M1 gives M ′2(bc) vM2(bc). So, M ′2 ve M2.
2. C1 is w := e.
We have C2 = C
′
2 = stop. Hypothesis M
′
1 ve M1 implies M1(e) = M ′1(e),
and thus, M2(w) = M
′
2(w). Because M
′
2(T (w)) = M
′
1(T (e)) unionsqM ′1(bccc) unionsq
M ′1(bc) and M2(T (w)) = M1(T (e))unionsqM1(bccc)unionsqM1(bc), hypothesis M ′1 ve
M1 gives M
′
2(T (w)) vM2(T (w)). So, M ′2 ve M2.
3. C1 is exit
We have C2 = C
′
2 = stop. Because M2(cc) = M1(cc).pop and M
′
2(cc) =
M ′1(cc).pop, hypothesis M
′
1 ve M1 gives ∀i: M ′2(bcc.popic) vM2(bcc.popic).
Hypothesis M ′1 ve M1 also gives M ′1(cc) v M1(cc), M ′1(cc.top.A) =
M1(cc.top.A), and M
′
1(bc) v M1(bc), and thus, we get M ′2(bc) v M2(bc).
From M ′1 ve M1, we also get M ′1(cc.top.W ) = M1(cc.top.W ). Because,
for all w ∈ W , we have M ′2(T (w)) = M ′1(T (w)) unionsqM ′1(bccc) unionsqM ′1(bc) and
M2(T (w)) = M1(T (w)) unionsqM1(bccc) unionsqM1(bc), hypothesis M ′1 ve M1 gives
M ′2(T (w)) vM2(T (w)). So, M ′2 ve M2.
2-Enf and EH,L use the same rules for other commands, so M
′
2 ve M2 follows
easily.
Lemma 24. EH,L is an enforcer and uses 1-dependent Ga:=e.
Proof. It is easy to prove that EH,L is an enforcer on R and satisfies restric-
tions (E1), (E2), and (E3) by induction on the operational semantics rules.
We omit the details.
We now prove that EH,L uses 1-dependent Ga:=e. Consider an assignment
a := e in an anchor-tailed command C;C ′, where C does not involve any
assignment to anchor variable and C ′ is a sequence of assignments to anchor
variables. From rule (AsgnA) of EH,L we get that Ga:=e is M(T (e))unionsqM(bccc)unionsq
M(bc) v M(T (a)). Because a := e is in an anchor-tailed command, we get
that a := e is not encapsulated in any conditional command. So, M(cc) = .
Because C does not involve any assignment to anchor variable, bc is ⊥ when
execution reaches C ′. While executing C ′, cc remains , and thus, from rule
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(AsgnA) of EH,L, we get that bc remains ⊥. So, M(bc) = ⊥. Thus, Ga:=e is
M(T (e)) vM(T (a)). So, EH,L uses 1-dependent Ga:=e.
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